Martin et al v. Lott et al

Filing 66

ORDER denying 63 Motion for Court Order Dismissing First, Second, and Third Causes of Action. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 12/21/09.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA C O L U M B IA DIVISION C a rlo s Edward Martin and T a sh ia n a Anita Martin, P l a i n t if f s , v. L e o n Lott, as representative for the O f f ic e of the Richland County S h e rif f 's Department, Deputies Ben F ield s and Joseph Clark, in their in d iv id u a l capacities as deputies with the Richland County Sheriff's D e p a rtm e n t, D e f e n d a n ts . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C / A No. 3:07-3782-JFA

ORDER

T h is matter comes before the court on plaintiff Carlos Martin's (Mr. Martin) [dkt. # 6 3 ] voluntary dismissal of claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or in the alternative motion f o r court order granting voluntary dismissal of the § 1983 claims. For the reasons that f o llo w , Mr. Martin's motion is denied. I. F ac tu al and Procedural Posture T h is case arises out of an encounter between Mr. Martin and Deputy Ben Fields (" D e p u ty Fields") on October 24, 2005. On that day, Deputy Fields was dispatched to Quail R u n apartment complex in Richland County based on a report of a suspicious individual. As D e p u ty Fields entered the complex in his patrol car, Mr. Martin followed behind. After they p a rk e d their cars beside each other, Mr. Martin and Deputy Fields engaged in an exchange,

th e result of which allegedly invovled Deputy Fields taking Mr. Martin to the ground, e m p tyin g an entire canister of mace on him, and placing Mr. Martin under arrest for b rea ch ing the peace. During the course of the exchange, Tashiana Martin ("Mrs. Martin"), w if e of Mr. Martin, came outside the apartment at Quail Run, which she shared with her h u s b a n d , and took several pictures with her cell phone and attempted to capture the exchange a n d subsequent arrest on video. Upon the arrival of other law enforcement officers, Ms. M a rtin alleges that Deputy Fields directed another officer to confiscate the cell p h o n e -- w h ich allegedly contained the pictures of the exchange and arrest. Mrs. Martin a lle g e s that Deputy Joseph Clark ("Deputy Clark") threw her against a vehicle, handcuffed h e r, forced her to the ground, and eventually placed her in the back of a police car. (Am. C o m p l. ¶ 18.) M r. and Mrs. Martin filed suit in state court on October 17, 2007 against Richland C o u n ty Sheriff Leon Lott, in his official capacity, and Deputy Fields and Deputy Clark, in th e ir individual capacities, pursuant to § 1983 for violation of their First and Fourth A m e n d m e n t rights, and asserted separate state court claims for false arrest, false im p ris o n m e n t, and battery. Thereafter, defendants removed the case on November 19, 2007. T h e court has at various times during the past two years issued three scheduling orders, s ta ye d the case for approximately eleven months, and conferred with counsel on numerous o c c as io n s regarding a variety of matters. The discovery period ended on November 20, 2009, d is p o s itiv e motions were filed the day after this motion, and trial is scheduled for the March

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9 , 2010 term of court. Mr. Martin now seeks to voluntarily dismiss her federal claims, or in the alternative m o v e s the court to issue an order allowing her to withdraw all § 1983 claims, and asserts that in the event the court grants her motion, the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over M r. Martin. In the conference call to discuss this matter, counsel for Mr. Martin indicated th a t she wished to go back to state court. Based on his counsel's representation, Mr. Martin o ste n sib ly seeks remand of his claims to state court.1 II. D is c u ss io n A . Voluntary Dismissal is Denied P u r s u a n t to Rule 41(a)(1)(A) a plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order b y filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion f o r summary judgment, or the plaintiff files a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties w h o have appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i)­(ii). In all other cases, an action may be d ism issed at the plaintiff's request only by court order on terms the court considers proper. F e d . R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit, in Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4 th Cir. 1987), discussed the terms a district court should consider when assessing a motion t o voluntarily dismiss. The Davis decision directs district courts to "focus primarily on p ro te c tin g the interests of the defendant." Id. The defendants answered the Martins' amended complaint on February 8, 2009, Considering that the statute of limitations likely ran on October 24, 2008 or before, remand would be the only route available to Mr. Martin to vindicate his claims. 3
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a c c o rd in g ly, pursuant to Rule 41, Mr. Martin needs the court's permission prior to voluntarily d ism issin g any of his claims. In conferring with counsel for all parties on this matter, c o u n s e l for Mr. Martin advised that Mr. Martin would prefer to maintain his § 1983 claims if the court determined remand inappropriate or inadvisable. Accordingly, the court now tu rn s to Mr. Martin's attack on the court's jurisdiction. B. T h e Court Retains Supplemental Jurisdiction

