Chesher et al v. 3M Company et al

Filing 294

ORDER denying 187 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable David C Norton on February 13, 2017. (rweh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
JAMES WILSON CHESHER, and
CHERYL ANN CHESHER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
3M COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:15-cv-02123-DCN
ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendant Crane Co.’s (“Crane”) motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court denies Crane’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Wilson Chesher (“Chesher”), a former machinist mate and a
commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, together with his wife, plaintiff Cheryl Ann
Chesher (together “plaintiffs”), allege that Chesher’s exposure to asbestos throughout his
Naval career, caused him to develop mesothelioma. Compl. ¶¶ 31–34. Chesher served in
the Navy from 1965 to 1989. For a significant portion of his career, Chesher conducted
or oversaw maintenance and repair work on various types of equipment, including valves
and de-aerating feed tanks—large tanks which remove dissolved oxygen from the water
before it is sent to the boiler. ECF No. 226-1, Chesher Video Dep. at 21:21–22:17,
26:10–22; ECF No. 226-2, Chesher First Dep. at 147:7–14. Chesher’s work on valves
required him, or his subordinate, to remove and replace internal packing and bonnet
gaskets, which were frequently made from asbestos-containing materials. Chesher Video
Dep. at 26:10–22 (describing work on internal packing and bonnet gaskets); ECF No.

1

226-9, Pantaleoni Dep. at 24:5–26:24, 57:7–25, 63:3–64:22, 72:9–18 (discussing
drawings of valves approved for use by the Navy that specified the use of asbestoscontaining materials); ECF No. 226-10, Moore Aff. ¶ 17 (noting that Crane drawings
specified use of asbestos containing internal packing and bonnet gaskets for certain
valves installed on the USS Henderson and USS Fox). This work produced dust which
Chesher breathed in. Pantaleoni Dep. at 27:20–28:25, 30:1–30:21. Chesher’s work on
de-aerating feed tanks required him to access nozzles inside the tank by crawling through
a manhole. Chesher First Dep. at 53:11–15. The record contains evidence that this
manhole was sealed by an asbestos-containing gasket, Moore Aff. ¶ 19, which needed to
be removed and replaced whenever the tank was inspected. ECF No. 226-3, Chesher
Second Dep. at 456:13–18.
Crane supplied valves for use on board the ships where Chesher performed, or
closely supervised, valve maintenance.1 ECF No. 226-8, Crane Answers to Interrogs. at
20. Indeed, Chesher recalls working on Crane valves frequently throughout his career.
Chesher Second Dep. at 420:4–15. Though Crane did not manufacture asbestoscontaining sheet packing or gaskets, these products were installed in Crane’s valves at the
time they were supplied to the Navy, see Pantaleoni Dep. at 24:5–11, 24:24–25:5
(indicating that Crane would have to provide component parts as specified in design
drawings at time of delivery), and Crane was aware that the valves’ sheet packing and
1

Crane admits to supplying valves to the USS Cadmus, USS Fox, USS Mahan,
and USS Pratt. ECF No. 226-8, Answers to Interrogs. 20. Crane cannot confirm whether
it sold valves for use on the USS Henderson and USS Kraus, but has found
documentation indicating that its valves were approved for use on those ships. Id.
Additionally, plaintiffs’ expert contends that Crane’s documents show that it supplied
valves used on the USS Henderson, USS Fox, and USS Kraus. Moore Aff. ¶ 17. The
court finds this evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Crane
valves were used on all the ships Chesher served on during the relevant portion of his
career.
2

gaskets would need to be replaced periodically. ECF No. 226-5, Crane Catalog No. 60 at
10–11. Crane is also alleged to be the successor-in-interest to Cochrane Corp.
(“Cochrane”), which manufactured the de-aerating feed tanks for two of the ships on
which Chesher served. Moore Aff. ¶ 19. Like the gaskets used in Crane valves, the
gaskets used to seal the manhole on the de-aerating feed tanks would have been replaced
periodically—namely, each time the tanks were opened. Id. ¶ 20.
On April 15, 2015, plaintiffs brought the instant action in the Court of Common
Pleas in Richland County, South Carolina, alleging claims for negligence, grossnegligence, negligence per se, conscious pain and suffering, punitive damages, and loss
of consortium against a number of defendants. The action was removed to this court on
May 22, 2015. On March 4, 2016, Crane filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
ECF No. 187. Plaintiffs filed a response on April 4, 2016, ECF No. 226, and Crane filed
a reply on April 14, 2016. ECF No. 230. The court held a hearing on June 2, 2016, and
ordered the parties to conduct supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs filed their supplemental
brief on June 3, 2016, ECF No. 248, and Crane filed a response on June 8, 2016. ECF
No. 249. The motion is now ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine

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issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[S]ummary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. When the party moving for summary judgment does
not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may discharge its burden by
demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The non-movant must
then “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322.
The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw all inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

