Dingle v. Armstrong et al

Filing 33

ORDER The Court overrules Plaintiff's objections (ECF No.31); the Court adopts and specifically incorporates the Magistrate Judge's Reportas the Order of the Court (ECF No. 29); the Court denies Plaintiff's moti on for judicial notice (ECF No. 21); the Court denies Plaintiff's second motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 23); the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (ECF No. 32); and the Court dismisses this action without prejudice, without issuance and service of process, and without leave to amend. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 08/29/2024.(rhei, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Eugene Dingle,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Leslie Armstrong, Candice Loreal
)
Sterling, South Carolina Department
)
of Social Services Child Support
)
Enforcement Division, Dorchester
)
County Family Court,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 2:23-4141-BHH
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Eugene Dingle’s (“Plaintiff”) pro se
complaint against the above-named Defendants. (ECF No. 28.) The matter was referred
to a United States Magistrate Judge for preliminary review in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C.
On June 6, 2024, Magistrate Judge Molly H. Cherry issued a Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) outlining the issues and recommending that the Court take the
following actions: dismiss this action without prejudice, without issuance and service of
process, and without leave to amend; deny Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice; and deny
Plaintiff’s second motion for preliminary injunction.1 (ECF No. 29.) In her Report, the
Magistrate Judge outlined the procedural history of this case and the allegations contained
in Plaintiff’s amended complaint and found this case subject to dismissal for lack of subject

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The Magistrate Judge previously entered a Report and Recommendation on January 16, 2024,
evaluating Plaintiffs’ fist motion for preliminary injunction and recommending that the Court deny the motion.
(ECF No. 14.) The Court adopted her Report on January 29, 2024, and denied the motion. (ECF No. 19.)
Plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider, which the Court denied on April 2, 2024. (ECF Nos. 24, 26.)

matter jurisdiction because: (1) Plaintiff’s claims are an improper attempt to appeal the
results of South Carolina family court actions to this Court and are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine2; (2) Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are barred by the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; (3) the Declaratory Judgment action, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201–2202, does not create an independent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction;
(4) the Court should abstain from interfering to the extent that Plaintiff’s state court
proceedings remain pending, pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (5) the
criminal statues cited by Plaintiff do not create a private right of action or offer a basis for
the Court to exercise federal question jurisdiction; and (6) the separation of powers doctrine
is not binding on the states.
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge found this case subject to dismissal for
frivolousness because: (1) a substantial portion of Plaintiff’s allegations are
incomprehensible and comprised of legalistic gibberish; (2) Defendant Armstrong is entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity for duties performed in her role as a guardian ad litem; (3)
Dorchester County is not a “person” subject to suit pursuant § 1983; (4) the Ninth
Amendment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim; (5) and the Tenth Amendment
does not create a constitutional right cognizable in a civil suit.
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge also considered Plaintiff’s motion for judicial
notice and found that the motion did not offer a set of indisputable facts or other information

2

As the Magistrate Judge noted, this is not the first action filed by Plaintiff regarding his South
Carolina family court case. Specifically, Plaintiff previously filed an action in this Court against Leslie
Armstrong (“Armstrong”), the guardian ad litem for the minor child at issue, and the family court judge. This
Court summarily dismissed that action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Dingle v.
Armstrong, et al., No. 9:22-CV-2746-BHH, 2023 WL 144717 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2023).
Also, subsequent to filing the instant action, Plaintiff filed another case against Armstrong regarding
his South Carolina family court case. See Dingle v. Sterling, et al., No. 2:23-05333-BHH-MHC.

