Hudson v. Columbia, City of
Filing
39
OPINION AND ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 34 Report and Recommendation, granting in part 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 1/26/2015. (cbru, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Vincent E. Hudson,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
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City of Columbia,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)
C/A No. 3:13-429-CMC-PJG
OPINION AND ORDER
Through this action, Plaintiff, Vincent E. Hudson (“Hudson”) seeks recovery from his
employer, the City of Columbia (“the City”), for alleged racial discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”).
Hudson’s claims focus on the City’s failure to promote him to the position of Battalion Chief in
2011, but include allegations relating to non-promotion in 2012 . Complaint ¶ 21 (ECF No. 1)
(conceding his non-promotion in 2011 followed his failure to obtain a passing score on the
supplemental application); Complaint ¶¶ 30, 31 (alleging that, after he reported complaints in 2012,
he was “passed over for [promotion] even though he successfully completed the testing
requirements”). Hudson also alleges that he was subjected to retaliatory actions between 2011 and
2012. Complaint ¶ 40 (alleging that the City “retaliated against [him] by failing to promote him for
jobs for which he was eligible [and] harassed and intimidated him”); Complaint ¶ 41 (alleging
retaliatory station transfer). Finally, Hudson alleges he was denied overtime pay to which he was
entitled. Id.
The matter is before the court on the City’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 24. For
the reasons set forth below, the City’s motion is granted in full.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), D.S.C., this
matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett for pre-trial proceedings and
a Report and Recommendation (“Report”). On December 2, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued a
Report recommending that the City’s motion for summary judgment be granted in full. Report (ECF
No. 34). The Magistrate Judge advised the parties of the procedures and requirements for filing
objections to the Report and the serious consequences if they failed to do so.
Hudson filed timely objections on December 17, 2014, arguing that summary judgment
should be denied as to all of his claims. ECF No. 36.1 The City responded on December 23, 2014,
urging the court to adopt the Report in full and grant summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 37.
STANDARD
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to which a
specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). In the absence of a specific objection, the court reviews the
Report and Recommendation only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
1
The Report concludes by “recommend[ing] that defendant’s motion for summary judgment
. . . be granted.” ECF No. 34 at 13. The recommendation as to the retaliation claim is, however,
based on Hudson’s failure to “properly exhaust” his administrative remedies and consequent failure
to “invoke[] the court’s jurisdiction.” Thus, this recommendation is more accurately a recommended
dismissal of the retaliation claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2
416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district
court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear
error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation”) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
To constitute a “specific objection” warranting de novo review, an objection must be made
with “sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court to the true ground for the
objection.” U.S. v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007) (addressing specificity requirement
in context of determining whether issue was preserved for appeal). To require less would “defeat
the purpose of requiring objections[,]” because judicial resources would be wasted and the district
court’s effectiveness would be undermined. Id.; see also Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th
Cir. 1982) (court not required to conduct a de novo review when presented with only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed
findings and recommendations”).
Although it is clear from his objections that Hudson disagrees with all of the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendations, Hudson has not provided the degree of specificity necessary to entitle him
to a de novo review. This is because Hudson’s objections do little more than identify the
recommendations to which he objects, followed by a superficial (and often inaccurate)
characterization of previously cited evidence and arguments offered in his memorandum in
opposition to summary judgment.
For example, Hudson’s second objection challenges the recommendation that the court find
he “cannot establish a prima facie case as it relates to comparing himself to a similarly situated
3
individual outside of his protected class.” ECF No. 36 at 3. The entirety of Hudson’s objection to
this recommendation is as follows:
Plaintiff presented evidence on the issue of whether or not he was treated
differently than similarly situated individuals who were not African American. For
example, Plaintiff directly compared himself to the class of 2009, wherein white
applicants underwent similar testing conditions but were promoted, unlike Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further described how some of [sic] white men competed with him in the
promotional testing process and were placed ahead of him on the promotional list in
2011 and 2012. By virtue of the requirements for the testing process and based upon
the theory of the testing as described by Tomes, the participants, before being scored,
are similarly situated in their respective positions and lines of work because they are
vying for the same promotion.
Plaintiff’s testimony and proffered evidence refutes the contention that he
failed to establish the comparator prong of the prima facie test.
ECF No. 36 at 3.
