Smith v. Michelin North America Inc

Filing 41

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS rejecting 27 Report and Recommendations, granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 08/12/2010. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA C O L U M B IA DIVISION J a m e s E. Smith, P l a in tif f , vs. M ic h e lin North America, Inc., D e f e n d a n t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C /A No.: 3:09-cv-00022-JFA-JRM

ORDER

T h ro u g h this action, pro se plaintiff James E. Smith ("Smith") seeks to recover d am ag es against his former employer, defendant Michelin North America, Inc. ("Michelin"), f o r alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. T h is matter is before the court for review of the Magistrate Judge's report and re c o m m e n d a tio n (the "Report") (ECF No. 27) on Michelin's motion for summary judgment (E C F No. 21). made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 7 3 .0 2 (B )(2 )(g ) (D.S.C.). T h e magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to the Court, to which any p a rty may file written objections . . . . The Court is not bound by the re c o m m e n d a tio n of the magistrate judge but, instead, retains responsibility for th e final determination. The Court is required to make a de novo d e te rm in a tio n of those portions of the report or specified findings or re c o m m e n d a tio n as to which an objection is made. However, the Court is not re q u ire d to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal c o n c l u s i o n s of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the report and re c o m m e n d a ti o n to which no objections are addressed. While the level of s c ru tin y entailed by the Court's review of the Report thus depends on whether o r not objections have been filed, in either case the Court is free, after review, to accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge's findings or r e c o m m e n d a tio n s .

W a lla c e v. Housing Auth. of the City of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 137, 138 (D.S.C. 1992) (citatio n s omitted). The Report recommends denying Michelin's motion for summary ju d g m e n t. In response, Michelin has lodged a number of objections. (ECF No. 30.) After re v ie w in g the parties' briefs, the record, the Report, and the objections, the court hereby ad o p ts the facts as outlined in the Report's "Facts" section but rejects the Report's re c o m m e n d a tio n , and grants Michelin's motion for summary judgment. I. F a c tu a l and Procedural History S m ith worked as an electrical troubleshooter at Michelin's Lexington, South Carolina f a cility from 1981 until his termination on January 7, 2008. Except for evaluations

s u g g e stin g that he improve his teamwork and communications skills, Smith had an u n e v e n tf u l work history with Michelin until 2007. On September 13, 2007, one of the operators reported that Smith had responded n e g a tiv e ly to a troubleshooting call. Next, on September 17, 2007, Smith allegedly nearly h it another employee with one of the three-wheeled bicycles that Michelin uses to facilitate q u ick travel through its facility. Then, on September 19, 2007, Smith was told during his lu n c h break that the conveyor belt was down and that he needed to check it. Smith told his s u p e rv is o r that he would follow up on it after he finished his lunch. The supervisor cited S m ith for insubordination and told him that disciplinary proceedings were in process. On S e p te m b e r 26, 2007, Smith met with his supervisors, and they discussed the incidents listed

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a b o v e . Two days after the meeting, Smith received a final written warning and a list of c o rre c tiv e actions to be taken. O n December 26, 2007, Michelin began its six-day scheduled shutdown period. S m i t h made arrangements to take off work on December 26 and 27, 2007. He agreed to w o rk the remaining four days of the shutdown period and was allegedly scheduled to work tw e lv e -h o u r days. He worked for the first three days without incident. On the fourth day, N e w Year's Eve, Smith left after working only five hours. He admits that he did not have p rio r approval and that he had work that he could have done. Smith claims that it was the sh o p 's policy to be on a "flexible schedule" during the shutdown. (Smith Aff. ¶ 16.) When Smith returned to work on January 2, 2008, his supervisors asked him whether h e had, in fact, left early on New Year's Eve without an emergency reason and without tellin g anyone. Smith confirmed that he did so. He contended that he was not the only p e rs o n who left early on New Year's Eve and that two white co-workers had not worked th e ir entire shift. Smith was told that those co-workers had made previous arrangements to d o so. He was terminated on January 7, 2008. Smith filed a charge of racial discrimination with the South Carolina Human Affairs C o m m iss io n as well as the EEOC and pursued an internal appeal through Michelin's "Fair T re a tm e n t Procedure" to challenge his termination. The EEOC issued a "no cause"

d e te rm in a tio n , and the South Carolina Employment Security Commission disqualified Smith f o r unemployment benefits for 10 weeks because it was determined that his termination was

