Pennington v. Kershaw County South Carolina et al

Filing 15

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION recommending the district judge deny Plaintiff's TRO Motion 9 . Objections to R&R due by 7/9/2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 6/20/2012. (jpet, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Jeffrey Pennington,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Kershaw County S.C.; State of South
Carolina; Kershaw County Detention
Center; Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation; Lt. Myers; Darrell
Drakeford; John Does 1-10; Jackson;
Lawson; McLeod; C.O. Alston; R.
Eugene Hartis,
Defendants.

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C/A No.: 3:12-1509-JFA-SVH

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before the court on the motion of plaintiff Jeffrey Pennington
(“Plaintiff”), filed June 18, 2012, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction (“TRO Motion”). [Entry #9].
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
The TRO Motion claims that Plaintiff has been falsely arrested by the defendants

on two occasions. Id. at 2. The original and amended complaints in this matter allege
that the defendants falsely accused Plaintiff of speeding, having an expired license, and
failing to have a vehicle license plate in Kershaw County on April 19, 2012. [Entry #1 at
6; Entry #8 at 3S4]. Subsequent to the arrest, Plaintiff was detained at the Kershaw
County Detention Center, where he was “forced to post bail and issued three tickets and
released.” [Entry #8 at 4]. The TRO Motion states that, on June 12, 2012, Plaintiff
returned to Kershaw County for a hearing.

[Entry #9 at 2].

An attempt to submit

evidence during the hearing allegedly resulted in Plaintiff being handcuffed by several
deputies and detained for a second time at the Kershaw County Detention Center. Id. at
3. Plaintiff has been issued a summons to return to Kershaw County on June 26, 2012,
for another hearing. Id. Plaintiff alleges “fear for his life and liberty because of the
actions of the defendants on April 19 and June 12, 2012,” and seeks “an Emergency order
restraining the defendants contact with the plaintiff until this matter has been
adjudicated.” Id. at 3S4.
II.

Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all four of the following
elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and
(4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575
F.3d 342, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2009), overruling Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v.
Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).1 A plaintiff must make a clear showing
that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; Real Truth,
Although the original decision in Real Truth was vacated by the Supreme Court
for further consideration in light of the decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010), the Fourth Circuit reissued its opinion on Parts I and
II of its earlier opinion in the case, 575 F.3d at 345–347, stating the facts and articulating
the standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions, before remanding it to the district
court for consideration in light of Citizens United. See The Real Truth About Obama, Inc.
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
1

2

575 F.3d at 345–46. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be
irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 19S20; Real Truth, 575
F.3d at 347. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the
party’s favor. See id. at 346–47.2 Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the
public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction.

Id. at 347

(quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 19–23).
B.

Analysis

The TRO Motion indicates that Plaintiff has a hearing scheduled for June 26,
2012, in Kershaw County, South Carolina, where he is being prosecuted for traffic
violations. [Entry # 9 at 2S3]. The TRO Motion asks this court to enjoin the defendants
from having contact with Plaintiff until the issues in Plaintiff’s pending federal civil
action have been adjudicated. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court has held that a federal court
should not equitably interfere with state proceedings except in the most narrow and
extraordinary of circumstances.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Gilliam v.

Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). In Younger, the Court noted that courts of
equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43S44. In the
present TRO Motion, Plaintiff alleges that he cannot receive a fair trial with the

Based on Winter, the Real Truth Court expressly rejected and overruled
Blackwelder’s sliding scale approach that formerly allowed a plaintiff to obtain an
injunction with a strong showing of a probability of success even if he demonstrated only
a possibility of irreparable harm. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347; Winter, 555 U.S. at 20S22.
2

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defendants.

[Entry #9 at 2].

However, such a claim rests on mere speculation or

conjecture at this time, and Plaintiff provides no indication that he lacks an adequate
remedy at law to address the denial of a fair hearing in state court. The TRO Motion also
offers no information to demonstrate how Plaintiff will incur irreparable injury if the
traffic court proceedings continue.

In addition, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of

proving that the balance of equities tips in his favor and fails to address the potential for
harm to the defendants if the TRO Motion were granted. Finally, Plaintiff fails to show
how public interest would be served by the issuance of a TRO at this time. Because
Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or more than a
possibility of irreparable harm, and because the balance of the equities and the public
interest involved do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, Plaintiff’s
TRO Motion should be denied.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the district judge deny Plaintiff’s

TRO Motion [Entry #9].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

June 20, 2012
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
“Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

4

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report
and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis
for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not
conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory
committee’s note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of
service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and
Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the
District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).