This objection is too general to warrant de novo review because it fails to provide any detail
as to why the “class of 2009” as a group or the unidentified white men who competed with Hudson
in the promotional testing process should be held to be appropriate comparators (and, consequently,
why the Report erred in concluding Hudson had not presented adequate comparator evidence). See
infra Discussion § B. Neither does Hudson cite any supporting evidence or legal authority for this
abbreviated argument.2
Hudson’s arguments on other issues are similar as they, at most, summarize the
recommendations in the Report, state that he disagrees with the recommendation, and provide a
2
In a footnote, Hudson states that “[a] copy of all deposition testimony and exhibits cited
herein were submitted” with his prior opposition memorandum and “craves reference” to the same
“as if attached hereto and resubmitted.” ECF No. 36 at 1 n.1 (emphasis added). Hudson does not,
however, cite any supporting evidence at any point in his objection memorandum. Neither does he
direct the court to any legal authority or even specific pages of his prior memorandum. In fact, his
only citations are to the Report.
4
superficial characterization of his prior arguments.3 For example, Hudson’s entire argument on the
Wage Claim is as follows:
The [H]onorable Magistrate Judge argues that the FLSA addresses firefighter
overtime pay and because of that, Plaintiff does not have a claim for unpaid overtime
because his schedule was reflective of that outlined by the FLSA for firefighters.
(Dkt. No. 34, p. 12). However, Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that the rate
and way in which he was paid did not align with the FLSA mandates, specifically
through his testimony and that of similarly situated firefighters.
ECF No. 36 at 5-6.
Despite their length, Hudson’s objections provide the court with no greater specificity than
had he stated: “I disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions, and I do so for the reasons I
argued in my memorandum in opposition to summary judgment.” This amounts to no more than a
general objection because it is impossible to draw meaning from Hudson’s objections without a
review of his entire prior submission. As noted above, allowing such an approach would defeat the
purpose of requiring specific objections as a prerequisite to de novo review because it would
increase, rather than decrease, the burden on the judiciary, thus defeating the purpose of the
magistrate judge system.4
For these reasons, the court finds Hudson is not entitled to a de novo review.
In an
abundance of caution, the court has, nonetheless, conducted a full de novo review to the extent
Hudson made even a non-specific objection. Having done so, the court concludes that the Report
was correct both in its reasoning and recommendations.
3
Hudson’s characterizations of his prior arguments are often inaccurate and are not, in any
event, persuasive.
4
The inadequate specificity is particularly troubling given that Hudson is not only
represented by counsel, but by counsel with substantial experience in employment litigation. Given
this district’s routine referral of such matters to a magistrate judge for pretrial proceedings, counsel
should be well aware of the need for specificity in any objection to a report and recommendation.
5
In reaching this conclusion, the court has taken each of Hudson’s generalized objections,
searched his prior opposition memorandum for supporting arguments and citation to evidence, and
considered those arguments and cited evidence as if presented to this court in a specific objection.
Having undertaken this duplicative and time-consuming process, the court finds no support for any
of Hudson’s objections for reasons explained below.
A.
Retaliation
Hudson’s objection to the recommended dismissal of his retaliation claim reads, in full, as
follows:
1.
The Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as it relates to his retaliation claim under Title VII.
Plaintiff sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as it relates to the
filing of his Title VII retaliation charge. Although Plaintiff did not select the
“retaliation” checkbox, he did select the “other” box, indicating that he suffered other
adverse treatment in addition to his race discrimination claims. As a result,
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should not be barred.
Objections at 3.5
Hudson’s argument on exhaustion in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment
was similar, reading in full as follows:
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination does not include
allegations pertaining to retaliation. (Dkt. No. 24-1 at p. 10). Plaintiff selected
“other” on his Charge and went on to testify that his original Charge was misplaced
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; it was also similar to other
Charges filed at the same time. (Exhibit R and Exhibit L at pps. 30:11-31:25).
ECF No. 28 at 11.
5
See also Objection at 1 (indicating in preamble that retaliatory actions included discipline
and a station transfer).
6
These arguments are not persuasive because Hudson did not check the box for retaliation and
nothing in the text of his charge suggests he is complaining of retaliatory actions. To the contrary,
the text solely and specifically challenges the testing process as unfair, arguably on a racial basis
although even the racial component of the concerns requires a generous reading of the charge.
Hudson does not argue, much less present supporting evidence, for application of the
exception to the exhaustion requirement allowed by Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir.
1992). The court has, nonetheless, considered this possibility sua sponte. This requires the court
to determine whether any of the claimed retaliatory incidents alleged in the Complaint (thus predating February 15, 2013) also post-date Hudson’s administrative charge (dated May 10, 2012).
