Arroyo v. Palmetto Health et al
ORDER re 14 Consent Motion to Remand to State Court. There is no state court to which the case can be remanded so for this reason the motion to remand is denied. No party urges the court to retain supplemental jurisdiction o ver Plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining causes of action, and Plaintiff's remaining state law causes of action are dismissed, without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 03/9/2015. (gmil) Modified to edit docket text on 3/12/2015 (gmil).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Julio Arroyo, M.D.,
) C/A No. 3:14-4505-MBS-PJG
Palmetto Health; Marty Bridges, in his
individual capacity; Greta Harper, in her
individual capacity; and Kristin Urquhart, )
in her individual capacity,
Plaintiff Julio Arroyo, M.D. filed this action on November 24, 2014, against Defendant
Palmetto Health, his former employer, and Defendants Marty Bridges, Executive Vice President of
Palmetto Health; Greta Harper, Vice President of Clinical Affairs at Palmetto Health, and Kristin
Urquhart, an officer manager at Palmetto Health. Plaintiff contends that he was discriminated
against on the basis of his race, Hispanic, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (First and Second Causes
of Action, against all Defendants). Plaintiff also alleges state law causes of action for conversion
(Third Cause of Action against Palmetto Health), violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (Fourth Cause of Action against Palmetto Health), breach of contract (Fifth Cause of
Action against Palmetto Health and Bridges), promissory estoppel (Sixth Cause of Action against
Palmetto Health, Bridges, and Harper), wrongful termination (Seventh Cause of Action against
Palmetto Health), quantum meruit (Eighth Cause of Action against Palmetto Health), and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (Ninth Cause of Action against all Defendants). Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and statutory damages, attorneys’ and experts’ fees, and punitive damages.
On February 23, 2015, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to
the following causes of action:
Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action alleging race discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981;
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleging breach of contract as to Defendant
Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleging promissory estoppel as to
Defendants Bridges and Harper only;
Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress as to Defendants Bridges and Harper only.
ECF No. 13.
This matter now is before the court on the parties’ consent motion to remand, which motion
was filed on February 23, 2015. The parties contend that the case should be remanded to state court
because (1) Plaintiff has not asserted a federal question in his remaining causes of action, and (2) the
parties are not diverse. The parties contend that the court now lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
As an initial matter, the court notes that Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in this court.
Because the case was not removed from state court, there is no state court to which the case can be
remanded. See Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 615 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988)). For this reason, the motion to remand is denied.
However, the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction indicates that federal courts generally have
discretion to retain or dismiss state law claims when the federal basis for an action drops away.
Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). No party urges the
court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Accordingly, the court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action, and
Plaintiff’s remaining state law causes of action are dismissed, without prejudice. Plaintiff, should
he choose to do so, may file a complaint in state court asserting his remaining state law causes of
action, i.e.: third cause of action for conversion against Palmetto Health; fourth cause of action for
violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act against Palmetto Health; fifth cause of
action for breach of contract against Palmetto Health; sixth cause of action for promissory estoppel
against Palmetto Health; seventh cause of action for wrongful termination against Palmetto Health;
eighth cause of action for quantum meruit against Palmetto Health; and ninth cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Palmetto Health and Urquhart. The period of
limitations for Plaintiff’s state law claims shall be tolled for a period of thirty days after dismissal,
unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Margaret B. Seymour
Senior United States District Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
March 9, 2015
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