Spencer v. Gause et al
Filing
43
OPINION AND ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 29). The Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment on th e issue of exhaustion and Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant Bennett and grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Quick. The Court hereby dismisses Defendant Quick from this action. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 8/27/2024. (dgar)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Demetrius R. Spencer,
)
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-02531-BHH-MGB
v.
)
Opinion and Order
)
Katurah Gause, Dlaquanta K. Quick,
)
Sharice L. Bennett,
)
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )
Plaintiff Demetrius R. Spencer (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code §
636(b)(1)(B), and the Local Rules, D.S.C., this matter was referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Now before the Court is Defendants Katurah Gause (“Gause”), Dlaquanta K. Quick
(“Quick”), and Sharice L. Bennett’s (“Bennett”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, (ECF No. 33),
and Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 36.)
On March 7, 2024, United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker issued a
thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that Defendants’
motion for summary judgment be denied in part and granted in part. (ECF No. 37.) The
Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and the
Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation. The Report
recommends denying summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims on the issue of
exhaustion and as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 failure to protect claim against Bennett. (Id.) The
Report recommends granting summary judgment as to all other claims, thereby
dismissing Defendants Gause and Quick from this action. (Id.)
Plaintiff and Defendants filed timely objections to the Report. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.)
Defendants also filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s objections. (ECF No. 42.) For
the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts in part and declines to adopt in part the
Report.
Standard of Review
The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and responsibility for making a final determination remains
with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). This Court is charged
with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which
specific objection is made, and this Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
This Court may also “receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate
with instructions.” Id. In the absence of specific objections, the Court reviews the matter
only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005) (stating that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need
not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear
error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation’”) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).
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Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Objections
1. Defendant Gause
Plaintiff claims that “[t]he R&R erroneously states that there is no record evidence
in defense of Associate Warden Gause’s motion for summary judgment [DE37, pp.1617,” and Plaintiff “objects to this finding.” (ECF No. 39 at 2) (emphasis in original).
Upon review, the Court finds that the Report makes no such finding. Rather, the
Magistrate Judge noted that, in response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff did not dispute
Defendants’ assertion that Gause is entitled to summary judgment as to direct liability,
and Plaintiff only provided arguments in support of his claims against Defendants Bennett
and Quick. (ECF No. 37 at 17.) The Magistrate Judge further observed that:
Plaintiff’s characterization of his claims and his arguments in support thereof
clarify that he is only alleging the following claims in this action: (1) a § 1983
deliberate indifference failure to protect claim against Defendant Bennett;
and (2) a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
against Defendant Quick.
(Id.)
Indeed, this Court’s de novo review of Plaintiff’s response confirms that Plaintiff did
not argue or cite to James Aiken’s “preliminary expert report” in support of a § 1983
supervisory liability claim against Gause. Instead, Plaintiff articulated and provided
arguments in support of § 1983 claims against Bennett and Quick. (See generally ECF
No. 33.) Plaintiff also stated that he can prevail on his claims against Bennett and Quick
without the use of James Aiken’s testimony. (Id. at 23.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge
properly considered all the arguments raised and evidence presented to the Court by
Plaintiff in support of his claims against Bennett and Quick.
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Now, for the first time in his objections, Plaintiff argues that Aiken’s “preliminary
expert report” creates a jury question as to Defendant Gause’s § 1983 liability to Plaintiff
from a supervisory standpoint. (ECF No. 39 at 2-5.) Seeing that this issue was not
presented to the Magistrate Judge for consideration, the Court will refer this matter back
to the Magistrate Judge solely for purposes of addressing this argument and Aiken’s
“preliminary expert report” and making a recommendation as to whether Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on this claim against Defendant Gause.
2. Defendant Quick
Plaintiff’s second and final objection is to the Report’s finding that summary
judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need against Defendant Quick. According to Plaintiff, the Magistrate
Judge committed error by finding that Plaintiff “has not shown that his medical needs were
not addressed ‘within a reasonable time frame.’” (ECF No. 37 at 30 (quoting Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2004)). 1 Plaintiff argues that “this
determination, of reasonableness, is a jury question.” (ECF No. 39 at 5-6.)
The Magistrate Judge reviewed Plaintiff’s assertions and medical records and
found that there was no evidence, even when construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, to support that Defendant Quick was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs. The Magistrate Judge examined the case law cited by Plaintiff – Gibson
and Blackmore – wherein the plaintiffs had suffered for five days and two days,
respectively, before receiving medical treatment. She then concluded that, even under
Blackmore is a Sixth Circuit case; however, it is discussed by the court in Gibson v. Laurens Cnty. Det.
