THI of South Carolina at Columbia LLC v. Wiggins

Filing 53

OPINION AND ORDER denying 44 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 11/30/2011.(cbru, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
THI of South Carolina at Columbia,
LLC, doing business as Magnolia Manor
of Columbia,

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)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Deborah J. Wiggins, as Personal Representative
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of the Estate of Earl Hall,
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Defendant.
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________________________________________ )

C/A No. 3:11-888-CMC

OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

This matter is before the court on motion of Defendant, Deborah J. Wiggins (“Wiggins”),
to reconsider the order which granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and found Wiggins’
cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings moot. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for
reconsideration is denied.
Grounds Argued. Wiggins raises two specific grounds for reconsideration. First, she
argues that the court relied on a facially invalid affidavit. Second, she argues that the court’s
injunction against “prosecuting her dispute with [Plaintiff, THI of South Carolina at Columbia, LLC
(“THI”)] in anything other than an arbitral forum” is improper because the nature of the dispute is
a motion to amend a state court judgment. In addition, she includes a generic ground for
reconsideration on “[s]uch other grounds [as] are supported by the common and statutory law of the
United States and the State of South Carolina.” Dkt. No. 44.
Applicable Rule. The caption of Wiggins’ motion suggests she seeks relief under both
Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither rule (or its applicable standard)

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is, however, mentioned in the body of Wiggins’ motion.

Thus, it is unclear under which rule

Wiggins proceeds. The timing of the motion (filed within 28 days of judgment) and the grounds
argued, however, suggest that Wiggins is proceeding under Rule 59(e).1
Standard. Rule 59(e) allows the court to alter or amend a judgment “‘(1) to accommodate
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or
(3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.’” Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)). “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used, however, to raise arguments
which could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue
a case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the first instance.” Pac.
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (citing Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749
(7th Cir. 1995)). A motion to alter or amend a judgment “is an extraordinary remedy which should
be used sparingly.” Id. at 402 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 at 124 (2d ed. 1995)).
DISCUSSION
Wiggins does not suggest either a change in the law or the existence of newly discovered
evidence not available prior to entry of the order. The court, therefore, assumes that she seeks
reconsideration to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. For reasons explained
below, Wiggins’ arguments do not support reconsideration on either ground.

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There is no suggestion of any error or ground for relief covered by either subpart of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (allowing for correction of clerical mistakes, oversights or
omissions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing for relief in the event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the
opposing party, a void judgment, a satisfied judgment or “any other reason that justifies relief.”).
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Reliance on Affidavit. In her first argument, Wiggins asserts that the court relied
extensively on the Harry Grunstein affidavit “in reaching its conclusion that THI may enforce a
contract to which it is not a party.” Dkt. No. 44-1.2 Wiggins argues that this affidavit “has no
evidentiary value whatsoever,” primarily because Grunstein “is not an officer or director or agent
of Magnolia Manor and does not claim to be.” Dkt. No. 44-1 at 2 (emphasis in original). She also
notes that the affidavit “was not even submitted in support of the motion to Compel Arbitration” but
was submitted “in opposition to Defendant Wiggins’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
Neither argument is well taken. First, Wiggins’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and
THI’s motion to compel arbitration were, effectively, cross-motions. As Wiggins explained in her
single-paragraph motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was filed contemporaneously with
her response to THI’s motion to compel: “No memorandum of law is attached as [Wiggins] certifies,
pursuant to Local Rule 7.04, that a full explanation of the basis for this motion has already been set
forth in [Wiggins’] Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Stay State-Court Proceedings.” Dkt. No. 28. Thus, the court properly considered all arguments and
all documents filed in support of or opposition to either motion in ruling on THI’s motion to compel
and in finding Wiggins’ cross-motion for judgment moot in light of the ruling on THI’s motion.
Despite the clear interrelationship of the motions, Wiggins failed to raise any challenge to
the Grunstein affidavit (Dkt. No. 34-5) in her subsequent filings, most critically her reply in support

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Contrary to the inference in this argument, the court did not hold that THI could enforce
the contract despite not being a party to it. As explained in the prior order, “THI” was not expressly
referenced in the admission contract but “was the only legal entity which could have been bound to
perform the obligations of the identified facility[,]” was also the entity which did perform, and was
identified in three addenda to the admissions contract executed on the same date. Dkt. No. 42 at 13.
Thus, while the admissions contract may have failed to expressly identify THI as the contracting
party, it did, in fact, hold that status and, consequently, was entitled to enforce its terms.
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of her motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. No. 36.

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Nowhere in this eleven-page

document does Wiggins mention the Grunstein affidavit, address the facts related therein, or suggest
a need for discovery on the relevant subject matter.
In short, Wiggins now seeks to raise an argument she could have raised prior to entry of the
opinion and order of which she now seeks reconsideration. This is not a proper basis for a motion
under Rule 59(e). See Becker, 305 F.3d at 290; Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
Denial of Any Remedy. Wiggins’ suggestion that the court has denied her any remedy is
also misplaced. In her motion, Wiggins assets that the court erred in enjoining her from
“prosecuting her dispute with THI in anything other than an arbitral forum” because the nature of
the dispute is a motion to amend a state court judgment. Dkt. No. 44 at 1. In her supporting
memorandum, she expands on this argument as follows:
The only question is whether the [state court] judgment [entered against Magnolia
Manor- Columbia, Inc.] can be altered to substitute a new Defendant. That is relief
an arbitrator cannot grant because an arbitrator cannot alter or amend a court
judgment. The Court’s ruling has entirely prevented Defendant Wiggins from any
kind of judicial relief because the relief she seeks cannot be obtained in the forum
this Court has condemned her to.
Dkt. No. 44-1 at 3.
Wiggins is correct that an arbitrator cannot alter or amend a state court judgment. That does
not, however, mean that an arbitrator could not, under appropriate circumstances, impose relief on
the party in arbitration which corresponded with the amount of the state-court judgment. Even if
such relief were not possible, the court would find Wiggins’ argument to be without merit because
the court’s ruling does not deny Wiggins any form of relief. It merely denies her preferred form of

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The second of these was a response to a court order and, consequently, limited in subject

matter.
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relief: extension of a default judgment obtained against one party (the entity named in the
complaint) to cover another entity which was not, but perhaps should have been, named in the
complaint.
To the extent there is any “unfairness” in the result reached by this court, it is the result of
a choice between two less-than-fully-satisfactory options. The court must either deprive THI of the
benefit of the contractual arbitration provision, or it must “deprive” Wiggins of the opportunity to
collect a judgment obtained against an incorrectly named state-court defendant from an entity she
believes might otherwise be held liable for the judgment. Between those choices, the better result
is to leave the party which was the author of the difficulty (Wiggins) with the natural result of her
earlier choices.
If this leaves Wiggins with no remedy at all, it is not because of the court’s ruling. Rather,
it would be because her state-court default judgment is not collectable against the defendant named
in that action and because her arbitration claim against THI is barred for some other reason. If
Wiggins faces the latter difficulty, it is the result of her own actions and decisions, not because this
court has enforced an otherwise binding arbitration provision. If her arbitration claim is not barred,
then all she has lost is the benefit of winning by default against an entity which was not named in
the underlying action.
Other Unspecified Grounds. Although Wiggins lists a third, generic, basis for relief in her
motion, she includes no corresponding argument in her memorandum. The third ground is,
therefore, manifestly without merit.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Wiggins’ motion to reconsider is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Columbia, South Carolina
November 30, 2011

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