Dash v. Mayweather et al
Filing
131
ORDER granting 112 Motion for Sanctions, ordering defendant Mayweather to perform 40 hours of community service at the Las Vegas Habitat for Humanity Project by January 31st, 2012. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 11/07/2011.(bshr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Anthony Lawrence Dash,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Floyd Mayweather, Jr., an individual;
)
Mayweather Promotions; Mayweather )
Promotions, LLC; Philthy Rich Records, )
Inc.; and World Wrestling
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Entertainment, Inc.
)
Defendants.
)
)
C/A No.: 3:10-cv-1036-JFA
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to the plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions (ECF No. 112). The parties have fully briefed this matter, and after hearing
oral argument from the parties, the court has determined that sanctions are appropriate.
For the reasons stated herein, the court hereby grants plaintiff’s motion for sanctions in
part and directs the individual defendant, Floyd Mayweather, Jr., to perform 40 hours of
community service at the Las Vegas Habitat for Humanity Project. The court directs
Mr. Mayweather to perform the community service personally by January 31st, 2012.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves an alleged copyright infringement. Plaintiff, a South Carolina
resident, filed the present action against Floyd Mayweather, Jr., his affiliated production
and promotional entities, and World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that
he created a beat called the Tony Gunz beat (TGB) in 2005. The plaintiff alleges that
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Mayweather unlawfully used plaintiff’s copyrighted music during his entrance into the
arena at two WWE events where Mayweather appeared.
Mr. Mayweather is a
professional boxer, but he appeared as a guest at two World Wrestling Entertaiment, Inc.,
events—Wrestlemania 24 held on March 30, 2008 and the August 24th, 2009 RAW
program. As part of his entrance into the ring at the two events, Mayweather played a
song called “YEP.” Cory Harris, manager of Philthy Rich Records, testified that he
created the beat to YEP sometime around 2007. (Harris Dep., 23:3–24:18, 56:4–57:25,
May 26, 2011, ECF 90-3.) Plaintiff alleges that Mayweather’s song “YEP” infringed on
his copyright in TGB.
Plaintiff commenced this action in April 2010 alleging copyright infringement
under 17 U.S.C. § 101, and the parties are currently engaged in discovery. The plaintiff’s
motion arises from Mayweather’s conduct during discovery and, in particular, his
representations about his availability for his deposition.
Following attempts to pick a date suitable to both parties, Plaintiff noticed
Mayweather’s deposition for July 11, 2011. Mayweather filed an emergency motion for
protective order (ECF No. 80) seeking to reschedule the deposition until after a boxing
match scheduled for September 17th, 2011. Mayweather argued that the deposition
would interfere with his training and promotional activities leading up to the fight. The
court held a phone conference with the parties and directed that Mayweather’s deposition
was “to be scheduled no later than 2 weeks after [the] fight” (ECF No. 83).
deposition was rescheduled for September 29th, 2011.
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The
On September 26th, 2011, Mayweather notified the plaintiff by letter that he would
not be available for the scheduled deposition. Plaintiff contacted the court and requested
a conference. The court conducted a telephonic conference with counsel for the parties
on September 27th, at 2:45 p.m. EST. Mayweather’s attorney, Mark Tratos, informed the
court that Mayweather had suffered numerous injuries from the fight and was recovering.
He based these statements upon a doctor’s note from Robert O. Voy, M.D. that outlined
Mayweather’s health problems. Voy recommended that Mayweather “not be subjected to
mental stress, sparring, or training, pending MRI results and until the headaches have
completely resolved.” (Pl.’s Supplemental Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions, Ex. 1, ECF No.
116.) The court expressed its concern that such notes are often easily obtained as a
matter of course and that Mayweather may be using the note as an excuse to escape his
obligations to the court. Moreover, the court specifically asked Mr. Tratos whether
Mayweather was resting or out partying. Tratos informed the court that Mayweather was
recovering from the fight and resting. As a result, the court granted an extension and
directed that Mayweather’s deposition should be taken no later than October 27th, 2011
(ECF No. 110).
Because plaintiff’s counsel would have to reschedule travel
accommodations as a result of the last minute rescheduling, the court directed that the
defendant would have to pay their costs associated with the postponement.
On September 30th plaintiff filed the present motion for sanctions. The plaintiff’s
later submitted a supplemental memorandum (ECF No. 116) in support of that motion.
Plaintiff sought sanctions against the individual defendant Floyd Mayweather, Jr.,
alleging that Mayweather misrepresented the reasons for the postponement. Plaintiff’s
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submitted video evidence that Mayweather appeared at the Echelon 3000 Club outside
Atlanta, Georgia on the night of September 29th, 2011—the date of the deposition prior
to the postponement. Mayweather appeared at another Atlanta area nightclub, the Ritz,
the following day. His appearance at this event was advertised on September 26th.
While Mayweather’s mangers represent that Mayweather did not dance at the clubs, he
can be seen alternatively throwing money into the crowd and burning U.S. currency.
These appearances occurred just days after the court postponed his deposition for health
reasons.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37 as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provide
federal courts with the power to issue sanctions. In addition to these provisions, “[d]ue to
the very nature of the court as an institution,” the court has the inherent power to issue
sanctions “to impose order, respect, decorum, silence, and compliance with lawful
mandates.” U.S. v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993). This
inherent power “is necessary to the exercise of all other powers” of the court. Id.
Because it is not subject to regulation by Congress or the people, this inherent
power “must be exercised with the greatest restraint and caution.” Id. at 461. Moreover, a
court must also comply with due process when exercising this power. Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). Where the rules provide adequate sanctions, a court
should rely on them, but when, “in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute
nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” Id. at 50.
