Willis v. Baines et al

Filing 22

ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss; granting 10 Motion to Remand to State Court, remanding the action to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Fifth Judicial Circuit. Clerk's Notice: Attorneys are responsible for supplementing the State Record with all documents filed in Federal Court. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 09/29/2011.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Christopher H. Willis,

Plaintiff,
vs.
Genetha Baines, United Services
Automobile Association, a/k/a USAA,
and USAA Casualty Insurance Co.,
Defendants.

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C/A No.: 3:11-cv-1833-JFA

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the defendant’s motion to dismiss
and the plaintiff’s motion to remand. The parties have fully briefed this matter, and
after hearing oral argument from the parties, the Court has determined that remand is
appropriate. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby denies defendant’s motion
to dismiss and grants plaintiff’s motion to remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 21, 2008,1 Christopher Willis was in an automobile accident with
Genetha Baines. Willis filed the present suit against USAA on June 20, 2011 in the
Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Fifth Judicial Circuit. Willis alleged breach of
contract, bad faith failure to pay a claim, violation of South Carolina’s Unfair Trade
Practices Act, violation of South Carolina’s Insurance Trade Practices Act, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and negligence. Willis alleged that USAA failed to pay
1

Plaintiff lists this date as the date of the accident in his complaint. Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 9, ECF No. 1-3. In Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand at page 1, however, the date is listed as May 21, 2008.
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Underinsured Motorist benefits pursuant to an insurance policy entered into by Willis
with USAA. On June 28, 2011, Willis amended his complaint to add USAA Casualty
Insurance Company (“USAA CIC”) and Genetha Baines as defendants. Willis alleged
the same causes of action against USAA CIC he alleged against USAA. In addition, he
alleged negligence against Baines stemming from the car accident of June 21, 2008.
The defendant filed a notice of removal on July 27, 2011 on the basis of diversity
and alleged fraudulent joinder of the non-diverse parties. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss Genetha Baines on August 1st, 2011. The defendant argued that Baines had
been joined in violation of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a motion to
remand on August 18, 2011.
LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the
facts alleged in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme
Court has stated, however, that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although “a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations,” a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic
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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Likewise, “a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancements.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557). Accordingly, Plaintiff must put forth claims that crosses “the line from conceivable
to plausible.” Id. at 1950–51 (internal quotation omitted).
“Ordinarily, a defense based on the statute of limitations must be raised by the
defendant through an affirmative defense, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and the burden of
establishing the affirmative defense rests on the defendant.” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc.,
494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). “It follows, therefore, that a motion to dismiss filed
under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests the sufficiency of the complaint,
generally cannot reach the merits of an affirmative defense, such as the defense that the
plaintiff's claim is time-barred.” Id. “But in the relatively rare circumstances where
facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense
may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. This principle
only applies, however, if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense “clearly appear[ ]
on the face of the complaint.” Id. (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v.
Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir.1993).
DISCUSSION
I.

MOTION TO DISMISS
This Court declines to find that this is an instance where the affirmative statute of

limitations defense should be determined by a motion to dismiss. The Court
acknowledges the distinct possibility that the addition of Baines as a party is barred by
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the statute of limitations.2 This Court, however, believes that defendant Baines should
appear and address the statute of limitations defense in state court. Such a forum would
provide for a full airing of all the attendant issues, including possible factual arguments
such as the tolling of the statute, inherent in an affirmative defense. Because this Court
lacks jurisdiction over the case if Baines remains a party, as discussed below, it could not
provide such a forum. Additionally, the resolution of the statute of limitations defense
involves a disputed question of state law.
As a result, this Court declines to address defendant’s affirmative statute of
limitations defense asserted in the present motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court
denies the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
II.

MOTION TO REMAND
Baines was joined as a party prior to the removal of the case to this Court.

Because this Court has denied the motion to dismiss Baines, her presence in the suit
defeats diversity.3 The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 because there is not complete diversity among the parties. See Owens-Illinois,
Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 199) (“In order to establish diversity
jurisdiction, the parties must be completely diverse; none of the plaintiffs may share
citizenship with any of the defendants.”). The Court hereby grants the defendant’s
motion to remand.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint lists the date of the accident as June 21, 2008. Plaintiff filed its Amended Complaint on June
28, 2011. The SC Statute of Limitations S.C. Code § 15-3-530(5), if applicable, would therefore bar the
amendment.
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The parties do not dispute that plaintiff and defendant Baines are both citizens and residents of Richland County,
South Carolina.
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Accordingly, the action is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, Richland
County, South Carolina. A certified copy of this order of remand shall be sent by the
Clerk of this Court to the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, Fifth
Judicial Circuit of South Carolina.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 29, 2011
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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