Jones v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc
Filing
33
ORDER AND OPINION granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 11/6/2013.(cbru, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Frankie Jones,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)
C/A No.: 3:13-cv-440-CMC
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Frankie Jones (“Jones”) filed this action against Defendant Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. (“Hobby Lobby”) after falling in a Hobby Lobby store located on Forest Drive in Columbia,
South Carolina. Jones alleges she was shopping for Christmas ornaments on December 10, 2011,
when she fell after she tripped over a platform displaying artificial Christmas trees. The matter is
before the court on Hobby Lobby’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 22. Jones filed a
response in opposition (ECF No. 27), to which Hobby Lobby replied (ECF No. 28). For reasons
explained below, the court grants Hobby Lobby’s motion for summary judgment.
I. STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). It is well established that summary judgment should be granted “only when it is clear that
there is no dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the inferences to be drawn from
those facts.” Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, and the court must view the evidence before it and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Rule 56(c)(1) provides as follows:
(1)
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
the assertion by:
(A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers
or other materials; or
(b)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
A party “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the
building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
Therefore, “[m]ere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment
motion.” Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by presenting his or her own conflicting
versions of events. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984) (“A genuine issue
of material fact is not created where the only issue of fact is to determine which of the two
conflicting versions of the plaintiff’s testimony is correct.”).
2
B. Negligence
To assert direct liability based on a negligence claim in South Carolina, Plaintiff must show
that (1) Defendant owed her a duty of care; (2) Defendant breached this duty by a negligent act or
omission; (3) Defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of her injuries; and (4) she suffered injury
or damages. Dorrell v. S.C. Dep’t of Trans., 605 S.E.2d 12, 15 (S.C. 2004) (citation omitted).
“Whether the law recognizes a particular duty is an issue of law to be determined by the court.”
Jackson v. Swordfish Inv., L.L.C., 620 S.E.2d 54, 56 (S.C. 2005) (citation omitted).
C. Invitee
“An invitee is a person who enters onto the property of another at the express or implied
invitation of the property owner.” Goode v. St. Stephens United Methodist Church, 494 S.E.2d 827,
831 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). “Invitees are limited to those persons who enter or remain on land upon
an invitation which carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that
reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises, and make them safe for their reception.” Sims
v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 862 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). The visitor is considered an
invitee especially when he is upon a matter of mutual interest or advantage to the property owner.
Parker v. Stevenson Oil Co., 140 S.E.2d 177, 179 (S.C. 1965); Landry v. Hilton Head Plantation
Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 619, 621 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994). The law recognizes two types
of invitees: the public invitee and the business visitor. Sims, 541 S.E.2d at 862. “A public invitee
is one who is invited to enter or remain on the land as a member of the public for a purpose for
which the land is held open to the public.” Goode, 494 S.E.2d at 831. A business visitor, on the
other hand, is an invitee whose purpose for being on the property is directly or indirectly connected
3
with business dealings with the owner. Id.; see also Parker, 140 S.E.2d at 179 (the term “invitee”
in premises liability cases usually means the same thing as a business visitor and refers to one who
enters upon the premises of another at the express or implied invitation of the occupant, especially
when he is there about a matter of mutual interest or advantage); Hoover v. Broome, 479 S.E.2d 62,
65 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“Business visitors are considered invitees as long as their purpose for
entering the property is either directly or indirectly connected with the purpose for which the
property owner uses the land.”).
D. Premises Liability
Under South Carolina law, the owner of property owes business visitors or invitees the duty
of exercising reasonable and ordinary care for their safety and is liable for any injuries resulting from
a breach of such duty. H.P. Larimore v. Carolina Power & Light, 531 S.E.2d 535, 538 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing Israel v. Carolina Bar-B-Que, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 123, 128 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)).
The landowner has a duty to warn an invitee only of latent or hidden dangers of which the landowner
is on actual or constructive notice. Id. at 538 (citing Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp., 406
S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (S.C. 1991)).
To recover damages for injuries caused by a dangerous of defective condition on a
storekeeper’s premises, Plaintiff must show either (1) that the injury was caused by a specific act of
Defendant which created the dangerous condition; or (2) that Defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous conditions and failed to remedy it. Wintersteen v. Food Lion, 542
S.E.2d 728, 729 (S.C. 2001).
A merchant is not an insurer of the safety of its customers, but rather owes them a duty to
4
exercise or maintain care and to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The merchant is
not required to maintain the premises in such condition that no accident could happen to a patron
using them. Denton v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, 439 S.E.2d 292 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983). “The entire
basis of an invitor’s liability rests upon his superior knowledge of the danger that causes the invitee’s
injuries. If that superior knowledge is lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the invitor cannot be
held liable.” H.P. Larimore, 531 S.E.2d at 540. A landowner is not liable for open and obvious
dangers unless the landowner “should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness”
or “has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover
what is obvious, . . . or fail to protect himself against it.” Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp.,
406 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (S.C. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
II. BACKGROUND
In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts are as follows. On December 10, 2011,
Plaintiff was shopping with her granddaughter for Christmas decorations at Hobby Lobby on Forest
Drive in Columbia, South Carolina. This was Plaintiff’s first time in the Forest Drive Hobby Lobby
store. Plaintiff entered the store and inquired of a customer service representative if and where the
store carried ceramic ornaments. The customer service representative pointed to an aisle and
indicated that the item Plaintiff sought was located on that aisle.