F edera l courts have jurisdiction over claims removed from state courts that could have p ro p e rly been brought in federal court in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Pursuant to 2 8 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court also has jurisdiction over state law claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case o r controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. W h e th e r federal and state law claims form part of the same case "is determined by whether th e y derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would o r d in a r ily be expected to try then all in one judicial proceeding." Hinson v. Norwest F in a n c ia l South Carolina, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 615 (4 th Cir. 2001) (internal citation and p u n c tu a tio n omitted). The court finds that the claims of Mr. and Mrs. Martin, appear to d e riv e from the same basic set of facts--the sequential arrests of Mr. and Mrs. Martin--and t h a t they consequently form one constitutional case. Accordingly, the court finds

s u p p le m e n t a l jurisdiction appropriate over the state law claims. C. T h e Court Finds Insufficient Basis for Remand

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T o escape federal jurisdiction and remain able to maintain his claim in state court, Mr. M a rtin would appear to be seeking a remand. To that end, Mr. Martin would necessarily be a s k in g the court to do one of the following:2 (1) find that some or all of the state law claims a re separate and independent, and exercise its discretion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1 4 4 1 (c ); (2) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant § 1367 and exercise the in h e re n t power of the court to remand; or (3) find subject matter jurisdiction lacking and re m a n d pursuant to § 1447(c). "Section 1441(c) provides for remand of matters in which State law predominates w h e n a separate and independent claim of cause of action within federal question jurisdiction is joined with a non-removable claim or cause of action and the entire case is removed." H i n s o n , 239 F.3d at 616 (internal citation omitted). The court finds this provision

in a p p lic a b le to Mr. Martin as the claims he asserts cannot be characterized as separate and in d e p e n d e n t . The alleged law enforcement misconduct arises from a common nucleus of o p e ra tiv e fact, namely the alleged law enforcement misconduct during the sequential arrests o f Mr. and Mrs. Martin. Mrs. Martin continues to assert her federal claims and, accordingly, th e court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Martin's pendent claims; Id. ("pendent c la im s are not separate and independent within the meaning of the removal statute" (internal c ita tio n omitted)). The court finds remand of Mr. Martin's claims on the basis of § 1441(c) in a p p ro p r ia te . The court declines to analyze any request to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(e), 1452. The court finds them inapplicable to the facts of this case. 5
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S ec tio n 1367(c) authorizes a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a p e n d e n t claim where (1) the claim raises novel or complex issues of state law; (2) the claim s u b s ta n tia lly predominates over claim(s) over which the district court has original ju ris d ic tio n ; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original ju ris d ic tio n ; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are compelling reasons for declining ju ris d ic tio n . Mr. Martin's state law claims do not present novel questions of state law or p re d o m in a te over the § 1983 claims, nor do there appear to be any exception circumstances w a rra n tin g the court to decline jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court finds the § 1367(c) f a cto rs inapplicable to the facts at hand. P o lic y concerns also weigh in favor of retaining the claims. Principles of judicial e c o n o m y militate against separate trials at this late date, three months before trial and after th e close of discovery; burdening the state system as trial approaches would appear to f ru stra te this goal. Fairness considerations also compel a finding that the defendant would b e prejudiced by defending two cases with similar or identical witnesses and similar legal th e o rie s. Even if discovery could be shared between the separate cases, the resources d e v o ted to defending two separate trials would be substantial. S e c tio n 1447(c) contemplates remand where a motion for remand is filed within thirty d ays of removal alleging defects in the removal procedure, or it appears that the district court la c k s subject matter jurisdiction prior to final judgment. 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Mr. Martin does n o t allege any defect in the removal procedure and the thirty-day window has long passed.

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M r. Martin asserts that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. However, as discussed a b o v e , the court finds supplemental jurisdiction appropriate over Mr. Martin's claims. See H in s o n 239 F.3d at 617 (finding that state law claims asserted by co-plaintiffs properly joined af ter removal of federal claim constituted part of the same constitutional case). Moreover, " re m a n d concepts apply to the `case' or `action,' not to the parties," § 1447(c) expresses the s u b je c t of remand as the case, not the parties to it. Id. Accordingly, because the court finds re m a n d improper under §§ 1441(c) and 1447(c), and there are no appropriate grounds to d e c l in e jurisdiction under § 1367, the court declines to remand Mr. Martin's claims. III. C o n c lu s io n F o r the foregoing reasons Mr. Martin's motion [dkt. # 63] to voluntarily dismiss his f e d era l claims is denied. To the extent that Mr. Martin seeks remand of his claims, that re q u e st is also denied. Mr. Martin's argument that he will be prejudiced by pursuing his c la im s as part of the same case as his wife are not properly before the court as Mr. Martin has n o t filed a motion to separate trials under Rule 42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). IT IS SO ORDERED.

D ec em b er 21, 2009 C o lu m b ia , South Carolina

J o s e p h F. Anderson, Jr. U n ite d States District Judge

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