At the outset, the court notes that there is no dispute that court has admiralty
jurisdiction over this action. Def.’s Mot. 5–7; Pls.’ Resp. 9. Because the Court has
admiralty jurisdiction, it must apply maritime law. See E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986) (“With admiralty jurisdiction
comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”). “Drawn from state and federal

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sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules,
modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.” Id. at 864–65. “The role of state
law in maritime cases is significant and complex.” Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 524
(4th Cir. 1999). A “fundamental feature of admiralty law” is that “federal admiralty
courts sometimes do apply state law.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 (1995). State law may be used to supplement federal
maritime law as long as state law is “compatible with substantive maritime policies” and
is not “inconsonant with the substance of federal maritime law.” Yamaha Motor Corp.,
U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996); see also Askew v. Am. Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341 (1973) (“Even though Congress has acted in the
admiralty area, state regulation is permissible, absent a clear conflict with the federal
law.”); Princess Cruises, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 143 F.3d 828, 834 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“When no federal statute or well-established rule of admiralty exists, admiralty law may
look to the common law or to state law, either statutory or decisional, to supply the rule
of decision.”); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[A]dmiralty law, at
times, looks to state law, either statutory or decisional, to supply the rule of decision
where there is no admiralty rule on point.”). However, “state law may not be applied if it
conflicts with, or seeks to materially change, federal maritime law.” E.g., State of Md.
Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 1226 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the court
must apply substantive maritime law supplemented by state law to the extent that it does
not conflict with well-established maritime law.

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B.

Duty to Warn Under Maritime Law

Crane argues that it cannot be held liable for Chesher’s injuries because there is
no evidence that he was ever exposed to any asbestos-containing products that were
manufactured or distributed by Crane. Def.’s Mot. 8. This argument, commonly known
as the “bare metal defense,” is premised on the assertion that a product manufacturer is
not responsible for harms caused by a product it did not manufacture or supply. Products
Liability, 3 The Law of Seamen § 31:6 (5th ed.). Plaintiffs contend that, in certain
narrow circumstances, the bare metal defense is unavailable and an equipment
manufacturer may be held liable for its failure to warn of risks arising from exposure to
asbestos-containing components supplied by third parties. Pls.’ Resp. 9–11. The bare
metal defense has garnered increased attention in recent years as courts have sought to
determine whether it applies in cases where the defendant’s products did not contain the
actual asbestos fibers that the plaintiff inhaled, but were nonetheless integral to the
plaintiff’s asbestos exposure. This court now joins this endeavor.
The starting point for any analysis of the bare metal defense under maritime law is
Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005). In Lindstrom, the
Sixth Circuit addressed maritime law’s requirements for establishing causation in a
products liability action. The court held regardless of whether the action was brought
under a theory of negligence or strict liability, “a plaintiff must show, for each defendant,
that (1) he was exposed to the defendant’s product, and (2) the product was a substantial
factor in causing the injury he suffered.” Id. at 492. Applying this principle to the
plaintiffs’ claims against the manufacturers of certain pumps and valves that utilized
asbestos-containing replacement parts, the Lindstrom court determined that the