Plaintiff did not find what she needed on the first aisle; accordingly, she turned down another
aisle bordered by a display of Christmas trees. The display was set up on a platform. The platform
lip was approximately four (4) to six (6) inches from the ground, and jutted out approximately one
(1) to two (2) inches from the base of the platform. As Plaintiff turned down the aisle, her foot
5
caught on the platform. Plaintiff fell, landing on her shoulder. No store employee witnessed her fall.
Plaintiff was thereafter transported by EMS to a local hospital where she was diagnosed with
multiple fractures to her shoulder.
On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. in the
Richland County Court of Common Pleas. On February 19, 2013, Defendant removed the case to
this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 based upon diversity jurisdiction.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant has moved for summary judgment, contending Plaintiff has produced no evidence
of a defective condition and that there is no evidence that Defendant knew or should have known that
an allegedly dangerous condition existed. In opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff presents
three arguments: that whether Defendant kept its premises in a reasonably safe condition is a jury
question which should preclude the award of summary judgment; that Defendant had a duty to
Plaintiff, as an invitee, to use due care to discover, eliminate, or warn of unreasonable risks; and that
Defendant had a duty to warn or protect against conditions on the premises regardless of whether the
condition was latent.
A. Condition of Premises: Jury Question?
Plaintiff argues the question whether Defendant’s premises were in a reasonably safe
condition is a question for a jury to determine based upon “Defendant’s failure to provide any
indication as to the presence of the platform, or to mark the lip of the platform jutting out from the
base.” Pl’s Resp. in Opp. at 5 (ECF No. 27). In support of its dispositive motion, Defendant submits
a variety of photographs, taken by Defendant’s store manager, Sarah Polley, several hours after the
accident. See ECF No. 22-2 at 2-11. Plaintiff does not dispute that these photographs are an
6
accurate depiction of the platform and area in question.
Plaintiff agreed with the following contentions in her deposition: that the edge of the
platform was a different color than the floor upon which it sat; that the platform had a beige or
yellow band that ran around the entire perimeter of the platform; that the platform had a dark grey
carpet distinguishable not only from the yellow band, but also the white floor directly beneath the
platform; that no material was hanging over the edge of the platform that could obscure her view of
the platform; that the platform was not in any sort of disrepair; and that she was not looking down
when she was walking. Depo. of Frankie Jones at 35-39 (ECF No. 22-3 at 3-7). Plaintiff testified
she was looking for merchandise on other aisles as she turned down the aisle:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Is there a reason you couldn’t see that platform?
I wasn’t –
Or is it that you just weren’t looking for it?
I just was looking for what I went in the store for. . . .
Id. at 39.
As noted above, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s photographs evidencing the
marking, differentiation from the floor, and general condition of the platform. Plaintiff admits there
was nothing obscuring the platform and that she “didn’t see anything because I wasn’t looking down
[toward the platform].” Id.
A merchant’s duty to its customers is a duty to exercise or maintain care and to keep its
premises in a reasonably safe condition. Based upon the evidence presented by the parties, including
the photographs of the platform and Plaintiff’s agreement with their depictions, no reasonable juror
could find that the edge of the platform was not reasonably apparent to one exercising due care for
her own safety.
7
B. Duty to Use Due Care to Discover, Eliminate or Warn
Plaintiff also argues Defendant breached its duty of due care by failing to have a store
employee escort Plaintiff to the area where the decorations she sought were located (instead of
directing her verbally); by failing to warn customers of the platform and its alleged dangerous
conditions; and in using a platform display, particularly during the store’s “busiest time of year . .
. .” ECF No. 27 at 6.
Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. Plaintiff points to no requirement that Defendant’s
employees escort invitees around its premises. Additionally, the photographs submitted by
Defendant indicate the platform was clearly marked with several distinguishing features which were
readily visible. As for the use of a platform display, South Carolina law requires merchants to
maintain their stores in a reasonably safe condition, not to maintain the premises in a condition such
that no accident could happen to a patron using them. Denton v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, 439 S.E.2d
292 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983).
C. Duty to Protect or Warn Against Latent Condition
Finally, Plaintiff argues Defendant had a duty to warn its invitees of the platform as it was
“a condition that Defendant knew or should have known may cause an injury . . . .” ECF No. 27 at
8. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant knew or should have known that shoppers would be distracted
when shopping for specific items during a particularly busy time of year, and that Defendant should
have taken steps different from those taken to alert shoppers to the condition.
Plaintiff fails to establish Defendant knew or should have known that the platform might
cause an injury. There is no evidence there were any accidents involving the platform prior to
December 10, 2011, and the photographs presented by Defendant, which Plaintiff does not challenge,
8
evidence a well-lighted area, with the platform clearly marked and its edges unobscured.
IV. CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and this
matter is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Columbia, South Carolina
November 6, 2013
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?