Greene v. Georgetown County School District

Filing 33

OPINION AND ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge accurately summarized the facts and evidence of record and applied the correct principles of law, and the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff' s objections. Therefore, the Court adopts and specifically incorporates the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 30); overrules Plaintiff's objections (ECF No. 31);and grants Defendants motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24), thereby dismissing this action. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 09/16/2022. (apsn)

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

Aisha T. Greene,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Georgetown County School District,
)
Georgetown County, South Carolina,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________)

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-00279-BHH
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff Aisha T. Greene (“Plaintiff”) complaint
against Defendant Georgetown County School District (“Defendant”), alleging employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e),
et seq. (“Title VII”). On November 15, 2021, Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 24.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion, and Defendant
filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 25 & 26.)
On July 12, 2022, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., United States Magistrate Judge Molly H. Cherry issued
a Report and Recommendation (“Report”), outlining the issues and recommending that the
Court grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff filed
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, and Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s
objections. (ECF Nos. 31 & 32.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules
Plaintiff’s objections, adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report, and grants Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 2 of 7

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

The Magistrate Judge’s Report
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court
is charged with making a de novo determination only of those portions of the Report to
which specific objections are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the
Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II.

Summary Judgment
To grant a motion for summary judgment, this Court must find that “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©). The Court is not to weigh the
evidence, but rather to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If no material factual disputes remain, then
summary judgment should be granted against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which the party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
In deciding the motion, all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123–24 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge’s Report sets forth the relevant factual
background and evidence of record in great detail, and no party has specifically objected

2

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 3 of 7

to this portion of the Report. Accordingly, the Court incorporates by specific reference the
background facts set forth in the Report and repeats only what is necessary to evaluate
Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, as set forth below.
I.

Scope of Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge first evaluated the scope of the administrative

charge of discrimination (“charge”) that Plaintiff filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) prior to filing suit. As the Magistrate Judge explained,
only those discrimination claims stated in an administrative charge, those reasonably
related to the original charge, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the
original charge may be maintained in a subsequent lawsuit. Evans v. Techs. Apps. & Serv.
Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996). Additionally, Title VII establishes certain limitations
periods for filing a charge of discrimination: “the basic limitations period is 180 days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice but can be extended to 300 days in a deferral
state if state law proscribes the alleged employment practice and the charge is first filed
with a state deferral agency.” Gerald v. Olsten, No. 4:20-cv-2555-CMC-KDW, 2021 WL
1394669, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 4:20-cv-2555-CMC, 2021 WL 960509 (D.S.C. March
15, 2021).
Here, because Plaintiff limited the allegations in her charge the time period from July
1, 2019 through September 15, 2019, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to alleged discriminatory acts that
occurred before July 1, 2019, or after September 15, 2019. (ECF No. 30 at 11–12.) Plaintiff

3

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 4 of 7

did not make any argument about the time frame limitation of her claims in response to
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; nor has Plaintiff filed any specific objections
to the Magistrate Judge’s findings on this issue. After review, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis and finds no clear error. Thus, the Court finds that, to the
extent Plaintiff bases any of her claims of discrimination on employment decisions made
before July 1, 2019, or after September 15, 2019, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on those claims due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
See Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding defendant entitled
to judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff’s administrative charges referenced “different
time frames, actors, and discriminatory conduct than the central factual allegations in his
formal suit”).
II.

Plaintiff’s Pay Discrimination Claim
Next, in her Report, the Magistrate Judge explained that Plaintiff has not offered

direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of her race; therefore, the Magistrate Judge
analyzed Plaintiff’s claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As the Magistrate Judge
explained, the McDonnell Douglas framework places upon a plaintiff the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie claim, then the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Merritt v. Old Dominion
Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010). “Finally, if the employer carries this
burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

4

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 5 of 7

that the neutral reasons offered by the employer ‘were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 253
(1983)).
Because Plaintiff’s claims involve alleged pay discrimination, the Magistrate Judge
explained that plaintiff must present evidence that: (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) she was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (4) the circumstances suggest an unlawfully discriminatory motive.
Spencer v. Virginia State Univ., 919 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Mar. 26,
2019). Further, “Where, as here, the prima facie case of wage discrimination is based on
comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than [people outside her
protected class] in similar jobs.” Id. In her Report, the Magistrate Judge outlined the
relevant evidence and concluded that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because she failed to show that similarly situated employees outside of her
protected class were treated more favorably; specifically, she failed to produce evidence
showing that she was similarly situated to any proffered comparator. (ECF No. 30 at
13–15.)
In her objections, Plaintiff contends that she has met her burden to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination and requests that the Court deny Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she has successfully shown she was
paid less than people outside her protected class in similar jobs. (ECF No. 31 at 7.)
Plaintiff revisits previous arguments about two of her proposed comparators, Elise Tiller
and William Johnson (compare id. at 7–8, with ECF No. 25 at 8–9), but does not explain
how those comparators’ duties, qualifications, and responsibilities were materially similar
5

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 6 of 7

to her own. In addition, Plaintiff argues:
Because the Plaintiff is the only individual in her specific role, there is no
other way in which to illustrate the wage discrimination based [on] her race
which she experienced than to compare her situation with white employees
given payment privileges while she was demonstrably paid less as a
coordinator than other white coordinators as well as a white employee who
shared the same role as her and received a higher pay promotion to become
a secretary.
(Id. at 8.)
After de novo review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections wholly without merit.
Magistrate Judge Cherry reviewed the evidence provided as to each of Plaintiff’s proposed
comparators, including Ms. Tiller and Mr. Johnson, and determined that Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that she and her comparators were similarly situated. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff has not shown that she had the same job description as her comparators, was
subject to the same standards, was subordinate to the same supervisor, or had
comparable experience, education, or other qualifications. (See ECF No. 30 at 14–15.)
Plaintiff cannot avoid the requirement to show material similarity between her position and
those of her comparators merely by pointing to the common title “coordinator.” Watts v.
S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:17-CV-2376-JMC-TER, 2019 WL 2090789, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan.
29, 2019) (citing Gustin v. West Virginia Univ., 63 Fed. App’x 695, 698 (4th Cir. 2003)),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-02376-JMC, 2019 WL 1122934 (D.S.C.
Mar. 11, 2019) ("Similarity in titles, however, is not enough."). The objections are overruled.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge accurately summarized the
facts and evidence of record and applied the correct principles of law, and the Court finds

6

2:21-cv-00279-BHH

Date Filed 09/16/22

Entry Number 33

Page 7 of 7

no merit to Plaintiff’s objections. Therefore, the Court adopts and specifically incorporates
the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 30); overrules Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 31);
and grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24), thereby dismissing
this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce H. Hendricks
United States District Judge
September 16, 2022
Charleston, South Carolina

7