Amerson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 11 Report and Recommendation, affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 12/03/2013. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Raymond Lavan Amerson,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
1
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner )
of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)

Civil Action No. 3:12-2448-TMC

ORDER

The plaintiff, Raymond Lavan Amerson (“Amerson”), brought this action under Title 42,
United States Code, section 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his claim for disability insurance
benefits. This case is before the court on the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation
(“Report”), recommending that the court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 11.)2
I. Background
Amerson filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 2, 2006,
alleging disability since January 6, 2006, due to arthritis, back pain, depression, and irritable
bowel syndrome. The Commissioner denied his application and he brought an action in this
court. See Civil Action No. 3:09-02857-HMH-JRM. This court remanded the case to the
Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner or Social Security on February 14, 2013. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted for Michael
J. Astrue as Defendant in this lawsuit.
2

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a United States Magistrate Judge may
conduct initial review of social security matters. The magistrate judge’s recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the United States District Court.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report to which either party specifically objects. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the magistrate judge’s recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

After remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reheard testimony from Amerson
and a vocational expert. The ALJ issued a decision denying Amerson’s claims. At the time
Amerson was last insured for disability benefits, March 31, 2006, he was fifty-two years old, had
a twelfth grade education (without a high school diploma), and had past relevant work
experience as a general farmer. The ALJ found that Amerson suffered from several severe
impairments under the Act, including obesity, irritable bowel syndrome, and vertigo. After
considering the record, the vocational expert’s testimony, and Amerson’s own testimony, the
ALJ found that Amerson should be limited to light work with certain restrictions, but that his
impairments did not equal one of the listed impairments and that jobs existed that Amerson was
capable of performing. The Appeals Council declined jurisdiction, making the ALJ’s decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. Amerson has now brought this action challenging the
Commissioner’s decision.
II. Standard of Review
The federal judiciary has a limited role in the administrative scheme established by the
Social Security Act (“SSA” or the “Act”). Section 405(g) of the Act provides, “the findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence has been defined . . . as more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir.
1964). This standard precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the
court’s findings for those of the Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971).
Thus, in its review, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make
credibility determinations, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

However, “[f]rom this it does not follow . . . that the findings of the administrative
agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates
more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative agency.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d
278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). Rather, “the courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give
careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the
[Commissioner’s] findings, and that this conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
III. Discussion
Amerson has raised four specific objections: (1) the magistrate judge failed to give
controlling weight to Amerson’s treating physician’s opinion; (2) due to his age, Amerson should
not be considered re-trainable; (3) Amerson is disabled under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.
2, Sec. 201.10; and (4) The ALJ failed to assign enough importance to Amerson’s depression.
(ECF No. 13.) In response, the Commissioner asserts that the parties and the magistrate judge
have already fully addressed the issues raised regarding Amerson’s treating physician and the
weight assigned to Amerson’s mental condition. (ECF No. 17, see Pl. Br., ECF No. 8 pp. 2-3;
Def. Br., ECF No. 9 pp. 9-12; Report, ECF No. 11 pp. 14-17.) The court has fully reviewed the
portions of the record relating to these two issues and finds that, as discussed more extensively in
the Report, the Commissioner’s findings as to both are supported by substantial evidence.
As to Amerson’s other two objections, the court does not find either persuasive. First,
Amerson does not cite any authority to support his proposition that based on his age alone, the
ALJ should have found that he was not capable of adjusting to work other than his prior work
experience.3 In making this finding, the ALJ, as he is required to do, considered Amerson’s age,

3

Amerson’s full objection states: “The claimant, who was born on May 25, 1953, was 53 years old as of his date last
insured (March 31, 2006). Because of his age (closely approaching advanced age), the Plaintiff should not be
considered re-trainable.” (ECF No. 13.) Without further guidance, the court interprets this objection as referring to
the ALJ’s finding number 10.

along with other relevant factors. (See ALJ Decision, ECF No. 7-8 p. 32.) Second, as discussed
in the Report, even under § 202.10’s4 framework, Amerson would not be disabled. The primary
difference between § 202.10 and the section the ALJ applied, § 202.14, is the claimant’s level of
education. Amerson’s objection asserts that “[h]e had a limited education and read at a 5th grade
level.” (ECF No. 13 p. 2.) In order to be considered disabled, Amerson would have to be
illiterate or unable to communicate in English. (See § 202.09.) While a fifth grade education is
less than a high school education, as the ALJ found, it is certainly more than illiteracy. 5 In
addition, the record clearly indicates Amerson’s ability to communicate in English with doctors,
attorneys, ALJs, and Social Security Administration representatives.
In sum, the court has considered all of Amerson’s objections and sees no reason to
deviate from the Report. The ALJ’s decision is well-reasoned and supported by substantial
evidence.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, after a full review of the record in this case, the court adopts the Report and
incorporates it herein. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Court Judge
December 3, 2013
Anderson, South Carolina

4

Amerson’s objection cites to § 201.10. However, the court does not find evidence in the record that Amerson
objects to the ALJ’s finding that Amerson should be limited to light, rather than sedentary, work. Thus, the court
assumes that Amerson meant to cite to § 202.10. If Amerson did intend to argue that he should be limited to
sedentary work, then that argument is unsupported by the record and equally unpersuasive.
5

Amerson’s arguments regarding his level of literacy have been fully briefed by the parties and considered in the
Report and by this court. (See ECF No. 8 p. 2; ECF No. 9 pp. 7-9; ECF No. 11 pp. 12-14.)