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that may be appropriate for judicial notice. Rather, the Magistrate Judge found that the
motion merely informed the Court as to Plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Accordingly, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny the motion.
Lastly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff’s second
motion for preliminary injunction, explaining that the motion is premature because the
action has not yet been served and finding that Plaintiff failed to make a clear showing of
the elements necessary for obtaining the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1) (“The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice
to the adverse party.”); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008).
Attached to the Magistrate Judge’s Report was a notice advising Plaintiff of the right
to file written objections to the Report within fourteen days of being served with a copy.
Plaintiff filed written objections on June 17, 2024, and he filed a motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint on July 2, 2024. (See ECF Nos. 31, 32.)
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court
is charged with making a de novo determination only of those portions of the Report to
which specific objections are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the
Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
In his 44-page objections, Plaintiff generally rehashes all of his claims and asserts
that federal question jurisdiction exists because he alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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due to violations of the First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No.
31 at 2-3.) He then regurgitates his specific claims against each Defendant and asserts
that his claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because his claims raise
independent constitutional violations that occurred during the underlying family court
proceedings. (Id. at 4-7.) Plaintiff repeats his alleged constitutional violations, asserting
that he was not provided proper notice in the family court or the opportunity to be heard;
that he was detained unlawfully; and that his right to petition the government for redress
was ignored. (Id. at 7-9.)
Next, Plaintiff asserts that his requests for injunctive relief fall within exceptions to
the Anti-Injunction Act and that the Court can entertain this declaratory judgment
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 because he raises federal constitutional
claims. (Id. at 9-15.) Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Younger
abstention applies, asserting that his state court case has now concluded, and he asserts
that the doctrine does not apply because the state court proceedings were conducted in
bad faith; because Plaintiff faces irreparable injury; and because there is no adequate state
remedy. (Id. at 15-17.) Plaintiff then rehashes the alleged violations of his First, Fourth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and contends that his “claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief are robustly supported by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at 18-20.) Plaintiff
then sets forth a list of cases he contends support his claims. (Id. at 20-22.)
As to the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding frivolousness, Plaintiff contends that
the Magistrate Judge unfairly characterized his claims as legalistic gibberish, and he
repeats his claims with various legal references. (Id. at 23-26.) Plaintiff also contends that
his claims against Defendant Armstrong fall outside the scope of quasi-judicial immunity.
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(Id. at 26-30.) As to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Dorchester County is not a “person”
amenable to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff requests leave to amend to add the appropriate
individuals associated with Dorchester County. (Id. at 31.) He then repeats his Ninth and
Tenth Amendment allegations. (Id. at 31-36.)
With respect to his motion for judicial notice, Plaintiff “acknowledges that judicial
notice cannot be taken for legal conclusions,” but he “emphasizes that the cases cited in
his motion are intended to provide a legal framework for understanding the violations of his
constitutional rights.” (Id. at 37.) Ultimately, Plaintiff “requests that the Court consider the
cited cases as part of the legal context and precedent that supports his claims, rather than
as adjudicative facts subject to judicial notice.” (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff then objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s findings as to his second motion for preliminary injunction and asks the
Court to grant the motion. (Id. at 38-42.)
After careful review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections wholly unavailing. Instead,
a de novo review of the record plainly indicates to the Court that the Magistrate Judge
accurately summarized Plaintiff’s claims as well as the law applicable to those claims, and
the Court finds that nothing in Plaintiff’s largely repetitive objections alters the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis. Indeed, the Court fully agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations, and the Court finds this action subject to summary dismissal for the
myriad reasons set forth in the Report. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice is improper and that Plaintiff has failed to
make a clear showing of the elements necessary for obtaining a preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the Court hereby adopts and specifically incorporates the Magistrate Judge’s
Report as the order of the Court.
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Finally, as to Plaintiff’s motion to amend, which was filed subsequent to his
objections, the Court first notes that Plaintiff does not include a proposed amended
complaint with his motion. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately concludes that amendment
would be futile at this time because it would not correct this case’s jurisdictional
deficiencies, which were carefully and correctly outlined in the Report. Accordingly, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to amend.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No.
31); the Court adopts and specifically incorporates the Magistrate Judge’s Report
as the Order of the Court (ECF No. 29); the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for judicial
notice (ECF No. 21); the Court denies Plaintiff’s second motion for a preliminary
injunction (ECF No. 23); the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint (ECF No. 32); and the Court dismisses this action without
prejudice, without issuance and service of process, and without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce H. Hendricks
United States District Judge
August 29, 2024
Charleston, South Carolina
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Plaintiff is hereby notified that any right to appeal this order is governed by Rules 3
and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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