Lovett v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 13 Motion for TRO; denying 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 13 Motion for Hearing. Signed by Chief Judge Margaret B Seymour on 8/1/2012.(abuc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Willie Lovett,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Deutsche Bank National Trust
)
Company, in its capacity as indenture
)
Trustee for Note holders of Aames
)
Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2, a
)
Delaware statutory trust; Mortgage
)
Electronic Registration System, a
)
Delaware Corporation, aka MERS; EMC
)
Mortgage Company, an entity; Real Time )
Solutions, an entity; Residential Credit
)
Solutions aka, RCS, a corporation;
)
AAMES Funding Corporation dba
)
Aames Home Loan, an entity; All Persons )
and Entities Claiming Any Interest in
)
Subject Real Property Located at 2344
)
Rolling Hills Road, Columbia, S.C. 29210; )
and Does 1-10, inclusive,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

C/A No. 3:12-01816-MBS-SVH

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the motion of plaintiff Willie Lovett (“Lovett”) for a
temporary restaining order, preliminary injunction, and a hearing. [Entry #13].
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
On July 2, 2012, Lovett filed a complaint against the Defendants, alleging ca uses of actions

for fraud, negligence, quiet title, and for an accounting and requesting injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief. [Entry #1]. The case appears to be related to Deutsche Bank v. Lovett, C/A 3:1201819-MBS-SVH (“Foreclosure Action”), in which Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(“Deutsche Bank”) filed a foreclosure action against Lovett, and which Lovett removed

simultaneously with his filing of the instant case. This action attempts to bring causes of actions
against Deutsche Bank and the other defendants surrounding the same set of facts as those at issue
in the Foreclosure Action. On July 30, 2012, Lovett filed the instant motion for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”), preliminary injunction and a hearing “to stop a scheduled foreclosure
illegally ordered by the court of common pleas in the city of Richland County on July 23 after a
Notice of Removal was filed on July 2 which stopped all activity in the case.” [Entry#13].
II.

Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

The court may only grant a TRO, which is issued “without written or oral notice to the
adverse party,” or a preliminary injunction, after notice to the adverse party, under strict conditions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Both TROs and preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary remedies involving
the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.”
MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Moore v.
Kemthorne, 464 F.Supp.2d 519, 525 (E.D.Va. 2006) (“The standard for granting either a TRO or a
preliminary injunction is the same.”). A petitioner seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and
(4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7 (2008); The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342,
346-47 (4th Cir.2009), overruling Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550

2

F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).1
Traditionally, preliminary injunctions are sought to “protect the status quo and to prevent
irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit, ultimately to preserve the court’s ability to render
a meaningful judgment on the merits.” In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2003).
B.

Analysis

Lovett is unable to show that there is a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his
case. Lovett’s alleges no factual allegations in his motion aside from those in his complaint. In
addition, Lovett indicates in the instant motion that a state court has ruled adversely to him on these
issues. This court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from attacking the conclusions of the
state courts regarding the validity of the legal title held by Lovett.2 Brown & Root. Inc. v.
Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents Plaintiff
“from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s
federal rights.”).

1

Although the original decision in Real Truth was vacated by the Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of the decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, --- U.S.
----, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010), the Fourth Circuit reissued its opinion on Parts I and II of its earlier
opinion in the case, 575 F.3d at 345–347, stating the facts and articulating the standard for the
issuance of preliminary injunctions, before remanding it to the district court for consideration in light
of Citizens United. See The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Elections Comm’n, 607 F.3d
355 (4th Cir. 2010).

2

Any argument by Lovett that the state court lacked jurisdiction based on removal will be addressed
in a separate order in the Foreclosure Action.
3

Lovett also fails to allege that he will be irreparably harmed if the court does not grant a TRO
or preliminary injunction. Additionally, Lovett has not met his burden of showing that the balance
of equities tips in his favor or that injunctive relief is in the public interest. Therefore, the
undersigned finds that Lovett has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to a TRO or a preliminary
injunction and further finds that a hearing on this motion is unnecessary.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Lovett’s motion for temporary restraining order, preliminary

injunction, and a hearing is denied. The matter is recommitted to the Magistrate Judge for
additional pretrial handling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Margaret B. Seymour
Chief United States District Judge

Columbia, South Carolina
August 1, 2012

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