Ctr., No. 2:10-cv-2132-RBH, 2011 WL 3903061 (D.S.C. June 14, 2011), the District of South Carolina case
Plaintiff cited to in support of this claim.
1
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the Blackmore reasoning, Plaintiff has not shown that his medical needs were not
addressed within a reasonable time frame, noting that the undisputed facts show that
Plaintiff was treated one hour after the assault for bruising, swelling, and a 1cm laceration
on his face. (ECF No. 37 at 30-31.)
After de novo review, the Court finds that the record does not support a finding that
Defendant Quick acted in a way that was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical
need. A review of Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion indicates that Plaintiff is
asserting a delayed treatment claim against Defendant Quick. (ECF No. 33 at 22.) Plaintiff
argues that his assertions are enough to survive summary judgment because Defendant
“Quick has not submitted any proof . . . that refutes [his] allegations” as to the one-hour
delay. (Id.) Plaintiff contends, therefore, that under Gibson, “his proof establishes a jury
question as to whether Quick acted with deliberate indifference when she observed
[Plaintiff] bleeding, with stab wounds in critical areas of his body, and failed to render aid
for at least an hour thereafter.” (Id. at 23.) According to Plaintiff, he “need not prove that
the ‘delay’ exacerbated his injuries.” (Id. at 22.) The Court disagrees and overrules
Plaintiff’s objection.
To state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts showing “(1)
that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was ‘sufficiently serious,’ and (2)
that subjectively the prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’”
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (emphasis added)).
As to the objective prong, “[a] serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
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would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Creech v. Nguyen, 153 F.3d
719, 1998 WL 486354, at *5 (4th Cir.1998). Here, Plaintiff contends that he was profusely
bleeding and had stab wounds about his head and face. (ECF No. 33-1 at 4.) Plaintiff’s
medical records, however, reflect that Plaintiff was treated for bruising and swelling to his
face and a 1cm laceration above his right eyebrow. (ECF No. 29-3 at 9.) He was given an
ice pack, ibuprofen, and Dermabond was applied to his cut. (Id. at 10.) The Court notes
that it is unlikely that the cut that Plaintiff sustained from the assault is a sufficiently serious
medical condition to satisfy the objective element of his deliberate indifference claim. See,
e.g., Cureton v. Unnamed Defendant, No. 5:24-CV-94-GCM, 2024 WL 2278704, at *4
(W.D.N.C. May 20, 2024) (finding it unlikely that a “deep cut” on the side and arm is a
sufficiently serious medical condition); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir.
1988) (affirming finding of “no serious medical needs” where pretrial detainee had cut
over one eye, a quarter-inch piece of glass in palm, and was required to wait fourteen
hours before being given treatment); Shelton v. Angelone, 148 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679 (W.D.
Va. 2001) (finding that three cuts on the wrist, which were bleeding, and two sets of marks
from a stun gun were not serious medical needs, even though plaintiff did not get
treatment until days later and the injuries left permanent scars). However, the Court’s
rationale for granting summary judgment on this claim is not based on a finding that
Plaintiff had no serious medical needs post-assault.
Rather, the Court finds that the delay between the end of the assault on Plaintiff
and his receipt of medical treatment did not constitute deliberate indifference to his health
or safety. The Fourth Circuit recently explained that “mere delay” in medical treatment,
without more, is not deliberate inference to a serious medical need. Moskos v. Hardee,
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24 F. 4th 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2022). Rather, the objective prong requires a plaintiff to show
that the delay put him at “‘substantial risk’ of ‘serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Moss v.
Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021)). See also Evans v. S.L.R. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17CV-2731-HMH-TER, 2019 WL 1026362, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2019) (“Intentionally
delaying access to medical care demonstrates deliberate indifference only if the delay
results in some substantial harm.”), R&R adopted sub nom. Evans v. Abraham, No. CV
4:17-2731-HMH-TER, 2019 WL 1022141 (D.S.C. Mar. 4, 2019). “A commonplace medical
delay such as that experienced in everyday life will only rarely suffice to constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation, absent the unusual circumstances where the delay itself
places the prisoner at ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ such as where the prisoner’s
condition deteriorates markedly or the ailment is of an urgent nature.” Moskos, 24 F.4th
at 298.