Thus, a “court may invoke its inherent power in conjunction with, or instead of, other
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sanctioning provision.” In re Weiss, 11 F.3d 1159, 1171 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Chambers,
501 U.S. at 46–50).
“A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction
for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45. A court
must find bad-faith on the part of the person to be sanctioned before exercising its
inherent power. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46. Under its inherent power, “a court
may issue orders, punish for contempt, vacate judgments obtained by fraud, conduct
investigations as necessary to exercise the power, bar persons from the courtroom, assess
attorney's fees, and dismiss actions.” Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 462. “Since orders dismissing
actions are the most severe, such orders must be entered with the greatest caution.” Id.
In the context of an award of attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court has found that bad faith
exists where “a court finds ‘that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple
of justice has been defiled,’” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (quoting Universal Oil Products
Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946)), or where a party “delay[s] or
disrupt[s] the litigation or hampers a court order’s enforcement,” id. (quoting Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14 (1978)).
Accordingly, a court may exercise its inherent power “not merely to remedy
prejudice to a party, but also to reprimand the offender and ‘to deter future parties from
trampling upon the integrity of the court.” Salmeron v. Enterprise Recovery Systems,
Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 797 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668 (7th
Cir.2003)).
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III.
DISCUSSION
The court is unconvinced by Mayweather’s attempts to justify his actions and finds
that his conduct warrants sanctions. Mayweather’s appearance at a nightclub on the day
he was supposed to be deposed contradicts his stated reasons for rescheduling that
deposition. On September 27th, Mayweather learned that his deposition had been
postponed and that he obtained clearance from the doctor. Mayweather argues that he
did not confirm his appearance at either of the events until this time. Mayweather,
however, sought and obtained a postponement from this court on the grounds that he was
recovering from the fight and experiencing ongoing health problems. The court was not
told that Mayweather was simply waiting on clearance from a doctor following an MRI
scan. Moreover, when Mayweather did obtain clearance from the doctor, he did not
notify the court of the change in circumstances.
This court finds that Mayweather’s actions constitute bad faith. When the court
granted the postponement, it sought and obtained verification from Mayweather’s
counsel that Mayweather was resting and not out partying. Within days the court was
aware that this was not the case and that Mayweather was indeed partying. Mayweather
misrepresented to the court the nature and severity of his injuries, thereby obtaining a
postponement of his deposition. He has therefore committed a fraud upon this court.
Moreover, Mayweather avoided taking his deposition—which had already been
rescheduled from the summer to accommodate his schedule—for yet another month.
Courts have found that parties engaging in such delay tactics act in bad faith. See, e.g.,
Hutto, 437 U.S. at 698 n.14 (collecting cases).
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The court is also aware that Mayweather has been sanctioned in another case for
failing to appear at a deposition. (Pl.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Sanctions, Ex. 1, ECF No.
129.) This court, however, bases its decision on Mayweather’s conduct in the present
case. The court finds that his actions in this case justify sanctions and that such sanctions
are necessary to deter Mayweather or similarly situated parties from “trampling upon the
integrity of the court.” Salmeron, 579 F.3d at 797 (citing Dotson, 321 F.3d at 668).
Cognizant of its duty to afford due process, the court advised Mayweather that he
had a right to appear and be heard in person at the hearing (ECF No. 110). Tratos,
Mayweather’s counsel, indicated that he had informed his client of that right, but
Mayweather did not appear at the hearing the court held on November 4, 2011. In
addition, Tratos informs the court that during the telephonic hearing on September 27th,
he was not aware that Dr. Voy had reviewed the MRI results and cleared Mayweather to
conduct activities as normal. Therefore, Mr. Tratos relayed to the court the facts as they
were presented to him, and the court does not find that sanctions against Mr. Tratos are
warranted. As discussed above, the court finds that Mayweather’s actions constitute bad
faith and finds that Mayweather has not accorded this court the proper respect.
The court also takes notice that Mayweather is a wealthy individual. Plaintiff’s
counsel informed the court that Mayweather could not provide an amount when asked
how much he earned from his most recent fight. At the parties in question, Mayweather
can be seen burning money, allegedly one-hundred dollar bills, while in another video he
throws money into the crowd. Mayweather often advertises himself using the moniker
“Money Mayweather” and his production company is Philthy Rich Records. Suffice it to
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say that Mayweather has substantial personal wealth. In order to have a deterrent effect,
any monetary sanction would also have to be substantial.1 This court declines to conduct
extensive hearings to determine Mayweather’s wealth in an effort to arrive at an
appropriate monetary sanction. Rather than expend the resources of the court and the
parties in that manner, the court finds that sanctioning Mayweather in another fashion is
necessary.
Accordingly, this court finds that the sanctions outlined in the rules and statutes are
not “up to the task” in the present case and the court turns instead to its inherent
authority. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. Pursuant to that authority, the court directs the
individual defendant Floyd Mayweather, Jr., to perform community service.
The court
finds that such sanctions are necessary to deter Mayweather from similar conduct in the
future and to preserve the “order, respect, decorum, silence, and compliance” that should
be afforded to proceedings before this court. Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 461.
Therefore, the court directs Mayweather to perform 40 hours of community service
at the Las Vegas Habitat for Humanity Project by January 31st, 2012. Mayweather shall
immediately contact Chakoya Sims (telephone (702) 638-6477) to arrange a schedule for
compliance with this order. A copy of this order shall be forwarded by the clerk to Ms.
Sims. Ms. Sims shall advise the court when Mr. Mayweather has fulfilled his obligations
under this order.
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Mayweather would also have little difficulty paying plaintiff’s costs, and in fact, the court has already assessed
some costs to Mayweather (ECF No. 110).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 7, 2011
Columbia, South Carolina
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge
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