Curtis et al v. Time Warner Cable Inc

Filing 155

ORDER denying 154 MOTION for Partial Reconsideration of 152 Order granting in part and denying in part Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by the Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. on 03/06/2014.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Keith Curtis, Tyneshia Brooks, Adrienne
Davenport, John Davenport, and Catherine
Comella-Ports, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

C/A No. 3:12-cv-2370-JFA

Plaintiffs,
ORDER
vs.
Time Warner EntertainmentAdvance/Newhouse Partnership; and TWC
Administration, LLC,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on a partial motion for reconsideration filed by Time
Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership (“TWEAN”).

ECF No. 154.

Specifically, TWEAN asks the court to reconsider the portion of an order that denied a motion to
dismiss as to the plaintiffs’ claims under the South Carolina Wage Payment Act, S.C. Code Ann.
§ 41-1-10 et seq. Id.
As motions to reconsider are not expressly contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court will treat this motion as a Rule 54(b) motion to revise its order. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b). While the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has offered little guidance on the evaluation
standard, it has held that motions under Rule 54(b) are “not subject to the restrictive standards”
of motions under Rule 60. Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462,
1472 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding it “unnecessary to thoroughly express [its] views on the interplay
of Rules 60, 59, and 54”). Thus, the court turns to cases involving Rule 59 for guidance.

1

A court’s reconsideration under Rule 59 “is an extraordinary remedy that should be
applied sparingly.” EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 116 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court should grant a motion to reconsider only
when (1) an intervening change in controlling law occurs; (2) additional evidence not previously
available has been presented; or (3) the prior decision was based on clear error or would work
manifest injustice. Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). As a result, Rule
59 motions are neither an opportunity “to make arguments that could have been made before the
judgment was entered,” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002), nor a chance to
rehash issues already ruled upon because a party disagrees with the result. See Tran v. Tran, 166
F. Supp. 2d 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Having reviewed the pleadings related to this motion, the court finds that further oral
argument will not aid in its decision-making process. In the view of this court, the motion
presents neither new controlling law, nor new evidence, nor points out a clear legal error of this
court. For the above reasons, the motion to revise the judgment is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 6, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

2