Langford v. Barnhart
Filing
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ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 22 Report and Recommendations, adopting the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge reversing and remanding to the Commissioner for an award of benefits pursuant to sentence four. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 9/3/08. (jada, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
L u c ille Langford,
) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) Michael J. Astrue, ) C o m m is s io n e r of Social Security, ) ) D e f e n d a n t. ) ______________________________________ )
C /A No.: 3:03-0192-JFA-JRM
ORDER
T h is is an action brought by the plaintiff, Lucille Langford, pursuant to Section 205(g) o f the Social Security Act, as amended (42 USC Section 405(g)), to obtain judicial review o f the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (" C o m m iss io n e r" ) denying her claims for disability insurance ("DIB") benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. T h e Magistrate Judge assigned to this action 1 has prepared a Report and R e c o m m e n d a tio n wherein he suggests that this court should reverse the Commissioner's d e c isio n and remand to the Commissioner for an award of benefits. The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and the court incorporates
The Magistrate Judge's review is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 7 3 .0 2 . The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive w e i g h t , and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific o b j e c t i o n is made and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate J u d g e , or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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s u c h without a recitation. T h e plaintiff was advised of her right to file objections to the Report and R e c o m m e n d a tio n , which was entered on the docket on August 13, 2008. The plaintiff did n o t file any objections 2 to the Report. The government has responded to the Report in d ica tin g that it will not file objections to the Report. B A CK G RO U N D T h e plaintiff applied for DIB on February 4, 2000, alleging she became disabled on D e c em b e r 18, 1998 due to back pain, headaches, arthritis, and depression. As the ALJ noted in his findings, the plaintiff has degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines a n d headaches, in addition to hypertension, anxiety, and depression. She has past relevant w o rk as a security guard and as a worker in a family-owned snack bar. T h e plaintiff, who was 55 years of age at the time she alleges she became disabled, h as a limited education (sixth grade or more), and that her past relevant work did not require th e performance of work-related activities precluded by her residual functional capacity ("R F C "). T h e plaintiff's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. She was g ran ted a hearing on June 28, 2001 before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") before
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the district court is obligated to conduct a de novo review of every portion of t h e Magistrate Judge's Report to which objections have been filed. The court reviews the Report only for clear error in t h e absence of an objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4 th Cir. 2005). T h o m a s v. Arn, 474 U . S . 140, 150 (1985). Failure to timely file specific written objections to the Report and R e c o m m e n d a tio n will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such R e c o m m e n d a t i o n . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 9 1 (4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).
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w h o m she appeared and testified with representation. The ALJ determined that the plaintiff w a s not disabled, that she was able to perform her past relevant work, and that she was not e n title d to benefits. The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ's decision on September 3, 2002. O n March 19, 2003, the undersigned, upon motion of the Commissioner and with p la in tif f 's consent, remanded this action to the Commissioner pursuant to Sentence Six of 4 2 U.S.C. Section 405(g) for further administrative action because the cassette recording of th e ALJ's hearing contained too many inaudible statements. The plaintiff attended a second ALJ hearing on August 23, 2005, wherein the ALJ ag ain found that the plaintiff was not disabled. The present action is now before the court u p o n the conclusion of the remand and the Appeals Council's August 11, 2007 decision to d en y a review and the final decision of the Commissioner. T h e plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not apply the correct legal principles and as such, th e Commissioner's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the p la in tif f contends that the ALJ erred when she (1) failed to discuss the numerous reports of p lain tiff 's treating physician; (2) failed to give the proper weight to the treating physician's o p in io n ; (3) failed to set out the rationale for plaintiff's RFC as required by SSR96-8p; (4) f a ile d to properly evaluate plaintiff's pain; and (5) made statements at the hearing that she e v a lu a te d the case under erroneous legal standards. To the contrary, the Commissioner a ss e rts that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
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S TANDARD OF REVIEW T h e role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the Social S e c u rity Act is a limited one. Section 205(g) of that Act provides: "The findings of the C o m m is s io n e r . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more th a n a scintilla, but less than preponderance." Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th C ir. 1964); see, e.g., Daniel v. Gardner, 404 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1968); Laws v. Celebrezze, 3 6 8 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1966); Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Va. 1976). This s ta n d a rd precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court's f in d in g s for those of the Commissioner. See, e.g., Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1 9 7 1 ); Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1968). "[T]he court [must] uphold the [ C o m m iss io n e r's ] decision even should the court disagree with such decision as long as it is supported by `substantial evidence.'" Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1 9 7 2 ). As noted by Judge Sobeloff in Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1969), "[f]rom th is it does not follow, however, that the findings of the administrative agency are to be m e c h an ic a lly accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates more than an u n c ritic a l rubber stamping of the administrative action." Id. at 279. "[T]he courts must not ab d icate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner's] findings, and that his conclusion is rational." V ite k , 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
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T h e Magistrate Judge suggests that the ALJ's decision to discount plaintiff's c re d ib ility during the relevant time period is not supported by substantial evidence and is not c o rre c t under controlling law. The ALJ stated: A f te r considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds th a t the claimant's medically determinable impairments could h a v e been reasonably expected to produce the alleged s ym p to m s , but the claimant's statements concerning the i n t e n s ity, duration, and limiting effects of these statements are n o t entirely credible. T r. 16. The Magistrate Judge suggests that the ALJ's opinion as to why she discounted p la in tif f 's pain and credibility is not clear and that she failed to discuss the two-part test for th e evaluation of pain as required in SSR 96-7p. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ). This court agrees and thus it cannot uphold the Commissioner's decision because it is not supported by substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Hays v . Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1990). T h e Magistrate Judge also suggests that the ALJ improperly evaluated and discounted th e opinions of the plaintiff's treating physician and specifically failed to consider the RFC a ss e ss m e n t. Again, this court agrees that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by su b stan tial evidence. Without a finding of substantial evidence in the record, this court c a n n o t support the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. A f te r a careful review of the record, including the findings of the ALJ, the briefs from t h e plaintiff and the Commissioner, and the Magistrate Judge's Report, the court finds the 5
R e p o rt provides an accurate summary of the facts and standards of law in this case. The M a g is tra te Judge's findings are hereby specifically incorporated herein by reference. Accordingly, this action is reversed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) a n d is remanded to the Commissioner for an award of benefits as noted herein and in the M a g is tra te 's Report and Recommendation. IT IS SO ORDERED.
S ep tem b er 3, 2008 C o lu m b ia , South Carolina
J o s e p h F. Anderson, Jr. U n ite d States District Judge
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