Barfield v. Kershaw County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 19

ORDER ACCEPTING 16 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, overruling plaintiff's objections 17 and granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Terry L Wooten on 1/29/2015. (gmil)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
KENNETH MICHAEL BARFIELD,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
KERSHAW COUNTY SHERIFF’S
)
OFFICE and AARON THREATT,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________ )

Case No. 3:13-cv-03569-TLW

ORDER
Plaintiff Kenneth Michael Barfield filed this action against the Kershaw County Sheriff’s
Office (“KCSO”) and Aaron Threatt pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on August 5, 2014 (Doc.
#10), to which Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on August 22, 2014 (Doc. #11). This
matter is now before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (“the Report”)
filed by United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges, to whom this case was assigned
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f), (D.S.C.). In the
Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends that this Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. #16). Plaintiff filed timely objections to the Report on November 17, 2014.
(Doc. #17). This matter is now ripe for disposition.
In conducting this review, the Court applies the following standard:
The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to the Court, to which any
party may file written objections . . . . The Court is not bound by the
recommendation of the magistrate judge but, instead, retains responsibility for the
final determination. The Court is required to make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation as to which
an objection is made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a de
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novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate
judge as to those portions of the report and recommendation to which no
objections are addressed. While the level of scrutiny entailed by the Court’s
review of the Report thus depends on whether or not objections have been filed,
in either case, the Court is free, after review, to accept, reject, or modify any of
the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations.
Wallace v. Housing Auth. of the City of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 137, 138 (D.S.C. 1992)
(citations omitted). The Court has carefully reviewed the Report and Plaintiff’s objections
thereto in accordance with this standard, and it concludes that the Magistrate Judge accurately
summarizes the case and the applicable law.
Defendant Threatt is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim
because he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for breach of peace. “[A] warrantless arrest by
a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe
that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,
152 (2004). An officer has probable cause for an arrest if the “facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution,
in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
The record shows that Plaintiff’s neighbor had previously made several reports of
Plaintiff causing disturbances, including two complaints about Plaintiff yelling from his yard on
the night of his arrest. Upon responding to the neighbor’s first complaint of the evening, Threatt
took no action because he did not “see” or “hear” Plaintiff yelling. (Doc. #10-3 at 7). After the
neighbor’s second complaint, with knowledge regarding Plaintiff’s yelling from his yard earlier
that evening, Threatt returned to Plaintiff’s property and undertook further investigation. He
turned off his patrol car and its lights and sat a few hundred yards away from Plaintiff’s house to
listen for any disturbance. Significantly, Threatt testified that he “heard Mr. Barfield yelling”
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and that he knew it was Plaintiff because he is “familiar with [Plaintiff’s] voice,” as he has heard
Plaintiff “be loud and boisterous before.” Id. at 9. These facts establish probable cause.
Although Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he was not in fact outside of his
house yelling on the night of his arrest, the Magistrate Judge recommended concluding that
“[e]ven if the yelling Threatt heard was not Plaintiff, the facts and circumstances within Threatt’s
knowledge—that [Plaintiff’s neighbor] had complained of Plaintiff’s yelling and that Threatt
recognized the voice as Plaintiff’s from his prior dealings—were sufficient to warrant Threatt to
conclude that Plaintiff had breached the peace.” (Doc. #16 at 10).
In his objections, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to Threatt, rather than accepting Plaintiff’s testimony that he was in bed
at the time the alleged breach of peace occurred. He asserts that there is a genuine issue of
material fact: Threatt claims to have heard Plaintiff yelling from his property, while Plaintiff
claims that he did not yell outside of his house the night of his arrest. If Plaintiff was not outside
his house making any noise, he contends, there was neither a breach of peace, nor probable cause
to believe a breach of peace was committed.
Although Plaintiff is correct that there is a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff was
actually outside of his house yelling, that factual dispute is relevant only to Plaintiff’s innocence
or guilt. It is not relevant to the issue of probable cause to arrest. Two important facts lead the
Court to conclude that Threatt had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for breach of peace. First,
Plaintiff’s neighbor, with whom he had been interacting for at least nine years (see Doc. #10-2 at
3), twice reported that she heard Plaintiff yelling from his property on the night of his arrest. The
neighbor’s complaints alone are enough to establish probable cause that a breach of peace had
occurred. Second, Threatt testified that he was familiar with Plaintiff’s voice through prior