With the possible exception of Hudson’s allegations that he has not been promoted despite
being placed on the 2012 promotion list, nothing in Hudson’s Complaint suggests that the alleged
retaliatory incidents occurred in 2012, much less that they occurred after his May 10, 2012
administrative charge (and before the Complaint was filed).6 Hudson’s deposition testimony
indicates that the alleged retaliatory incidents (other than his non-promotion despite placement on
the 2012 promotion list) occurred sometime during or soon after October 2011. See Hudson dep.
at 49-51 (discussing station move, which Hudson attributes to his questioning his superior’s criticism
of his crew); id. at 56-58 (discussing memorandum Hudson wrote questioning Kip’s qualifications
for placement on the 2011 promotion list and Kip’s call to Hudson about the memorandum, and
6
In his Complaint, Hudson alleges that, after complaining about discriminatory treatment,
he was subjected to retaliatory treatment including a station transfer, non-promotion despite passing
all requirements, and other harassment or intimidation. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30-31, 40-42. The only
specifically identified incident of harassment or intimidation is that someone in the chain of
command passed Hudson’s letter complaining about the qualifications of a white applicant on the
2011 promotion list on to that white applicant (Christopher Kip). The Complaint does not provide
dates for these incidents.
7
indicating both occurred after Hudson’s station transfer); id. at 65 (indicating memorandum relating
to Kip’s qualifications was written in October 2011); see also id. at 83 (stating his allegations of fear
and intimidation tactics refer to Kip’s call); id. at 98-99 (stating he felt his station move was a form
of discipline for questioning his superior’s criticism of his crew).7
To the extent Hudson’s claim relating to his placement on the 2012 promotion list is a claim
for retaliation, there is some possibility that Nealon might apply.8 As noted above, however, Hudson
has neither made such an argument nor directed the court to evidence that would support it. The
court’s own review reveals an absence of evidence as to when Hudson was placed on the 2012
promotion list. Under these circumstances, the court finds an insufficient basis for applying the
Nealon exception to any aspect of Hudson’s retaliation claim, even assuming his allegations relating
to his placement on the 2012 promotion list are intended to assert a retaliation claim.9
7
The court has located these citations through a complete review of the portions of Hudson’s
deposition submitted as exhibits. As noted above, Hudson cites no specific evidence in his objection
memorandum. Hudson’s discussion of the evidence in his memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment is minimally helpful due to his practice of making broad statements of fact followed by
string citations to multiple depositions pages that, in a number of instances, fail to support the
premise for which they are cited.
8
In his objections, Hudson refers both to his failure to make the promotion list in 2011 and
his later placement on the list in 2012. Objection at 1 (ECF No. 36) (stating he “was passed over for
a promotion to Battalion Chief in 2011 after undergoing a series of testing before finally being
eligible for promotion in 2012”); Objection at 3 (stating he “described how some of [the] white men
[who] competed with him in the promotional testing process were placed ahead of him on the
promotional list in 2011 and 2012”). Although these statements do not indicate that Hudson is
alleging the non-promotions were retaliatory rather than the result of disparate treatment, the court
considers the former possibility here.
9
The filed excerpts from Hudson’s deposition include testimony that he is now on the 2012
promotion list and that he is the last of seven or eight individuals on the list. Hudson dep. at 14.
Hudson’s testimony does not, however, suggest any concern that his placement on the list was due
to some retaliatory motive or was otherwise discriminatory. Neither was this argument raised in
Hudson’s memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. See, e.g., ECF No. 28 at 7 (listing four
8
B.
Disparate Treatment – Prima Facie Case
Report. The Report recommends summary judgment be granted on Hudson’s disparate
treatment claim because he has “present[ed] no evidence that any similarly situated person outside
of his protected class was treated differently” and cannot, therefore, establish a prima facie case.
Report at 9 (ECF No. 34). “Specifically, he has not identified any comparators that are similarly
situated to him in all relevant respects.” Id. The Report addresses affidavits of two former
firefighters on which Hudson relies, noting that neither affidavit “identifies any specific white
employee who was treated more favorably in any manner raised by Hudson.” Id. at 10.10
Objection. In his objection memorandum, Hudson argues that he previously presented
evidence that “he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals who were not African
American.” ECF No. 36 at 3. In support of this claim, Hudson asserts that he “directly compared
himself to the class of 2009, wherein white applicants underwent similar testing conditions but were
promoted, unlike Plaintiff.” Id. Hudson also asserts that he “described how some . . . white men
competed with him in the promotional testing process and were placed ahead of him on the
promotional list in 2011 and 2012.” Id.; see also id. at 4 (asserting, in discussing whether he has
provided adequate comparator evidence, that “once [Hudson] had a passing score, he [was] placed
at the bottom of the promotional list, behind numerous white individuals who were not as qualified
categories of discriminatory treatment, none of which relate to placement on the 2012 promotion
list); id. at 11 (listing two categories of adverse employment actions which included “failure to be
promoted” but make no specific mention of placement on the 2012 promotion list). The court, in
fact, finds no mention of the 2012 promotion process or list in Hudson’s opposition memorandum.
