Govan v. Caterpillar Inc
Filing
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ORDER AND OPINION denying 55 Motion for Reconsideration re 49 Order Ruling on Report and Recommendation. Signed by Chief Judge Margaret B Seymour on 10/26/2012.(asni, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Lakeisha J. Govan,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
Caterpillar, Inc.
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________)
Civil Action No. 3:10-03132-MBS
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Lakeisha J. Govan (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against her former employer,
Caterpillar, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging that she was subjected to discrimination and a hostile
work environment because of her sex and pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978 (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also asserted a state law claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) In an order entered on September 26, 2012
(the “September order”), the court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for sex and
pregnancy discrimination. (ECF No. 49.) This matter is before the court on a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) by Defendant as to the portion of the
September order denying summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for sex and pregnancy
discrimination. (ECF No. 55.) Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion, asserting that Defendant’s
motion is wholly and utterly without legal merit. (ECF No. 60.) For the reasons set forth below,
the court DENIES Defendant’s motion for reconsideration as to Plaintiff’s claim for sex and
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pregnancy discrimination.
I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A detailed recitation of this matter’s relevant factual and procedural background can be
found in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and in the September order. (See
ECF Nos. 45, 49.) Summarily, Plaintiff filed this action on December 9, 2012, alleging that
Defendant’s decision to lay her off on July 27, 2009 resulted from discriminatory animus
regarding her multiple pregnancies.
The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for sex and pregnancy discrimination, finding that Plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find that sex and/or pregnancy
discrimination was the real reason for her lay-off instead of the reasons cited by Defendant.
(ECF No. 49, p. 15.) Defendant filed the instant motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) on October 5, 2012, to which Plaintiff filed opposition on October 19, 2012. (ECF
Nos. 55, 60.)
II.
A.
LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
Standard for Reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides the following:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or
parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The “district court retains the power to reconsider and modify its
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interlocutory judgments . . . at any time prior to final judgment when such is warranted.” Am.
Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003). This power of
reconsideration is committed to the discretion of the district court. See Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (noting that “every order short of a final
decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge”).
The Fourth Circuit has offered little guidance on the standard for evaluating a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) motion, but has held motions under Rule 54(b) are “not subject to the strict
standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment.” Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326
F.3d at 514; see also Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1472
(4th Cir. 1991) (the Court found it “unnecessary to thoroughly express our views on the interplay
of Rules 60, 59, and Rule 54”). In this regard, district courts in the Fourth Circuit, in analyzing
the merits of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 motion, look to the standards of motions under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59 for guidance. See U.S. Home Corp. v. Settlers Crossing, LLC, C/A No. DKC 08-1863, 2012
WL 5193835, at *2 (D.Md. Oct. 18, 2012); R.E. Goodson Constr. Co., Inc. v. Int’l Paper Co.,
C/A No. 4:02-4184-RBH, 2006 WL 1677136, at *1 (D.S.C. June 14, 2006); Akeva L.L.C. v.
Adidas Am., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565–66 (M.D.N.C. 2005). Therefore, reconsideration
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 is appropriate on the following grounds: (1) to follow an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) on account of new evidence; or (3) to correct a clear error of law
or prevent manifest injustice. Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., C/A No. PJM-08-409,
2010 WL 3059344, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 4, 2010) (“This three-part test shares the same three
elements as the Fourth Circuit's test for amending an earlier judgment under Rule 59(e), but the
elements are not applied with the same force when analyzing and interlocutory order.”) (citing
Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 514). Furthermore, motions to reconsider “may not be used to
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make arguments that could have been made before the judgment was entered.” Hill v. Braxton,
277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002). Nor are they opportunities to rehash issues already ruled
upon because a litigant is displeased with the result. R.E. Goodson, 2006 WL 1677136, at *1
(citing Tran v. Tran, 166 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
B.
Analysis
1.
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant asserts that the court should reconsider the September order because it
“reflects a misapprehension of certain controlling principles of law and overlooks the Court’s
own assessment of relevant facts which compel a conclusion contrary to that reached by the
Court.” (ECF No. 55-1, p. 1.) Specifically, Defendant asserts that the court “misapprehended
and misapplied the appropriate legal standard for direct evidence” in finding that direct evidence
supports Plaintiff’s claim that pregnancy motivated her layoff. (Id. at pp. 4-6.) Further, as
evidence of an erroneous application of the appropriate legal standard, Defendant identifies a
sentence in a paragraph in the September order addressing evidence regarding the ultimate
decision-maker wherein the proposition is stated that “[t]he focus of . . . [the] inquiry is whether
the employer’s stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate, wise, or well-considered.”
(Id. at p. 4 (citing Anderson v. Ziehm Imaging, Inc., C/A No. 7:09-02574-JMC, 2011 WL
1374794, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2011)).) Defendant asserts that the cited sentence relates to
pretext, and does not support the court’s conclusion that direct evidence supports Plaintiff’s
claim. Moreover, since direct evidence of discrimination does not exist to support Plaintiff’s
claim for discrimination, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973).
(Id. at pp. 6-9.)
Based on the foregoing, Defendant requests that the court
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reconsider the September order and grant summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s sex and
pregnancy discrimination claim. (Id. at p. 10.)
In her opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff asserts that the motion for
reconsideration is meritless because “(1) there has been no intervening change in controlling law
since this Court’s prior Order denying summary judgment; (2) no new evidence justifying a
reconsideration has come to light; and (3) no clear error of law or manifest injustice exists.”
(ECF No. 60, p. 1.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the court
“properly cited, applied and interpreted appropriate, governing legal standards when it reached
its conclusions.”
(Id. at p. 4.)
Therefore, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration should be denied. (Id.)
2.
Court’s Analysis
Upon review, the court agrees with Defendant that the sentence cited from Anderson
relates to pretext.
However, the court does not agree with Defendant that the citation to
Anderson in the context of the September order amounted to the application of the wrong legal
standard or a clear error of law in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s claim for sex and pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, the citation to Anderson
occurred contextually after the court’s discussion of direct evidence and was not related to the
court’s finding that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff after finding that
Johnson, Johns, and Faulling maintained a discriminatory attitude towards pregnant women and
that discriminatory attitude impacted the ultimate decision to lay-off Plaintiff during the RIF.”
(ECF No. 49, p. 14.) Therefore, Defendant has made an insufficient showing that there has been
a change in the controlling law, the introduction of new evidence justifying reconsideration, or
that the court committed a clear error of law in its September 26, 2012 order. Accordingly, the
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court must deny Defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the court hereby DENIES Defendant’s
motion for reconsideration of the portion of the September 26, 2012 order denying summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for sex and pregnancy discrimination. (ECF No. 55.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Margaret B. Seymour__________________
MARGARET B. SEYMOUR
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
October 26, 2012
Columbia, South Carolina
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