Meadows v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 42

ORDER granting in part 39 Motion for Attorney Fees, awarding $7,000.00 in attorney's fees to plaintiff. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 12/21/2012.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Tiffany Meadows,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Michael J. Astrue,
)
Commissioner of Social Security
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 3:11-cv-00290-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the court on a Joint Motion and Stipulation [Dkt. No. 40] for
Payment of Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d).
The court accepts the parties’ stipulation that Defendant will pay $7,000.00 in
attorney’s fees to the order of Plaintiff and that such payment shall constitute a complete
release from and bar to any and all claims Plaintiff may have relating to EAJA fees in
connection with this action. The court further accepts the stipulation that this payment is
without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to seek attorney fees under section 206(b) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), subject to EAJA’s offset provisions. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2412(c)(1), 2414.
However, the court cannot accept the remainder of the parties’ stipulation. The
parties propose that
[i]f, after receiving the Court’s EAJA fee order, the Commissioner (1) determines
that Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is subject to offset under the Treasury
Offset Program; and (2) agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment
Act, then the EAJA fees will be made payable to Plaintiff’s attorney. However, if
there is a debt owed under the Treasury Offset Program, the Commissioner cannot
agree to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, and the remaining

EAJA fees after offset will be paid by a check made out to Plaintiff but delivered
to Plaintiff’s attorney.
Joint Motion and Stipulation [Dkt. No. 40 at 1-2]. The United States Supreme Court was
clear in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2526-27 (2010) that an award of attorney’s fees
must be paid to the litigant not the litigant’s attorney. While the Court found that
attorney’s fees awarded under the EAJA are subject to an offset to satisfy a litigant’s preexisting debt to the United States Government, the Court did not base its decision on the
importance of insuring that the debt owed to the Government was satisfied first. Instead,
the Court based its decision on the unambiguous language of the EAJA, which the Court
held clearly intended for the award to be paid to the “prevailing party,” a term of art
referring to the prevailing litigant and not the prevailing attorney. Id. at 2525. See 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the stipulation’s consideration of the potential preexisting debt owed by Plaintiff and the concessions made by Plaintiff’s attorney to insure
that that debt be paid first does not obviate the requirement that the award be paid to
Plaintiff.
Ratliff did not address whether claimants may assign EAJA fees to their attorneys
through a contract, as has been done in this case. However, courts in this district have
expressed a concern that such contracts “constitute an end-run around the plain text of the
EAJA” as interpreted by Ratliff.

Phillips v. Astrue, CA 1:10-936-TLW, 2011 WL

5041751 (D.S.C. Oct. 21, 2011); see also Brinkley v. Astrue, CA 3:08-3427-GRA, 2010
WL 3192909 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2010); Tate v. Astrue, CA 3:09-3246-CMC-JRM, 2010
WL 4860356 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2010). The instant stipulation would accomplish a similar
end run around the Supreme Court’s holding in Ratliff.
Therefore, the court does not accept the stipulation that the fee be made payable

to Plaintiff’s attorney. Furthermore, the court cannot accept the alternate stipulation that
the check be made payable to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney.

The

attorney’s fee agreement gives him the power to sign over to himself any check for
awards made payable to Plaintiff. See Fee Agreement [Dkt. 39-2]. As a result, a check
made payable to Plaintiff but sent directly to Plaintiff’s attorney would effectively be a
payment directly to Plaintiff’s attorney. Such a result would be contrary to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Ratliff.
Therefore, the court orders Defendant to pay Plaintiff the stipulated amount of
$7,000.00 in attorney’s fees. The check should be payable to the order of the Plaintiff
and mailed directly to Plaintiff, but notice of the payment and mailing should also be
provided to Plaintiff’s attorney.
IT IS SO ORDERED

United States District Judge
December 21, 2012
Greenville, South Carolina