The argument appears, instead, to have been raised for the first time in his objections, and then
without any citation to supporting evidence.
10
The two affidavits are from firefighters who retired in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Thus,
even the general observations of these firefighters relate to a period distant from the one at issue:
a selection process conducted during 2011.
9
with time and grade as Plaintiff.”).11 Hudson argues that he and these alleged comparators were
similarly situated because “the participants, before being scored, are similarly situated in their
respective positions and lines of work because they are vying for the same promotion.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
Discussion. Even taken at face value, Hudson’s argument would not support a claim of
discrimination because it would effectively eliminate the requirement for similarly situated
comparators by assuming that all individuals vying for the same promotion through the same process
are similarly situated. If this were enough, every denial of a promotion would support a prima facie
case of discrimination so long as the individual promoted was from outside a protected class to
which at least one individual who was not selected belonged.
The argument also fails for its categorical and conclusory approach to proof because it relies
on allegations that “the class of 2009” and unidentified “white men” were treated differently than
Hudson without providing any specific details as to why either the group or individuals should be
considered similarly situated or precisely how they were treated differently under the same or similar
circumstances. Most critically, as to his non-placement on the 2011 promotion list, Hudson fails
to proffer evidence that any person was placed on the list despite failing one or more steps in the
promotion process and it is undisputed that Hudson failed to achieve a passing score at the first stage
in the process.
Nothing in Hudson’s memorandum in opposition to summary judgment suggests greater
specificity. His closest argument is a statement that he “testified and provided a plethora of evidence
11
Neither here nor in his earlier memorandum in opposition to summary judgment does
Hudson offer any evidence as to his qualifications relative to the other individuals on the 2012
promotion list.
10
to suggest he was more than qualified for the positions he sought through the supplemental testing
program.” ECF No. 28 at 11 (citing Hudson dep. at 12:3-25; 75:4-10).
Hudson cites two pages of his deposition in support of his assertion that he has provided a
plethora of evidence in support of his qualifications. Id. The first-cited deposition excerpt states that
Hudson is familiar with what a Battalion Chief does and has performed those duties on
approximately twenty-five shifts (apparently subsequent to becoming “eligible” for the position in
2012). In the second-cited excerpt , Hudson indicates that he used the maximum amount of time
available to prepare for the supplemental application process (apparently referring to the 2011
supplemental application, on which he failed to receive a passing score). Even if otherwise relevant,
this testimony would not support Hudson’s claim for disparate treatment as to the 2011 promotion
process because it is undisputed that he did not pass the supplemental application stage of this
process and he has proffered no evidence that a similarly situated white candidate was treated more
favorably under the same circumstances.12
Nothing else in Hudson’s memorandum in opposition to summary judgment suggests that
he is even attempting to provide evidence of comparators. Instead, Hudson misstates the fourth
prong of the relevant test as requiring “other evidence . . . raising an inference of discrimination[,]”
disregarding the cited case’s description of the fourth prong as requiring a showing “that similarlysituated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.” ECF No. 28 at
10 (citing White v. BFI Waste Svcs, LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004)).
12
Evidence addressed in related cases establishes that Kip took and passed the various tests
in the 2011 promotion process. See Capone v. City of Columbia, C.A. No. 3:12-cv-3369-CMC,
ECF No. 54 at 9-11 (Corrected Opinion and Order entered January 9, 2015).
11
As noted above, Hudson did not address his particular placement on the 2012 promotion list
in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. See supra n. 11. Even if he did, the court
would lack jurisdiction over such a claim because it does not fall within the scope of the
discrimination alleged in Hudson’s May 10, 2012 charge.13
In sum, Hudson has failed to direct the court to evidence that he was treated less favorably
than any similarly situated employee outside his protected class with respect to the 2011 promotion
process. This is despite the City raising the issue in its motion for summary judgment and the Report
relying on this deficiency in recommending summary judgment be granted. No allegations relating
to disparate treatment as to the 2012 promotion list are properly before the court.
C.
Disparate Treatment – Pretext
Report. The Report also recommends summary judgment be granted on Hudson’s disparate
treatment claim because Hudson has not proffered evidence sufficient to establish that the City’s
stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was pretextual. Report at 11. The Report
notes, first, that Hudson had “failed to refute the City’s showing that Kip was qualified for the
position . . . and makes no attempt to argue that Hudson’s qualifications were demonstrably superior
to Kip’s.” ECF No. 34 at 11.14 The Report also notes that the evidence was “unrefuted . . . that
Hudson did not receive a passing score” on a test that was a prerequisite to promotion. Id.
