Williams v. United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia and South Carolina et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, dismissing Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and notifying Plaintiff should she amend her complaint, she must file it within 21 days of the date of this order. Signed by Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr on 01/16/2014.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Stephanie Williams,

C/A No. 3:13-cv-02779-JFA

Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER
United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia, Inc.; and
United Cerebral Palsy of South Carolina, Inc.,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

ECF No. 5.

Stephanie

Williams (“Plaintiff”) has sued United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia, Inc., and United
Cerebral Palsy of South Carolina, Inc. (“Defendants”), alleging breach of contract, and
violations of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (“Wage Payment Act”), S.C.
Code Ann. § 41–10–10 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §
201 et seq. For reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendants hired Plaintiff as a full-time employee in 2008, according to the

complaint. Because of an abuse and neglect complaint in the fall of 2010, Defendants
placed Plaintiff on administrative leave while they conducted an investigation. The
investigation, which lasted almost one year, revealed no abuse, and Defendants asked
Plaintiff to return to work on or around September 27, 2011. When Plaintiff returned, a
director for Defendants promised Plaintiff that she would be paid for the time she was on
leave, and Plaintiff retroactively filled out a number of time sheets at Defendants’
request. However, Defendants never honored that promise. As a result, Plaintiff sued.

In her complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants breached the oral contract created
after her return to work. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff for
her time on administrative leave violated the Wage Payment Act and the FLSA. In
response, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. On January 16, 2014, the court heard oral arguments on the
motion.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and view them in a light
most favorable to a plaintiff. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999).
However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” a pleading that only offers
“labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, a plaintiff must assert claims that cross
“the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1950–51 (internal quotation omitted).
In deciding whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss, this court
evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into
the complaint. Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705

(4th Cir. 2007); Phillips v. LCI Int’l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that
“a court may consider [a document outside the complaint] in determining whether to
dismiss the complaint” where the document “was integral to and explicitly relied on in
the complaint” and there was no authenticity challenge). However, the court cannot go
beyond these documents on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; if it does, it converts the motion into
one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(d), 56. Such conversion is not
appropriate when the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery. Gay
v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges breach of contract, as well as violations of the Wage Payment Act

and the FLSA. The court addresses those claims in turn.
A.

Breach of Contract

To prevail on her breach of contract claim, Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the existence and terms of the contract, Defendants’ breach of a contractual
term, and damages resulting from the breach. See Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (S.C. 1962). Thus, an action for damages for breach of contract
turns on the existence of a contract. Tidewater Supply Co. v. Indus. Elec. Co., 171 S.E.2d
607, 608 (S.C. 1969). The essential elements of a contract are an offer, an acceptance,
and valuable consideration. Carolina Amusement Co. v. Conn. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 437
S.E.2d 122, 125 (S.C. App. 1993). Valuable consideration “may consist either in some
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss of responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.” Furman Univ. v.
Waller, et al., 117 S.E. 356 (S.C. 1923) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants breached the initial employment
contract or a modification of the initial employment contract. Instead, Plaintiff argues
that Defendants breached a new contract when they failed to honor the promise made by
Defendants’ director upon Plaintiff’s return to work.

However, to sue for breach,

Plaintiff must show an enforceable contract, which requires an offer, acceptance, and
valuable consideration.

In her complaint, Plaintiff submits that Defendants made a

promise to pay, but she does not allege any facts supporting consideration on her part.
Plaintiff argues that filling out a number of time sheets retroactively for the period when
she was on leave amounts to consideration. This court disagrees. Because Plaintiff has
not made any factual allegations in support of consideration, which could convert
Defendants’ gratuitous promise into an enforceable contract, her claim fails.
B.

Wage Payment Act

The Wage Payment Act requires an employer to pay all wages due in a timely
manner. S.C. Code Ann. § 41–10–40. The statute provides the court with the discretion
to award treble damages, attorney’s fees, as well as costs. Mathis v. Brown & Brown of
S.C., Inc., 698 S.E.2d 773, 781 (S.C. 2010).
Under the Wage Payment Act, wages are “all amounts at which labor rendered is
recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on . . . other method of
calculating the amount and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are
due to an employee under any employer policy or employment contract. . . . ” S.C. Code
Ann. § 41–10–10(2). Here, Plaintiff does not contend that she is owed wages either for
labor rendered, or for a type of leave—vacation, holiday, and sick leave—enumerated in
the statute. As with the breach of contract claim, Plaintiff also does not appear to connect

this claim with the initial employment contract.

Instead, Plaintiff submits that

Defendants violated the statute by failing to provide compensation for a time when she
was not working and was on administrative leave, which falls outside the scope of the
Wage Payment Act.
C.

FLSA

Under the FLSA, an employer must pay all employees the minimum wage and
must pay all nonexempt employees overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a
workweek. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207.
In her complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants owe her minimum wage
for the time that she did work, nor does Plaintiff assert that she is due any overtime pay
for time worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Instead, the complaint makes only
conclusory assertions, with no factual support. As a result, the FLSA claim fails.
D.

Leave to Amend

In her opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff seeks this court’s
leave to amend her complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that a court should consider
granting a plaintiff leave to amend if the court dismisses a complaint based on Rule
12(b)(6). See Ostrzenski, 177 F.3d at 252–53. “Amendment should be refused only if it
appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim.” Id. at 253. “The better practice
is to allow at least one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading
appears because except in unusual circumstances it is unlikely that the court will be able
to determine conclusively on the face of a defective pleading whether plaintiff actually

can state a claim.” Id. Bound by Fourth Circuit precedent, this court grants Plaintiff
leave to amend her complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby grants Defendants’ motion and

dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. Should Plaintiff amend her complaint,
she must file it within 21 days of the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 16, 2014,
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge