Nichols v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 28

ORDER overruling 26 Objection to Report and Recommendation filed by Dennis E Nichols and affirming 22 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 3/6/13. (juwo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
DENNIS E. NICHOLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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No. 3:11-cv-02927-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on an objection to the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendation (R&R). The Commissioner of Social Security denied plaintiff
Dennis E. Nichols’s application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on
February 7, 2013, recommending the Commissioner’s decision be reversed and
remanded. The Commissioner does not object to the R&R. Plaintiff objects “only to the
recommended remedy of remand,” arguing “an outright reversal and award of benefits is
warranted under the circumstances of this case.” Pl.’s Obj. 1.
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). A party’s failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of
the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). The
recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).
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Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision regarding disability benefits
“is limited to determining whether the findings of the [Commissioner] are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence has been defined . . . as more
than a scintilla, but less than [a] preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541,
543 (4th Cir. 1964). In other words, “[i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is not within the province of a
reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court’s function to
substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner] if his decision is supported by
substantial evidence.” Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
The court has the authority to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the ALJ,
“with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Where the
[Commissioner’s] determination is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the
evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner’s]
decision” pursuant to Section 405(g). Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir.
1971). While remand is the norm, it is not appropriate where “further proceedings would
serve no useful purpose,” Olson v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1995), such as
where “all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately
establishes a plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits.” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994).
The magistrate judge found that this matter should be reversed and remanded to
the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings because “there are questions as

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to whether a finding of disability as of December 1, 2006 is warranted and the record
does not overwhelmingly support a finding of disability.” R&R 20 n.7. The court
agrees. It is for the ALJ to consider all relevant evidence, including the statement
provided by plaintiff’s mother and the severity of plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury, as
well as to apply the law correctly when evaluating plaintiff’s credibility and the opinion
of Dr. Young.
For the reasons set forth by the magistrate judge, the court OVERRULES
plaintiff’s objection, AFFIRMS the magistrate judge’s R&R, REVERSES the
Commissioner’s decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
REMANDS for further proceedings consistent with the R&R and this order.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
March 6, 2013
Charleston, South Carolina

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