Burns v. Crawford Steel Corporation et al

Filing 46

ORDER: The Court ADOPTS the R & R as the Order of the Court. (Dkt.No. 41). Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 31). Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. No. 29). The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's ADA failure to accommodate claim. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff's ADA disability claim. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/17/23. (ltap, )

2:21-cv-00797-RMG

Date Filed 01/17/23

Entry Number 46

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Christopher Burns,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Crawford Steel Corporation, and Allied
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Crawford Charleston, Inc.
)
)
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 2:21-00797-RMG

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of the
Magistrate Judge recommending the Court grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint and
recommending the Court grant in part, deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
(Dkt. No. 41). The Court adopts the R & R as the Order of the Court.
I.

Background
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges disability discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Allied Crawford Charleston, Inc. (“Allied
Charleston”) and Crawford Metal Company (“CMC”). (Dkt. No. 1).1 Plaintiff was employed by
Allied Charleston where he worked as a plant manager. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 15-18). Plaintiff suffered
bone infections caused by a skull implant that limited Plaintiff’s ability to think, concentrate, and
perform manual tasks. (Dkt. Nos. 1 ¶¶ 19, 21; 29-3 at 2). Between 2010-2019, Plaintiff required
leave from work when he experienced problems with his bone infection. (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 2).
Allied Charleston granted Plaintiff’s leave requests. (Id. at 2-3).

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In the original complaint, CMC is misnamed as “Crawford Steel Corporation”. (Dkt. No. 1).
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In January 2019, Plaintiff suffered a grand mal seizure at work. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 33). Allied
Charleston allowed Plaintiff to take medical leave for recurring infections throughout 2019. (Id.
¶ 35). In August 2019, Plaintiff informed Geoff Marshall, the general manager of Allied
Charleston, and Gary Stern, the CEO of CMC, that he needed to undergo corrective surgeries to
help prevent future infections that would require several months away from work. (Id. ¶ 39). The
surgeries were set for September 2019 and January 2020. (Dkt. No. 29-3 at 7). Plaintiff indicates
he applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits to help get money for his family while he
recovered, and that Tonja Bowdoin, the general manager at Allied Crawford (Atlanta), Inc., helped
him apply. (Id.).
In December 2019, Mr. Stern held a meeting with staff to discuss whether it would be safe to
bring Plaintiff back to work. Several individuals indicated they did not believe it would be safe to
bring Plaintiff back to work. (Dkt. Nos. 29-7 at 5; 30-16 at 5). On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff
gave Mr. Marshall a doctor’s note releasing him back to work with no restrictions. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶
77; 30-12 at ¶ 11). Sometime in January, Mr. Stern called Mr. Marshall and instructed him to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment. (Dkt. No. 30-16 at 5). Mr. Marshall testified they were “[j]ust
going to go in a different direction.” (Id.). On January 31, 2020, Mr. Marshall informed Plaintiff
Allied Charleston was “going in a different direction.” (Dkt. No. 30-16 at 38).
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) against Allied Charleston. (Dkt. No. 1-2). Allied Charleston filed a position letter that
stated Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from his position. (Dkt. No. 30-5 at 2). Allied Charleston
filed a letter from Ms. Bowdoin where she stated Plaintiff chose to resign. (Dkt. No. 30-5 at 5).
Plaintiff filed a rebuttal that denied he resigned. (Dkt. No. 30-6 at 1). Allied Charleston filed a

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supplemental position letter where it stated Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and the plant manager
position was eliminated. (Dkt. No. 30-8 at 3-5).
Mr. Stern testified he held a Zoom call with Mr. Marshall in December 2019 to late January
2020. During this call, Mr. Marshall indicated he could perform the plant manager job and the
position was not needed. Mr. Stern agreed with eliminating the position. (Dkt. No. 30-15 at 12).
Mr. Marshall testified that in August 2019, while Plaintiff was out, he and Marlon Smalls assumed
the duties of the plant manager position. (Dkt. No. 29-5 at 6, 7). Mr. Marshall stated that
operations were running effectively without a plant manager and discussed eliminating the plant
manager position with Mr. Stern. (Dkt. No. 29-6 at ¶ 15). Mr. Stern testified he agreed with
terminating Plaintiff’s employment. (Dkt. No. 30-16 at 6). In January 2022, Mr. Smalls was
promoted to plant manager at Allied Charleston. (Dkt. Nos. 30-16 at 3; 30-15 at 2).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff filed a response conceding his
failure to accommodate claim. (Dkt. Nos. 29; 30). On the same date, Plaintiff filed a motion to
amend the complaint. (Dkt. No. 31). The motions are fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 33; 34; 36). On
October 13, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending the Court grant Plaintiff’s
motion to amend the Complaint and grant in part, deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (Dkt. No. 41). The parties did not file any objections to the R & R. The matter is ripe
for the Court’s adjudication.
II.