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f o r cause. That decision was upheld on appeal. In addition, Smith's termination was c o n s id e re d , reviewed, and upheld through four levels of review in the Michelin process. Smith subsequently filed a complaint in this court. II. L e g a l Standard S u m m ary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure m a te r ia ls on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material f a ct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party opposing summary judgment "must . . . set out s p e c if ic facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). "The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of showing that there is no g e n u in e issue as to any material fact in the case." Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F .2 d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). "When determining whether the movant has met its burden, th e court must assess the documentary materials submitted by the parties in the light most fa v o rab le to the nonmoving party." Id. III. L a w and Analysis A plaintiff may prove disparate treatment either by using direct or circumstantial e v id e n c e, or by using the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U .S . 792 (1973). Smith has produced no direct or circumstantial evidence of racial d is c rim in a tio n and has elected to proceed pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework. T o overcome a motion for summary judgment under this avenue, Smith must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. He must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected

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c la ss ; (2) he was performing at a level that met Michelin's legitimate expectations; (3) he was term inated ; and (4) similarly situated Michelin employees outside of the protected class were re ta in e d under similar circumstances. See Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 1 8 0 , 188 (4th Cir. 2004). If Smith can make out a prima facie case for discrimination, the burden shifts to the e m p lo ye r to offer legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for the termination. Holland v. W a sh in g to n Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007). If Michelin carries this burden, S m ith must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that these reasons are merely pretext f o r racial discrimination. Id. B o th parties agree that Smith has established the first and third elements of the prima f a c ie case, but Michelin argues that Smith can not prove the second and fourth elements. A. S a tis fa c tio n of Michelin's Legitimate Expectations

A s to the second prong, Smith cannot show that he was performing at an acceptable lev e l at the time of his termination. In the analysis of this prong, Smith's perception of his o w n performance is not relevant. Smith v. Flax, 681 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980). "It is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant." Id. Following Smith's failure to respond to a troubleshooting call until after he finished h is lunch, his supervisor, Mark Wilkins, and another manager, Steve Phillips, called a m e e tin g with Smith to discuss his performance. At that time, Wilkins and Phillips told Smith that "various production members" had described him as "intimidating" and "were wary

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a b o u t calling for support." (Wilkins Aff. ¶ 13.) Smith speculated that the other employees w e re lying about these incidents but did not offer any reason why they would do that. When to ld that the managers "had doubts about his ability to improve his performance, pointing out th a t these issues had been long-standing" and could "end with his termination," Smith did n o t offer any explanation or positive suggestions for improvement. (Id. ¶ 14.) He seemed to understand that his job was in jeopardy but did not seem overly concerned. Following this meeting, Wilkins issued Smith a "Final Written Warning" and a list o f areas that Smith could try to improve. (Id. ¶ 15.) Smith has not presented any evidence to suggest that his supervisor's concerns were illegitimate or that he had improved his p e rf o rm a n c e and attitude. He was still on final warning status at the time of his termination. A c c o rd in g ly, the Court finds that Smith has not met his burden to show that he was meeting M ic h e lin 's legitimate expectations. B. T r e a tm e n t of White Comparators

T o prove the fourth prong, Smith points to two white employees who were not p u n ish e d for working abbreviated shifts on New Year's Eve. However, according to W ilk in s, those employees had pre-approved permission to leave early. (Id. ¶ 15.) Smith re l i e s on an unsworn statement by Kenneth Hendrick, a Michelin employee, which says leav ing early during a shutdown "is normally not a problem." (Pl. Mem., Ex. A.) However, th e statement goes on to say that normally an employee works out scheduling issues b e f o re h a n d , which is precisely what Smith did earlier in the week when he wanted to take

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tw o days off. Smith has not produced any evidence to show that the white comparators left w ith o u t pre-approval or were given preferential treatment. Because Smith cannot establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination, the a n a lys is ends, and the burden does not shift to Michelin to show that it had a nond is c rim in a to ry, legitimate reason for firing Smith. IV. C o n c lu s io n T o defeat Michelin's motion for summary judgment, Smith "may not rely merely on a lle g a tio n s or denials in [his] own pleading; rather, [his] response must--by affidavits or as o th e rw is e provided in this rule--set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R . Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Smith relies solely on his own affidavit and a vague statement by another e m p lo ye e to prove discrimination. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute b etw ee n the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary jud g m en t." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986). V ie w in g the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that th e re are no genuine issues of material fact in this case. Because Smith cannot establish a p rim a facie case pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, Michelin is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law, and the Court need not rule on Michelin's objections (ECF No. 30). The Court re je c ts the Report's recommendation (ECF No. 27) and grants Michelin's motion for s u m m a ry judgment (ECF No. 21).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

A u g u st 12, 2010 C o lu m b ia , South Carolina

J o s e p h F. Anderson, Jr. U n ite d States District Judge

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