Reyes v. Jeffcoat

Filing 105

ORDER denying 83 Motion for Reconsideration PETITIONER'S MOTION PURSUANT TO RULES 52(b), 59(a),(e), AND FOR RECONSIDERATION and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 09/18/2012.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Maritza Meszaros Reyes,
Petitioner,
vs.
Harry Lee Langford Jeffcoat,
Respondent.

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C/A No.: 3:12-cv-298-JFA

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

This matter comes before the court on petitioner’s motion requesting the court to
reconsider its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court has reviewed the
parties’ briefs and has considered the arguments made before this court at an August 31,
2012 hearing, and, for the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
Motions under Rule 59 are not to be made lightly: “[R]econsideration of a
previous order is an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality
and conservation of judicial resources.” 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal
Practice ¶ 59.30[4] (3d ed.). “Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a judgment,
but it may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). “Mere disagreement [with a
court’s ruling] does not support a Rule 59(e) motion.”

U.S. ex rel. Becker v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal citation
omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held a motion to reconsider should be granted for only
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three reasons: (1) to follow an intervening change in controlling law; (2) on account of
new evidence; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff does not seek
reconsideration on the basis of an intervening change in controlling law or on account of
new evidence; rather, she requests reconsideration based on a new legal theory and
allegations that this court made clear errors of both law and fact in its Factual Findings
and Conclusions of Law.
Plaintiff first urges this court to adopt the theory of consecutive, alternating
habitual residences. The court is constrained to deny plaintiff’s request for multiple
reasons. First and foremost, the theory of consecutive, alternating habitual residences
was not pled, advanced, or argued until the instant motion, though the court suggested on
more than one occasion as the trial progressed that the evidence favoring one country or
the other might, in the final analysis, be equally balanced. This court heard over 24 hours
of testimony and argument throughout trial, and not once did plaintiff mention the theory
of consecutive, alternating residences. Moreover, Rule 59 motions are not the time to
raise new theories of law that could have been raised prior to entry of judgment. See
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. at 486 n.5. Additionally, the court does not
believe that the theory of consecutive, alternating residences applies in this case, and
even if it did apply, it would not change the outcome based on the law that plaintiff
presented to this court.
Plaintiff argues that this court made a number of errors of law in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, including the following: failure to evaluate whether there
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was a shared settled intention to abandon Venezuela prior to 2006, failure to evaluate
whether the children had acclimatized to the United States by September 2011, failure to
consider the last place the family lived together as a unit, and assignment of improper
weight to matters pertaining to travel, immigration, and residency status in one country or
the other. The court denies that it either failed to consider or improperly considered any
of the issues raised by the plaintiff. However, the court takes this opportunity to expound
on its findings that the children were habitually resident in the United States from 2006 to
2008 and that the United States was still the habitual residence of the children when
petitioner alleges that respondent wrongfully retained the children.
As stated in this court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, under the twopart framework that federal courts have developed to assist in habitual residence analysis,
courts evaluate the following:
(1)

shared parental intent – whether the parents shared a settled intention to
abandon the former country of residence; and

(2)

acclimatization – whether there was an actual change in geography coupled
with the passage of an appreciable period of time, one sufficient for
acclimatization by the children to the new environment.

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2009). In this case, the court found few
of the factors that courts usually consider in evaluating shared parental intent and
acclimatization helpful in determining habitual residence. During trial, the parties mostly
focused on the period from September 2008 to September 2011, and in the court’s view
the parties were not on the same page regarding the residence of their children during that
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period. Thus, there was no shared parental intent in September 2008 to abandon the
former habitual residence. As to acclimatization, the court finds the children were not
acclimatized to either country such that removing them would take them out of the family
and social environment in which their lives had developed. Simply put, because the
children had been moved back and forth between the United States and Venezuela all of
their lives they were comfortable in either environment. Furthermore, the children were
busy with school and extracurricular activities regardless of what country they were in.
Prior to September 2008, all of the children attended school and participated in
extracurricular activities in Lexington, South Carolina. (Tr. at 806). Respondent was
also living in Lexington, South Carolina, but petitioner was living in Venezuela and
commuting to the United States as frequently as she could. (Tr. 550 & 807). Based on
the actions of the parties during that time, the court believes that they had a shared
intention for the children to reside in the United States. As such, the court found in its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the children were habitually resident in the
United States from 2006 to September 2008 and that petitioner was unsuccessful in
showing that their habitual residence changed to Venezuela in September 2008.
Though plaintiff claims that this court made errors of fact in its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, plaintiff merely states facts that favor her position and argues
that this court came to the wrong conclusion as to habitual residence and acclimatization.
The court disagrees that it made any factual errors.
Finally, petitioner takes issue with the court’s consideration of the children’s
“wish” to stay in the United States and the court’s failure to make a finding on any
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imposition and influence by the respondent on the children’s preference. By not issuing
any findings on the alleged imposition and influence of the respondent on the children’s
preference, the court meant to imply that it found no such imposition and influence. As
to the legal significance of the children’s “wish” to stay in the United States, petitioner
presumes that the court gave weight to the children’s preference, but the court gave little,
if any, weight to that fact in coming to its conclusion that petitioner had not met her
burden of showing wrongful retention.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 18, 2012
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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