Bryan v. Matthews

Filing 11

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and without service of process, for 8 Report and Recommendation, Signed by Honorable R Bryan Harwell on November 28, 2012. (kbos)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Edward Bryan, #235730,
Plaintiff,
v.
Carolyn C. Matthews,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No.: 3:12-2316-RBH

ORDER

Plaintiff Edward Bryan, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action, alleging
violations of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This matter is
before the Court after the issuance of the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States
Magistrate Judge Joseph R. McCrorey.1 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the
Court summarily dismiss Plaintiff’s action against Defendant without prejudice and without service
of process.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Ridgeland Correctional Institution, filed this 42 U.S.C. §
19832 action in August 2012, alleging that Defendant Carolyn C. Matthews, a judge on the South
Carolina Administrative Law Court (“ALC”), committed fraud and violated his due process rights
in failing to provide Plaintiff notice of an order in his case. According to the allegations in

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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (D.S.C.), this matter was
referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling. The Magistrate Judge’s review of Plaintiff’s
complaint was conducted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A. The Court is mindful of its duty to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants. See
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978); but see Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775
F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court liberally construes his due process claim as raised
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Plaintiff’s complaint, an undated, unsigned final order was issued in February 2008, but Plaintiff did
not physically receive it until May 2010. He asserts that, despite his complaints to many officials,
the properly signed and dated final order was not issued until January 2011. Though it is not
completely clear from his allegations, it appears that Plaintiff is claiming that the “late issuance” of
the Defendant’s final order in 2011 somehow prevented Plaintiff from filing a timely notice of
appeal and properly exhausting his state court remedies.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly sent the subject final order to an attorney who
previously represented Plaintiff despite records showing that Plaintiff’s own address was supposed
to be used. He also states that there was “fraud” in connection with the final order because there
was a “remand” in 2008, but no compliance with the directions contained in the remand until 2011.
Plaintiff does not provide copies of the orders on which he bases his claims although he refers to
them as “exhibits,” and he does not state what the remand was for or who was supposed to comply
with what under the terms of the alleged remand, but he does allege that Defendant “negligently
discharged judicial duties” and that her lack of supervision over the completion of those duties
deprived him of his ability to appeal her order. Compl., ECF No. 1.
The Magistrate Judge issued his R&R on September 28, 2012, R&R, ECF No. 8, and
Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R on October 15, 2012, Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 10.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the R&R to which specific objection is made, and the Court may

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accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or
recommit the matter to him with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The right to de novo review may be waived by the failure to file timely objections. Orpiano
v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court need not conduct a de novo review when a
party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific
error in the [M]agistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. Moreover, in the absence
of objections to the R&R, the Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the
recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). However, in the absence of
objections, the Court must “ ‘satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.’ ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d
310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge recommends summarily dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint on the basis
that Defendant is an ALC judge. In his objections, Plaintiff largely rehashes the allegations of his
complaint. The Court reiterates that it must only consider objections to the R&R that direct this
Court to a specific error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 n.4
(4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-47 nn.1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Indeed, “[c]ourts
have . . . held de novo review to be unnecessary in . . . situations when a party makes general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the [Magistrate Judge’s]
proposed findings and recommendation.” Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47.
However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court, after reviewing the allegations of
Plaintiff’s complaint, finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. As the Magistrate
Judge noted in his R&R, the alleged wrongdoing of Defendant—issuing an order and providing

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notice of the order—was within her duties as a judge on the ALC. Even in his objections, Plaintiff
admits that he acknowledged Defendant was “performing the duties of her office.” R&R 4. Given
Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant is thus absolutely immune from liability. S.C. State Ports Auth. v.
Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
511-14 (1978) and observing that the Supreme Court “extended absolute judicial immunity to
[administrative law judges] precisely because [they] perform judicial acts”); McKinnedy v.
Reynolds, et al., No. 6:08-cv-03169-HMH-WMC, 2008 WL 4924947, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 14, 2008)
(citing S.C. State Ports Auth. and applying judicial immunity to judges on the South Carolina ALC).
CONCLUSION
The Court has thoroughly analyzed the entire record, including the complaint, the Magistrate
Judge’s R&R, objections to the R&R, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated above and by
the Magistrate Judge, the Court hereby overrules Plaintiff’s objections and adopts the Magistrate
Judge’s R&R.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED without
prejudice and without service of process.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ R. Bryan Harwell
R. Bryan Harwell
United States District Judge
November 28, 2012
Florence, South Carolina

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