Mallory v. Holdorf et al

Filing 90

ORDER and OPINION denying 79 Motion for Reconsideration Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 1/29/2013.(mdea )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Justin Wright Mallory, Sr.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
Travis Holdorf, Stan Smith and
)
Randy Strange,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)

Civil Action No. 3:11-03295-MBS

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the court by way of a motion filed by Plaintiff Justin Wright
Mallory, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), seeking to alter or amend an order of the court pursuant to Rule 59 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 59 motion”). (ECF No. 79.) In the order filed on
September 28, 2012 (the “September Order”), the court granted summary judgment to
Defendants, Travis Holdorf (“Holdorf”), Stan Smith (“Smith”), and Randy Strange (“Strange”)
(collectively “Defendants”), on Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and
violation of due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 76.) For the reasons stated
below, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the September Order.
I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On December 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants, alleging claims of
false arrest, malicious prosecution, and due process violations. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff sought to
recover damages from Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his
rights protected by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution that occurred during the course of his arrest and prosecution for the murder of his
wife, Nekia Gibson Mallory (“Plaintiff's wife”), for which Plaintiff was ultimately found not

1. The September Order contains a thorough recitation of the relevant factual background and is incorporated herein by reference.

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guilty. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights were violated by Defendants when
they knowingly fabricated evidence against him and concealed exculpatory evidence that caused
his arrest and prosecution for murder. (Id.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
coerced Joshua Porch (“Porch”), who was charged with the murder of Plaintiff's wife after
Plaintiff’s acquittal and is currently awaiting trial, into testifying as to false facts and committing
perjury to assist Defendants in the prosecution of Plaintiff. (Id.)
After answering the complaint denying Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on December 20, 2011. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) Plaintiff filed opposition to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on August 3, 2012, to which Defendants filed a reply
in support of summary judgment on August 27, 2012. (ECF Nos. 52, 62.) On August 30, 2012,
the court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 66.)

Thereafter, the court issued the September Order, granting summary judgment to Defendants.
(ECF No. 76.) On October 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed the present motion, asking the court to alter
or amend the September Order. (ECF No. 79.)
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment under Fed. R. Ci. P. 59
The decision whether to amend or alter a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is

within the sound discretion of the district court. Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th
Cir. 1995). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a court may “alter or amend the judgment if the movant
shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence that was not
available at trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.” Robinson
v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Collison v. Int'l Chem.
Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1994). “[T]he rule permits a district court to correct

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its own errors, ‘sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate
proceedings.’” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998).
However, Rule 59 motions “may not be used to make arguments that could have been made
before the judgment was entered.” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002). Nor
should they be used as opportunities to rehash issues already ruled upon because a litigant is
displeased with the result. See Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993)
(stating that “mere disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e) motion”); see also Consulting
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Geometric Software Solutions & Structure Works LLC, 2007 WL 2021901, at *2
(D.S.C. July 6, 2007) (“A party’s mere disagreement with the court’s ruling does not warrant a
Rule 59(e) motion, and such motion should not be used to rehash arguments previously
presented or to submit evidence which should have been previously submitted.”). “In general,
reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used
sparingly.” Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
B.

The Arguments of the Parties
In his Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff argues that summary judgment was erroneously granted

to Defendants because the court misconstrued the nature and governing law of his due process
claim for violating his right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a fabrication of evidence.
(ECF No. 79.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff asserts that individuals possess a due
process “‘right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a
government officer acting in an investigating capacity.’” (ECF No. 79-1, p. 5 (citing
Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d
342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000))).) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants “fabricated evidence” in
violation of due process when they, starting in June 2007, induced Porch to fabricate false

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testimony in support of Plaintiff’s prosecution for the murder of his wife. (See, e.g., ECF No.
79-1, pp. 6-12.) In this regard, Plaintiff claims that the court erroneously failed to recognize that
Plaintiff was entitled to recover on his due process claim for fabrication of evidence even if
Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and the arrest was otherwise lawful. (Id. at 2-3
(citing Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997)).)

Moreover,

qualified immunity is not a defense to a fabricated evidence due process claim and, therefore,
the court also erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on their affirmative defense of
qualified immunity. (Id. at 5 (citing Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 276-77 (4th Cir.
2005)).)
In addition to alleged errors regarding his due process fabrication of evidence claim,
Plaintiff argues that the court erroneously (1) failed to reference all the evidence favorable to
him regarding probable cause for a warrantless arrest and (2) considered post-arrest evidence in
concluding that the Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (Id. at 13-21, 27-8.)
Plaintiff further argues that the court should have delayed issuing the September Order to allow
Plaintiff time to depose Porch, who was unavailable for discovery in this matter pending his
criminal prosecution for the murder of Plaintiff’s wife. (Id. at 26-7.) Finally, Plaintiff argues
that the statute of limitations does not bar his claims. (Id. at 28-9.) Based on the foregoing,
Plaintiff urges the court to grant his Rule 59 motion and deny Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
In their opposition to altering or amending the September Order, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff’s Rule 59 motion should be denied because he fails to (1) allege an intervening change
in controlling law, (2) assert there is new evidence available, or (3) demonstrate that the court
committed a clear error of law. (ECF No. 85, p. 2.) Defendants further assert that the court did

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not commit error as suggested by Plaintiff in relying “almost entirely on the Defendants’
deposition testimony and statements” in analyzing probable cause because a proper analysis of
probable cause required the court to consider the facts known to the officers at the time of
Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. at 3.) In this regard, Defendants argue that the court “correctly and
thoroughly addressed the procedural and substantive issues on which the summary judgment
was granted” and “Plaintiff’s [Rule 59] motion is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate
matters that he has already lost on summary judgment and to further introduce novel and
additional arguments.” (Id. at 7, 8.) Therefore, Defendants urge the court to deny Plaintiff’s
Rule 59 motion.
C.

The Court’s Review
In his Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff does not rely on an intervening change in controlling law

or refer to new evidence previously unavailable.

Plaintiff instead asserts that the court

committed a clear error of law by granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s due
process claim for violating his right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of
evidence.
Upon review, the court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s arguments entitle him to relief
from summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
fabrication of evidence do not undermine the evidence in the record supporting the court’s
determination that probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with his wife’s murder. Wilkes v.
Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Probable cause only requires enough evidence ‘to
warrant a man of reasonable cause in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.”’) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). In this regard,
the fabrication of evidence claim fails because the probable cause supporting Plaintiff’s murder

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charge was the cause of his loss of liberty, not Porch’s allegedly false testimony.

See

Washington, 407 F.3d at 282 (To establish a violation of the right not to be deprived of liberty
based on false evidence, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants fabricated evidence, and
(2) the fabrication “resulted in a deprivation of liberty.”). As such, the court does not agree with
Plaintiff that the September Order contains clear error law regarding his due process claim for
fabrication of evidence. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)
(Under the “clear error” standard, a trial court’s decision will not be set aside so long as it is
“plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”)
In addition to the foregoing, the court concludes that the remaining contentions in
Plaintiff's Rule 59 motion merely rehash arguments that were previously set forth and rejected in
the September Order. Accordingly, the court fails to find a reason to alter or amend the
September Order and, therefore, denies Plaintiff's Rule 59 motion, ECF No. 79.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the
court’s September 28, 2012 order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Margaret B. Seymour___________________
MARGARET B. SEYMOUR
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 29, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

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