Legal Standard
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court that has no presumptive

weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This
Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R Plaintiff specifically
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objects. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Where Plaintiff fails to file any specific objections, “a district
court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear
error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). “Moreover,
in the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court need not give any explanation for
adopting the recommendation.” Wilson v. S.C. Dept of Corr., No. 9:14-CV-4365-RMG, 2015 WL
1124701, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2015). See also Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th
Cir.1983).
III.

Discussion

a) Motion to Amend
The Court finds the Magistrate Judge ably determined that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the
complaint should be granted. (Dkt. No. 41 at 9-12). Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the complaint
to correct the name of a misnamed Defendant. (Dkt. No. 31 at 4). In the complaint, Plaintiff
misidentified CMC as “Crawford Steel Corporation”. (Dkt. No. 1). “If the right party is before
the Court, although under a wrong name, an amendment to cure a misnomer of parties will be
allowed.” United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber, Co., 162 F.2d 872, 874 (4th Cir. 1947); Morrel
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 224 (4th Cir. 1999). Despite Plaintiff’s
misidentification of CMC, there does not appear to be any dispute that the correct party was served.
CMC is represented by the same counsel as Allied Charleston, filed pleadings in this case, and
participated in discovery. (Dkt. No. 23). Allowing Plaintiff to correct the misidentification of
CMC is warranted. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is granted.
b) Motion for Summary Judgment
CMC argues the court should grant summary judgment and dismiss it from this action. It
argues Plaintiff failed to name it in his EEOC charge. The Magistrate Judge ably determined that
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neither party addressed a central issue related to this, whether the “substantial identity exception”
to the rule that plaintiff may not sue a party he did not identify in his EEOC charge, applies. (Dkt.
No. 41 at 13). As such, Defendant failed to meet its burden on summary judgment as to this point.
CMC argues Allied Charleston employed Plaintiff not it, and therefore it should be dismissed
as a Defendant in this action. The Magistrate Judge analyzed whether the two companies are joint
employers and may be considered a single employer for purposes of liability under the ADA
pursuant to the test set forth in Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408-09 &
n.3 (4th Cir. 2015). “Control is the ‘principle guidepost’ of the analysis.” Butler, 793 F.3d at 414.
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined evidence in the record suggested Mr. Stern exercised
control over Allied Charleston and its employees. (Dkt. No. 41 at 16). He testified he sometimes
played a role in hiring general managers of the plants. (Dkt. No. 30-15 at 2). Plaintiff testified
Mr. Stern hired him as plant manager at Allied Charleston and Mr. Stern ran the plant there. (Dkt.
Nos. 30-12 ¶ 1; 36 at 2-3). Mr. Stern made the decision to end Plaintiff’s employment with Allied
Charleston. (Dkt. Nos. 30-16 at 7). Based on the record, questions of material fact exist as to
whether CMC was not Plaintiff’s employer such that it should be dismissed as a Defendant.
The Magistrate Judge comprehensively analyzed the merits of Plaintiff’s ADA disability
discrimination claim to correctly determine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants
discriminated against him when they terminated his employment. (Dkt. No. 41 at 17-24). The
Magistrate Judge applied the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of disability

discrimination. (Dkt. No. 41 at 19). The Magistrate Judge correctly determined Defendants’ stated
reason for discharging Plaintiff, that it eliminated the plant manager position at Allied Charleston,
is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 11-13). The Magistrate Judge

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correctly determined issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff is pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff may show
pretext by showing “an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination are
inconsistent over time, false, or based on mistakes of fact.” Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc.
19 F.4th 643, 652 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). Allied Charleston’s first position
letter stated Plaintiff voluntarily resigned, but its supplemental position statement stated it
eliminated the plant manager position. It now solely argues Plaintiff was discharged because it
eliminated the plant manager position. (Dkt. No. 29 at 11-13). Defendants’ changing reasons are
inconsistent and evidence of pretext. (Dkt. No. 41 at 22). Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADA disability discrimination claim is denied.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R & R as the Order of the Court. (Dkt.
No. 41). Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 31). Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Dkt. No. 29).
The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s ADA failure to accommodate
claim. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s ADA disability claim.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Richard M. Gergel
Richard M. Gergel
United States District Judge
January 17, 2023
Charleston, South Carolina

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