Wilson v. South Carolina Department of Labor Licensing and Regulation et al

Filing 61

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 45 Report and Recommendation, denying 22 Motion to Dismiss by Catherine Templeton. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 03/15/2013. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Sherry Wilson,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
South Carolina Department of Labor
)
Licensing and Regulation, Catherine
)
Templeton, Samuel Wilkins, William “Ron” )
Cook, Charles Ido, and Holbrook “Ryan” )
Alvey, in their official and individual
)
capacities,
)
)
Defendants. )
)

C/A No.: 3:12-cv-1750-JFA

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on Defendant Catherine Templeton’s Objection to the
Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and Renewed Motion to Dismiss. The Magistrate
Judge has recommended that this court deny Defendant Templeton’s previous Motion to
Dismiss. Having reviewed the record, including the motion and the objections, the court finds
that the Magistrate Judge has applied the correct principles of law in her Report. Accordingly,
the court adopts the Report and fully incorporates it into this order.
The Plaintiff, Sherry Wilson, filed this action asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 42 U.S.C. §
1985; as well as a state law claim of civil conspiracy. The crux of Wilson’s Complaint is that the
Defendants unlawfully forced her, an African-American female, to accept a demotion and
subsequently to resign. In her motion to dismiss, Defendant Templeton seeks the dismissal of
Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action, alleging civil conspiracy. After this motion was fully briefed,

1

the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that this court deny
Templeton’s motion.
I.

Legal Standard
A.

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge made her review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to the court. It has
no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). Parties are allowed to make a written
objection to a Magistrate Judge’s report within fourteen days after being served a copy of the
report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). From the objections, the court reviews de novo those portions of
the report that have been specifically objected to, and the court is allowed to accept, reject, or
modify the report in whole or in part. Id.
B.

Motion to Dismiss

When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the facts
alleged in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v.
Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999).

The United States Supreme Court has stated,

however, that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Although “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations,” a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic

2

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Likewise, “a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancements.’”

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs must put forth claims that cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Id. at 1950–51 (internal quotation omitted).
II.

Analysis
The Magistrate Judge has recommended that this court deny Defendant Templeton’s

Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Plaintiff sufficiently pled special damages as a part of her
civil conspiracy claim. Templeton raises the following objections to the Report: (1) damages
claimed for civil conspiracy are repetitive and overlap with the damages claimed in other causes
of action; (2) damages claimed for “physical impairment, pain and suffering, emotional distress
and other intangible damages including reputational loss” are non-economic damages not
capable of calculation; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to identify how Defendant Templeton engaged
in a civil conspiracy with respect to Plaintiff’s employment.
The first two objections that Templeton raises to this court were previously presented to
the Magistrate Judge as arguments in Templeton’s Motion to Dismiss. The court finds these
arguments unavailing. This court recognizes that “[i]f a plaintiff merely repeats the damages
from another claim instead of specifically listing special damages as part of their civil conspiracy
claim, their conspiracy claim should be dismissed.” Hackworth v. Greywood at Hammett, LLC,
682 S.E.2d 871, 875 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). However, after comparing the special damages pled
as a part of the civil conspiracy claim to the damages alleged in the other causes of action, this
court finds that the special damages are not duplicative of the general damages pled in the
Complaint. As to Templeton’s assertion that special damages for civil conspiracy must be

3

capable of calculation, the court cannot agree. Though Templeton failed to cite any case law to
support this statement in her Objections, she has previously supported the same argument by
citing cases dealing with special damages related to claims other than civil conspiracy. The court
is not persuaded that such law is applicable in the civil conspiracy context. In Templeton’s third
objection, she contends that Plaintiff has not identified how Templeton engaged in a civil
conspiracy with respect to Plaintiff’s employment. On the contrary, the Complaint states, “the
individual defendants and others met, schemed, conspired and planned in secret and sometimes
even open meetings to demote the plaintiff and others of her race and to deny them equal
treatment as their white counterparts throughout the [reduction in force].” (ECF No. 1, p. 7).
Defendant Templeton qualifies as one of the “individual defendants.”

Thus, Plaintiff has

properly pled a claim of civil conspiracy against Templeton. This court rejects the arguments
made in Templeton’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report.
Additionally, Templeton disagrees with the suggestion made in Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition that costs and fees associated with this action are special damages.
The Magistrate Judge did not specifically address Plaintiff’s argument about costs and fees as
special damages, but it appears to the court that Plaintiff has not pled fees and costs as special
damages. Plaintiff’s Complaint merely states a general prayer for costs and fees. As recognized
by the South Carolina Court of Appeals, “special damages must ‘be specifically stated’ to avoid
surprise to the other party.” Benedict College v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 518, 523
(2012) (quoting Preferred Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Elkholy, 399 S.E.2d 19, 21 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990)). It
should be noted that the court’s determination that Plaintiff has properly pled special damages as
part of her civil conspiracy claim is not based upon Plaintiff’s prayer for fees and costs.

4

III.

Conclusion
For all of the reasons discussed above, this court hereby denies Defendant Templeton’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22), as well as her Renewed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 47).1
IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 15, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

1

Although the court has denied the motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim at the pleading stage, the court
expects the issue to arise again at the summary judgment stage of this case.

5