Upon close review of the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show
how the one-hour delay was attributable to Defendant Quick’s deliberate indifference
rather than negligence or how the one-hour delay placed him at a substantial risk of
serious harm. 2 See Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
alleged delays in providing adequate care also do not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference where the delay does not cause further injury); Coats v. Pope, No. 1:17-cv-
For reference, the Fourth Circuit recently identified scenarios in which substantial harm existed for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment:
2
And the facts here do not remotely resemble cases where we have found the objective
prong to be met, as with an inmate who collapsed and subsequently died after the use of
pepper spray, see Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008), or an inmate who was
denied medical attention for several days while vomiting blood, see Scinto, 841 F.3d at
231–32.
Moskos, 24 F.4th at 298.
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02930-TLW, 2019 WL 5586871, at *6-7 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2019) (denying defendants’
motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiff’s “vomiting, inability to walk or stand,
delirious look on his face, inability to speak, and seizures” were obvious signs of a
substantial risk of harm from a forty-three minute delay in calling for medical assistance);
Brown v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 2d 615, 652 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding triable issue of
deliberate indifference where prisoner was suffering from “heavy sweating, vomiting,
incoheren[t], and [unable] to walk” but patrolling guards “took virtually no action in
response”).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court finds that the
Magistrate Judge correctly recommended granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim against Defendant Quick. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”).
Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s final objection is without merit.
B. Defendants’ Objections
To recap, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After a detailed review
of the evidence submitted by the parties relevant to the exhaustion issue, the Magistrate
Judge determined that there was evidence in the record to support that Plaintiff exhausted
his administrative remedies with respect to the underlying incident. Further, she
determined that Plaintiff had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, 3 that the
3
See Drayton v. Newman, No. 7:22-CV-00574, 2024 WL 3274790, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 2, 2024) (noting
that “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
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administrative remedy process was not available to him. Accordingly, she recommended
that summary judgment be denied on this issue, that the Court find that Plaintiff’s
administrative remedies were effectively unavailable, and that the Court find that a
hearing on this issue is not necessary. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge recommended
denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 deliberate
indifference failure to protect claim against Defendant Bennett.
Defendants filed lengthy objections to these findings and recommendations by the
Magistrate Judge, focused mostly on the exhaustion issue. (See ECF No. 40.) For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ objections are overruled.
1. Exhaustion
Defendants’ objections with regard to the exhaustion issue can be summarized as
follows: that the Magistrate Judge applied an erroneous standard of Rule 56 in evaluating
conflicting evidence of exhaustion; that she failed to review the totality of the facts
surrounding exhaustion; that she failed to recognize that a determination that a grievance
process is “unavailable” should be a rare and uncommon finding; and that she failed to
grant Defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 6-24.)
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record, the applicable law, and
the Report of the Magistrate Judge. Having done so, the Court agrees with the
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge with regard to exhaustion and incorporates
this portion of the Report into this Order. The Court finds that genuine issues of material
administrative remedy was not actually ‘available’ to him because he was prevented, ‘through no fault of
his own, ... from availing himself of it.’” (quoting Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008))).
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fact exist so as to preclude summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and that Plaintiff’s
administrative remedies should be deemed exhausted.
The record reveals that Plaintiff filed at least two grievances in November 2019,
alleging misconduct specific to the assault at issue, and the response he received stated
that the grievances were being returned to Plaintiff as unprocessed because they did not
include sufficient evidence of attempted informal resolution. However, as the Magistrate
Judge correctly pointed out, it is unclear as to whether an informal resolution was
required. The Inmate Grievance System (“IGS”) at the South Carolina Department of
Corrections requires that inmates initially attempt to resolve grievances informally;
however, informal resolution is not required when the matter involves allegations of
criminal activity and/or misconduct of officers. In any event, Plaintiff filed another
grievance on December 12, 2019, which was considered duplicative of his November
filings. This grievance was submitted as an emergency to the IGS; however, it was
processed such that Plaintiff was allowed to file a timely a Step 2 grievance on January
29, 2020, and a final disposition denying the appeal was served on February 27, 2020.
Based on this evidence, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that “it appears that
Plaintiff completed the administrative process concerning his December 12, 2019,
grievance about the underlying incident” and that summary judgment in favor of
Defendants should be denied on this basis. (ECF No. 37 at 13.)
In the alternative, to the extent Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies by not timely filing a grievance, the Magistrate Judge found that “Plaintiff has
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [IGS] operated as a ‘dead end’ in
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this instance such that the administrative remedy process was unavailable to Plaintiff.”
(Id.) (emphasis added.) The Court agrees.
First, the Report concluded that the evidence presented by Defendants supports
that “Plaintiffs’ grievances should not have been repeatedly rejected for failure to attempt
informal resolution,” given the incident at issue and alleged employee misconduct. (Id. at
14.) Second, the Report found that the evidence supports a finding that “Plaintiff had
reasonable cause for the late filings of his grievances because he was in lock up.” (Id.)
