Boyd v. South Carolina, State of et al

Filing 123

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS adopting 111 Report and Recommendations, granting 63 Motion to Dismiss, denying 68 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and terminating all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 46 , 50 , 51 , 67 , 69 , 73 , 81 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 99 ). Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 09/19/2011. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Don Boyd,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Angelica Textile Services, Inc.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)

C.A. No.: 3:10-cv-872-JFA

ORDER

This employment litigation matter is before the court upon Plaintiff Don Boyd’s
(“Boyd”) objections to a United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”), which recommends that this court grant Defendant Angelica Textile Services, Inc.’s
(“Angelica”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for summary
judgment (ECF No. 63) and deny Boyd’s motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 68).
Specifically, Boyd filed a first set of objections on June 27, 2011 and filed two additional sets of
objections on July 11, 2011 and July 22, 2011. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the two sets of
objections filed in July were untimely, and, therefore, this Court is not required to consider these
objections. However, in an effort to show some deference to the pro se litigant, this Court
chooses to consider both the timely and the untimely objections filed by Boyd. Nevertheless,
having reviewed the entire record, this Court finds that the Magistrate Judge fairly and accurately
summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the court adopts the
R&R and fully incorporates it into this order.

1

I.

Legal Standards
A.

The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge made her review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to the court. It has
no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). Parties are allowed to make a written
objection to a Magistrate Judge’s report within fourteen days after being served a copy of the
report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). From the objections, the court reviews de novo those portions of
the R&R that have been specifically objected to, and the court is allowed to accept, reject, or
modify the R&R in whole or in part. Id.
B.

Legal Standard for Dismissal

The defendant has moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), contending that this Complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to
administratively exhaust the claims he has raised. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which
jurisdiction can be founded. It is the plaintiffs’ burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to
“regard the pleadings’ allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence
outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.
1991).
To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider
undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. The court may dismiss a case for
2

lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Johnson v.
United States, 534 F. 3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
C.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

“Before filing a suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust [his] administrative
remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC.” Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234,
247 (4th Cir. 2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Exhaustion of administrative remedies
is a statutory prerequisite to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court. See, e.g., Jones
v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that “a failure by the plaintiff
to exhaust administrative remedies concerning a Title VII claim deprives the federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim”); Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th
Cir. 1995) (stating that “receipt of, or at least entitlement to, a right-to-sue letter is a
jurisdictional prerequisite”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

The Fourth Circuit has

emphasized:
The filing of an administrative charge is not simply a formality to be rushed
through so that an individual can quickly file his subsequent . . . lawsuit. Rather,
Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to serve the primary purpose of
notice and conciliation. First, an administrative charge notifies the employer of
the alleged discrimination. This notice gives the employer an initial opportunity
to voluntarily and independently investigate and resolve the alleged
discriminatory action. It also prevents the employer from later complaining of
prejudice, since it has known of the allegations from the very beginning. Second,
the exhaustion requirement initiates agency-monitored settlement, the primary
way that claims of discrimination are resolved.
Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
3

II.

Plaintiff’s Objections
As an initial matter, this Court has reviewed the record in this case and finds the

Magistrate’s summary of the relevant facts of this case to be accurate. As such, this Court adopts
in its entirety the factual background of this case as summarized in the Magistrate’s R&R.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he did not exhaust all
administrative remedies. Boyd claims that he did seek recourse at the South Carolina Human
Affairs Commission (“SCHAC”), the deferral agency in South Carolina for the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and that he completed the necessary steps to
advance his complaint. However, the facts of this case do not support Boyd’s assertion. Boyd
failed to fully complete the SCHAC questionnaire, and completion of the questionnaire was the
first step in the process for Plaintiff to proceed with his claim. When SCHAC requested
additional information from Plaintiff through a letter sent to the address listed by Boyd on his
initial questionnaire, SCHAC informed Boyd that if he did not contact SCHAC within ten days,
they would assume Boyd did not want to file a charge. Boyd failed to respond within ten days as
directed by the letter from SCHAC. Though SCHAC gave Plaintiff several opportunities to
revise his original questionnaire and fix his mistake before the 300 day window that he had to
file his claim, Plaintiff failed to complete the first step in pursuing his claim and, in doing so,
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
Plaintiff also objects to the Report and Recommendation’s background section because it
is not identical to the facts in Plaintiff’s complaint. Boyd asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s
summary of his complaint “is not construed in light favorable to non-movant and is conclusory
without referencing Complaint facts or other facts in support of Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 115).

4

Plaintiff seems to argue that the Magistrate Judge should have relied on the facts as laid out by
Boyd in his complaint and that by failing to do so the Magistrate has been unfair to Plaintiff.
This argument is without merit. This Court directs Plaintiff to the overview of the legal standard
for dismissing actions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) that is provided above. In his
objections, Boyd has cited the standard for summary judgment rather than that for dismissing a
case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). As previously indicated, the court may dismiss a case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction based on the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts coupled
with the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Johnson v. U.S, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008)
(citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). Contrary to the suggestion
made by Boyd’s objections, this Court is not bound to consider the Plaintiff’s complaint as
absolute truth for the purposes of resolving this motion. With that in mind, this Court finds that
the Plaintiff’s complaint in addition to the undisputed facts set forth in the R&R prove that this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
In his July 11, 2011 objection to the R&R, Plaintiff states that Saundra L. Ligon lied in
her affidavit and goes on to provide several points in an attempt to prove this allegation. The
Plaintiff’s attempt to prove that the affidavit is a forgery does not persuade this court. In the
final objection filed by Boyd, he contends that Angelica’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations is improper. Plaintiff then reiterates the
objections that he raised in his previous two sets of objections. The objections asserted by the
Plaintiff are not persuasive. The facts as evident from the record of this case establish that
Plaintiff did not exhaust the administrative remedies for his claim. As such, this Court has no

5

choice but to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, this case should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
III.

Conclusion
After carefully reviewing the applicable law, the record in this case, and the Report and

Recommendation, the court finds the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation fairly and accurately
summarizes the facts and applies the correct principles of law. The court, therefore, adopts the
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in full and incorporates this Report by specific
reference. The court hereby grants Defendant’s motion for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) (ECF No. 63), denies Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 68),
and terminates all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 46, 50, 51, 67, 69, 73, 81, 84, 85, 86, & 99).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
September19, 2011
September 16, 2011
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

6