13
The exception to the exhaustion requirement addressed in Nealon would not apply here
as it applies only to retaliation claims. Thus, this court would not have jurisdiction over this aspect
of Hudson’s disparate treatment claim even if it arose after the charge was made.
14
As the report notes, Hudson initially took the position that Christopher Kip should not
have been promoted in 2011 because he lacked a required certification. The City has, however,
presented uncontroverted evidence that Kip had the required certification before the relevant
deadline.
12
Objection. Hudson argues that he “fully explained his superior qualifications for the
promotion in his deposition testimony and . . . that he, like other African American testing
participants, failed to make the promotion list.” ECF No. 36 at 3. Hudson concedes that he failed
to receive a passing score on the referenced test but argues he was treated less favorably even after
he passed the test. Id. at 4 (discussed supra § B).
Discussion. Hudson’s argument as to qualifications is unavailing as to his non-promotion
in 2011 because he conceded he failed to pass the first step in that promotion process. It is
unavailing as to his relative placement on the 2012 promotion list because he has not exhausted
administrative remedies as to any such claim.
D.
Disparate Impact
Rather than challenging the Report’s legal conclusion that the disparate impact claim must
be supported by statistical evidence, Hudson refers to the testimony of William Tomes, who was
involved in development of the promotion process including the test.
Objection memorandum at
5, ECF No. 36. Hudson states that “Tomes testified that the written test had undergone several
variations over the years, which would support his contention that the sampling size would be too
small for a valid analysis.” Id. This statement does not suggest the existence of statistical evidence
supporting the disparate impact claim. It, instead, indicates that no such evidence could likely be
obtained.
Hudson’s earlier memorandum in opposition to summary judgment is similarly devoid of any
statistical evidence. He, instead, suggests in his discussion of facts (under the subheading “§ 1983”)
that disparate impact might be established based on the mere potential for discrimination resulting
from the employer’s control over the testing process. ECF No. 28 at 8 (alleging “promotional testing
scheme . . . has a disparate impact upon African American employees because of the way in which
13
it is executed[,]” most critically the City’s control over the process which included “direct input into
identifying the ‘best answer’ to panel situational questions”; also noting Tomes’ testimony that “the
possibility exists for race discrimination in the testing process” (emphasis added)). In the argument
section of this memorandum, Hudson combines his discussion of disparate impact with his
discussion of disparate treatment, without reference to statistical evidence and assuming that both
are established through the burden-shifting framework. Id. at 10-12 (ignoring distinctions between
the theories). Hudson does not expressly mention disparate impact under his Section 1983 argument,
instead focusing on generalized allegations that “African American employees [were] not given the
same opportunities as white employees as it relates to the promotional testing process because of the
customs and practices of Defendant in maintaining a great deal of control over the testing process[.]”
Id. at 16.
Hudson also relies on proffered affidavits of two firefighters who retired in 2008 and 2009
as well as his testimony regarding his own experiences. This evidence fails to support a disparate
impact claim because it is, at best, subjective and anecdotal (and at worst irrelevant to the time frame
at issue). Hudson offers no support for his apparent premise that this evidence may substitute for the
sort of statistical evidence generally required to support a disparate impact claim.
E.
Wage Claim
Hudson’s objection to the recommendation that summary judgment be granted on his wage
claim is entirely generic, consisting of one sentence summarizing the Report’s recommendation and
the following statement: “Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that the rate and way in which he
was paid did not align with the FLSA mandates, specifically through his testimony and that of other
similarly situated firefighters.” ECF No. 36 at 5-6.
14
The Report relied on a specific FLSA regulation applicable to overtime for firefighters in
recommending Hudson’s state and federal wage claims be dismissed. Hudson does not mention,
much less discuss, this regulation either in his objection memorandum or in his memorandum in
opposition to summary judgment. He has not, therefore, offered any argument that might support
this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court adopts the Report and Recommendation and grants
the City’s motion in full. Despite absence of objections sufficiently specific to warrant de novo
review, the court has conducted a de novo review as to all claims. Having done so, the court fully
concurs in and adopts the reasoning and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge for reasons
explained above, with the sole clarifications that the retaliation claim and disparate treatment claim
to the extent based on Hudson’s placement on the 2012 promotion list are dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and summary judgment is granted on the remaining claims. Judgment
shall be entered for the City accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
Senior United States District Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
January 26, 2015
15
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