Moreover, the Report pointed out that none of Plaintiff’s grievances or inmate requests
that he submitted about the underlying incident were rejected for reasons of untimeliness.
(Id. at 14-15.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s December 12, 2019, grievance was accepted and
processed. (Id. at 15.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge rightly found that “it would be
inconsistent for the Court to now consider [the December 12, 2019,] grievance as
improper based on the time of its filing.” (Id.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge properly
concluded that “Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were effectively unavailable.” (Id.)
The Magistrate Judge also determined that an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary to determine whether Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies.
Defendants object and reiterate that the Court should conduct an evidentiary hearing prior
to deciding this issue. However, based upon the facts and evidence in the record, as
summarized above, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary to decide the exhaustion issue. 4 (See ECF
“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is a question of law to be determined by the
judge,” Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2010), and “judges may resolve factual disputes
relevant to the exhaustion issue without the participation of a jury,” Woodhouse v. Duncan, 741 F. App’x
177, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir.
2013)). Where, as here, “the plaintiff survives summary judgment on exhaustion, the judge may resolve
disputed facts concerning exhaustion, holding an evidentiary hearing if necessary.” Turner v. Clelland, No.
1:15cv947, 2016 WL 6997500, at *12 n.16 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2016) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d
4
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No. 37 at 15-16.) See Kough v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 0:17-cv-2938-JFA-MGB, 2020 WL
1283710, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2020) (agreeing with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion
that the administrative remedy process was effectively unavailable to plaintiff and
deciding, without holding an evidentiary hearing, that plaintiff’s suit should not be barred
and adopting the Report’s recommendation that defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the issue of exhaustion be denied); Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrs.,
No. 2:18-cv-1022-DCN-MGB, 2020 WL 5249224, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (clear error
review) (adopting portion of R&R that found plaintiff’s claims were not barred because
plaintiff’s administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him and recommended
denying both defendants’ motion for summary judgment and request for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of exhaustion).
2. Defendant Bennett
As to the recommendation that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be
denied with regard to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Bennett, Defendants
contend that the “R&R erroneously accepted [Plaintiff]’s self-serving statements to
establish a standard of care for a correctional officer, and evidence of a breach of that
standard of care.” (ECF No. 40 at 24.) In sum, relying on cases outside the Fourth Circuit,
Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed in the absence of expert testimony.
(Id. at 25.) Upon de novo review, the Court disagrees.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Defendant Bennett knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to
260, 273 (5th Cir. 2010)), adopted by 2017 WL 913630 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2017). Such questions of law
arising in prisoner civil rights actions also may be referred to a magistrate judge for factual development
and preparation of a report making proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended
disposition of the issue. See, e.g., Woodhouse, 741 F. App’x at 178-79.
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Plaintiff when Bennett allegedly unlocked Plaintiff’s and the other inmates’ cell doors and
ran from the area immediately prior to the attack on Plaintiff. (ECF No. 37 at 25.) In so
finding, the Magistrate Judge examined Plaintiff’s affidavit testimony and correctly noted
that Defendants do not provide any evidence to support their claim that Bennett left the
area to call for assistance or to directly refute Plaintiff’s affidavit testimony as to Bennett’s
knowledge of the gang members hostility towards Plaintiff or Bennett’s actions on the day
of the attack. (Id. at 26.) Upon close review, the Court finds that the record evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, supports that, at a minimum, Bennett had
an “inkling that the attack was going to occur.” James v. Cartledge, No. 9:15-cv-0625TLW-BM, 2016 WL 1448557, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2016), R&R adopted, 2016 WL
1427391 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2016), aff’d, 669 F. App’x 674 (4th Cir. 2016.) Thus, the
Magistrate Judge properly found that genuine disputes of material fact underlie Plaintiff’s
§1983 claim against Bennett. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
(explaining that factual disputes are “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). Thus, the Court finds this objection
is without merit.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts in part and declines to adopt in
part the Magistrate Judge’s Report. (ECF No. 37.) The Court adopts as Order of the Court
the Report’s findings as to exhaustion and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants
Bennett and Quick. The Court declines to adopt the Report’s findings as to Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim against Defendant Gause. Instead, the Court remands the matter back to the
Magistrate Judge solely for purposes of addressing Plaintiff’s argument and Aiken’s
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“preliminary expert report” and making a recommendation as to whether Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Gause.
Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 29). The Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the issue of exhaustion and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant
Bennett and grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
against Quick. The Court hereby dismisses Defendant Quick from this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
August 27, 2024
Charleston, South Carolina
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