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interactions with him and that he based his conclusion that he heard Plaintiff yelling on that
familiarity. Even accepting that it was not actually Plaintiff who Threatt heard yelling, Threatt
had an objective, reasonable belief that Plaintiff was the person he heard yelling, and it was
justifiable for him to conclude that Plaintiff had breached the peace. The record establishes that
Threatt had probable cause to arrest. Thus, for the reasons set forth above, the Magistrate Judge
properly recommended finding that Threatt is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false
arrest claim.
Threatt is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Claims
of excessive force during the course of an arrest are governed by an objective inquiry: “the
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (citations omitted). However, the extent of the
arrestee’s injuries is relevant, both because it may suggest whether the use of force could
plausibly have been thought necessary in that particular situation, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 321 (1986), and because it may provide some indication of the amount of force applied,
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (rejecting the notion that an Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim involving only de minimis injury is subject to automatic dismissal). “Not
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,
violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff testified that he was sleeping when he heard knocking on his doors and
windows. He stated that he walked outside to see who was knocking, and as he stepped off the
porch, he walked by a “big bushy tree” and was “bulldogged from behind” by Threatt. (Doc.
#11-2 at 7). Plaintiff’s wife testified that she was standing at the door when she saw Plaintiff

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step off the porch and get knocked to the ground by Threatt, who hit Plaintiff “like a football
player.” (Doc. #11-3 at 7). The Magistrate Judge recommended concluding that Plaintiff failed
to show that Threatt used excessive force because Threatt “was reasonable in exerting force
under the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest” and “[t]he
record is devoid of evidence that Threatt used more force than was necessary to restrain
Plaintiff.”

(Doc. #16 at 12).

The Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and

recommendation because Threatt used reasonable force in light of evidence that Plaintiff was
yelling, cursing, and using alcohol – evidence of breach of peace. (See Doc. #10-2).
In his objections, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly determined that
Threatt did not use more force than necessary because, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, “it is clear he describes a violent ambush in which Threatt tackled him.”
(Doc. #17 at 4). Plaintiff makes repeated assertions about the “violent nature” of Threatt’s
conduct, (see, e.g., Doc. #17 at 4-5 (“Threatt simply jumped out from behind a tree and violently
tackled Plaintiff;” “[Plaintiff] was tackled to the ground in a violent manner”)), but he has
introduced no evidence indicating that the force Threatt used was anything other than “a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” see Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40. The record does not
reflect that the Plaintiff suffered any injury in light of the excessive force he alleges. It is
undisputed that EMS workers called to the scene of Plaintiff’s arrest found that his vital signs
were normal. Moreover, Plaintiff refused to go to the hospital for treatment. Other than the
redness Threatt noticed on Plaintiff’s wrists from where he fell wearing handcuffs, there is no
evidence of any injury. Even accepting Plaintiff’s contention that he was “tackled to the ground”
with no warning (see Doc. #17 at 5), “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates the Fourth
Amendment,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, and Plaintiff’s lack of injuries indicate that Threatt used

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appropriate and reasonable force necessary to restrain Plaintiff, especially in light of the conduct
that led to Plaintiff’s arrest. Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff’s
allegations simply do not rise to the level of “objective unreasonableness” required to sustain a
claim of excessive force. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge properly recommended concluding
that Threatt is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
The Magistrate Judge also properly recommended granting summary judgment for KCSO
on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. South Carolina law is clear that an action for false
imprisonment cannot be maintained where one is arrested by lawful authority, see Manley v.
Manley, 291 S.C. 325, 330 (Ct. App. 1987), and as discussed above, Plaintiff’s arrest was
supported by probable cause and was thus lawful.

Finally, the Magistrate Judge properly

recommended granting summary judgment for KCSO on Plaintiff’s battery claim because, as
previously discussed, Plaintiff failed to show that Threatt’s use of force was excessive or
unlawful.
For the reasons discussed herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Report and
Recommendation is ACCEPTED (Doc. #16), and Plaintiff’s objections thereto are
OVERRULED (Doc. #17). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.
(Doc. #10).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Terry L. Wooten
Terry L. Wooten
Chief United States District Judge
January 29, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina

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