Simpson v. City of Columbia Fire Department

Filing 60

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 51 Report and Recommendation, granting 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. on 03/25/2014. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Trent M. Simpson,
Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Columbia,
Defendant.

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C/A No.: 3:12-cv-401-JFA

ORDER

This employment litigation matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Trent M.
Simpson’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) issued by a Magistrate
Judge in this case. The Magistrate Judge has recommended that this court grant Defendant City
of Columbia’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).
Having reviewed the entire record, including Plaintiff’s Objection, the court finds that the
Magistrate Judge has fairly and accurately summarized the facts and has applied the correct
principles of law in her Report. Accordingly, the court adopts the Report and fully incorporates
it into this order.
I.

Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a firefighter before his employment was

terminated on August 30, 2010. In her Report, the Magistrate Judge included a thorough
summary of the Plaintiff’s disciplinary history with the Defendant and of the events leading to
Plaintiff’s termination. As this court has already incorporated the Magistrate Judge’s Report in
full, it need not repeat Plaintiff’s employment history here.

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Plaintiff filed the instant action against the City of Columbia on February 13, 2012.
(ECF No. 1). Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 20, 2013. (ECF No.
34). After that motion was fully briefed, the Magistrate Judge issued her Report recommending
that this court grant Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff filed his Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
Report on January 31, 2014. (ECF No. 57). This court now considers Plaintiff’s objections and
rules on the Report.
II.

Legal Standard
A.

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge made her review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to the court. It has
no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). Parties are allowed to make a written
objection to a Magistrate Judge’s report within fourteen days after being served a copy of the
report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). From the objections, the court reviews de novo those portions of
the report that have been specifically objected to, and the court is allowed to accept, reject, or
modify the report in whole or in part. Id.
B.

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall
be rendered when a moving party has shown that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The court must determine
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). Summary judgment should be granted in those cases

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where it is perfectly clear that there remains no genuine dispute as to material fact and inquiry
into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of the law. McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees of
Mayland Community College, 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992). In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249.
C.

Employment Discrimination Framework

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race or
sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may
resort to the judicially created burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), under which a plaintiff has the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of
a person of another race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and (2) that disciplinary
measures enforced against the plaintiff were more severe than those enforced against the other
person. Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260, 264–65 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, the task
falls on a plaintiff to identify a suitable comparator, bearing in mind that “‘[t]he similarity
between comparators and the seriousness of their respective offenses must be clearly established
in order to be meaningful.’” Bradley v. South Carolina Dep’t Corr., C/A No. 3:08-2510-JFA,
2010 WL 883729, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2010) (quoting Lightner, 545 F.3d at 265).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.

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Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight, 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010) (Title VII). The defendant’s
burden “is one of production, not persuasion.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 142 (2000).

If the defendant meets the burden to demonstrate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the proffered reason was “‘not its true reason[], but [was] a pretext for discrimination.’” Merritt,
601 F.3d at 294 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
“Notwithstanding the intricacies of proof schemes, the core of every [discrimination] case
remains the same, necessitating resolution of the ultimate question of . . . whether the plaintiff
was the victim of intentional discrimination.” Merritt, 601 F.3d at 294–95.
III.

Discussion
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff was unable to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination because he did not identify a suitable comparator. Specifically, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff and proposed comparators Christopher Branham, April
Haynie, Robert Joyner, and Mike Edmonds were not similarly-situated because their disciplinary
histories, use of Defendant’s resources for private gain, or permission from supervisors are not
comparable. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff was unsuccessful in
showing that Defendant’s articulated reason for discharging Plaintiff was pretextual. For all of
those reasons, the Magistrate Judge found summary judgment appropriate in this case. The court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and findings.
Plaintiff has raised the following objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report: (1) the
Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to identify a suitable comparator and, thus,
that Plaintiff failed to show a prima facie case of disparate discipline; (2) the Magistrate Judge
erred in finding that summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiff failed to establish that

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Defendant’s reason for termination was pretextual.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s

employment was terminated for promoting his private business while on the job and with city
resources, after receiving numerous disciplinary measures.

The court discusses each of

Plaintiff’s objections below.
Plaintiff takes issue with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Branham is not a valid
comparator because he and Plaintiff are not similarly-situated. “[T]o be deemed ‘similarlysituated,’ the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have
dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the
same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.”

Parker v. Magna Innertech-

Spartanburg, Civil Action No. 6:09-773-JMC-KFM, 2010 WL 5488599, at *7 (D.S.C. Nov. 29,
2010) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff points out
that Branham also organized a fundraising event, a golf tournament, and alleges that Branham
also used City resources to promote the event. However, Plaintiff supports this allegation by
offering Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that Branham told Plaintiff that Branham had used the
City’s name in promoting the golf tournament.

ECF No. 57, p. 2.

The court finds that

Branham’s statements regarding a fundraising event organized by Branham are not within the
scope of Branham’s employment with Defendant, and are, therefore, inadmissible hearsay. See
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Lastly, Plaintiff points to Branham’s use of his City email and
mailing addresses for correspondence related to the golf tournament.

However, Plaintiff’s

conduct goes much further, as Plaintiff represented both directly and indirectly that his
fundraising activities were approved by the City. The court finds that the difference between
Plaintiff’s and Branham’s conduct is sufficient to render Branham an unsuitable comparator.

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Plaintiff next takes issue with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Haynie is not a valid
comparator because she and Plaintiff are not similarly-situated.

Plaintiff alleges that the

Magistrate Judge erred because Plaintiff and Haynie both had permission from Chief Jenkins to
conduct similar fundraising activities and because both Plaintiff and Haynie did, in fact, use the
City’s name in promoting their respective fundraisers. However, the court finds the disparity
between Plaintiff and Haynie’s disciplinary records alone is sufficient to make Haynie an
unsuitable comparator.
Plaintiff next contends that the Magistrate Judge erred by finding that Joyner is not a
valid comparator because he and Plaintiff are not similarly situated. Particularly, Plaintiff argues
that Joyner fit and sized fellow firefighters for new uniforms while on duty, in relation to a
second job held by Joyner, thus using his position with the City for private gain. However, the
fact that Plaintiff owned the business Plaintiff promoted while working and Joyner worked for
the uniform business is significant. Further, Joyner’s disciplinary history is non-existent, while
Plaintiff’s disciplinary record is significant.

The court, therefore, finds that the difference

between Plaintiff’s and Joyner’s conduct is sufficient to render Joyner an unsuitable comparator.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by finding that Edmonds is not a
valid comparator because he and Plaintiff are not similarly situated. Particularly, Plaintiff argues
that Mr. Edmonds authorized “scantily clad women having their pictures taken for a commercial
calendar.” ECF No. 57, p.5. Plaintiff next argues that Defendant “persecuted [Plaintiff] for
taking pictures of male firefighters for his calendar fundraiser to raise money for a noble cause.”
Id. It is unclear exactly what Plaintiff’s argument is on this point, but assuming that the
allegation is disparate treatment on the basis of sex, the court notes that Plaintiff and Edmonds
are both males. Moreover, there is no evidence that Edmonds had ever been disciplined for

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similar conduct, unlike Plaintiff. Therefore, the court concludes that Plaintiff has been unable to
identify a suitable comparator.
Even assuming Plaintiff was able to show a prima facie case, Defendant has produced
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment, and
Plaintiff is unable to show that this reason is a pretext.

Plaintiff summarily states in his

Objection that he demonstrated that the reason proffered by Defendant is pretextual, but in
reviewing Plaintiff’s previous arguments on this issue, the court disagrees. In the absence of
specific objections to the Report of the Magistrate Judge, this court is not required to give any
explanation for adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
The court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that the stated reason for
termination was a pretext for discrimination.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court hereby adopts the Report and Recommendation of

the Magistrate Judge.

Accordingly, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (ECF No. 34).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 25, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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