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defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs had not shown that
the defendants actually manufactured the asbestos-containing material that caused their
injuries. Id. at 495–97 (holding that “Henry Vogt cannot be held responsible for material
‘attached or connected’ to its product on a claim of a manufacturing defect,” “Coffin
Turbo cannot be held responsible for the asbestos contained in another product,” and
“Ingersoll Rand cannot be held responsible for asbestos containing material that it was
incorporated into its product post-manufacture”).
In a case addressing similar facts, the federal asbestos multidistrict litigation
(“MDL”) court applied the same principle to the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims.
Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2012). In Conner, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant-manufacturers were liable for their failure to warn of the risks
associated with asbestos-containing replacement components used in their products. The
MDL court acknowledged that there was evidence that:
[d]efendants knew Navy sailors would be exposed to asbestos while
repairing and maintaining [d]efendants’ products; that the products
“required” asbestos insulation, gaskets, and packing; that [d]efendants
sometimes shipped their products with asbestos components “already in
place”; that [d]efendants supplied asbestos-containing replacement parts;
and that their products required maintenance that would expose the sailors
to asbestos-containing products.
Id. Despite this evidence, the MDL court relied on Lindstrom and certain state court
decisions to hold that, “under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for harm caused
by, and owes no duty to warn of the hazards inherent in, asbestos products that the
manufacturer did not manufacture or distribute.” See id. at 798–801 (discussing
Lindstrom, and certain California and Washington state court decisions). The MDL court
also highlighted the public policy concerns underlying its decision, explaining that
“public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended
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for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of
production against which liability insurance can be obtained,” id. at 801 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (1965)), and concluding that these concerns
“weigh against holding manufacturers liable for harm caused by asbestos products they
did not manufacture or distribute because those manufacturers cannot account for the
costs of liability created by the third parties’ products.” Id.
The court in Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. took a different approach. 17 F.
Supp. 3d 760 (N.D. Ill. 2014). While the Quirin court acknowledged that Lindstrom
appeared to preclude recovery for claims based on exposure to asbestos-containing
replacement components, the court found that Lindstrom’s holding was not determinative
because the Lindstrom court did not discuss failure-to-warn claims. Id. at 768. The court
also acknowledged the MDL court’s decision in Conner, but explained that not all courts
had applied the same approach when faced with this issue. Id. at 769. After surveying
the caselaw, the court found that three basic approaches had emerged:
Some courts have concluded that a defendant is liable whenever the use of
asbestos in connection with its product is foreseeable. [] Conversely, other
courts have concluded that a defendant is never liable when the material
containing asbestos was supplied by a third party. [] Finally, some courts
have followed a middle road, finding a duty where the use of asbestoscontaining materials was specified by a defendant, was essential to the
proper functioning of the defendant’s product, or was for some other
reason so inevitable that, by supplying the product, the defendant was
responsible for introducing asbestos into the environment at issue.
Id. The court then adopted the “middle path” and held that while a manufacturer
generally could not be held liable for materials it did not supply,
a duty may attach where the defendant manufactured a product that, by
necessity, contained asbestos components, where the asbestos-containing
material was essential to the proper functioning of the defendant’s
product, and where the asbestos-containing material would necessarily be
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replaced by other asbestos-containing material, whether supplied by the
original manufacturer or someone else.
Id. at 769–70. The court described the scope of this duty in a number of ways,
contrasting cases where there was no evidence that the defendant “specified that its
[product] had to be used with asbestos-containing [material] or that the [product] required
such [material] to function properly.” Id. at 771. The court also explained that “[t]he
duty attaches only when the manufacturer incorporated the asbestos-containing material
into its product.” Id. at 770. Finally, the court concluded that “a manufacturer should
[not] avoid liability . . . , where it designed its products to be used with asbestoscontaining materials and actually incorporated asbestos-containing materials into the
products it sold,” reasoning that when such criteria were satisfied “a jury could conclude
that it was not just foreseeable, but inevitable, that the product would subject those
working with it to the possible hazards of asbestos exposure.” Id. at 771.
In recent years, a split has emerged between courts applying Quirin, or a similar,
Quirin-like approach, and courts adhering to Conner’s more restrictive view of a
manufacturer’s duty to warn.2 Compare Osterhout v. Crane Co., 2016 WL 6310765, at
*3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2016) (reiterating the court’s previous adoption of the Quirin
analysis), Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 2016 WL 5780104, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct.
4, 2016) (holding that a manufacturer that incorporates asbestos components into its
finished product may be liable if the manufacturer’s failure to warn of hazards associated
with “the original asbestos components . . . is a proximate cause of a subsequent harmful
2

Not all courts that have applied a Quirin-like approach have formally adopted
Quirin, and even those that have purported to adopt Quirin have not been entirely
consistent in their interpretations of Quirin. Nor have all of the courts that have strictly
applied the bare metal defense explicitly “adopted” or “followed” Conner. Nevertheless,
the court views the Quirn and Conner decisions as representative of the two primary
approaches to this issue.
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exposure to asbestos contained in an aftermarket replacement part” or “if the
manufacturer negligently recommends the use of a defective aftermarket product”)
(emphasis in original),3 Hedden v. CBS Corp., 2015 WL 5775570, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
30, 2015) (recognizing that, generally, “a manufacturer cannot be liable for asbestos
products that it did not manufacture or distribute,” but holding “the defendant may be
liable for asbestos injuries” under the circumstances outlined in Quirin), Kochera v.
Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2015 WL 5584749, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015) (“Like the
Quirin court, this Court is not convinced that a manufacturer should avoid liability on a
failure to warn theory where it designed its products to be used with asbestos-containing
materials.”), and Andrews v. 3M Co., No. 2:13-cv-2055, 2015 WL 12831315, at *6
(D.S.C. May 22, 2015) (“[T]he Court follows Quirin and holds that [a manufacturer] can
be legally responsible for internal asbestos-containing replacement packing under certain
circumstances, even if there is no direct evidence that [the manufacturer] supplied the
replacement packing.”), on reconsideration, sub nom. Andrews v. CBS Corp., 2015 WL
12831342 (D.S.C. June 18, 2015),4 with Evans v. CBS Corp., 2017 WL 240079, at *1 (D.

3

Though the Bell court distinguished its analysis from Quirin, finding that
Quirin’s analysis overlooked “the differing liabilities of manufacturers of final products
and component parts, and [] the differences between strict products liability actions and
negligence actions,” 2016 WL 5780104, at *5, this court reads the Bell decision to apply
an approach that is much closer to Quirin than Conner. Not only did the Bell court flatly
reject the defendants’ argument that “a company can never have any liability for a
product that it did not make, sell, or otherwise control,” it also recognized that liability
for “aftermarket asbestos products” may exist in circumstances similar to those outlined
in Quirin, stating that, when asbestos-containing components are incorporated into a
finished product and the plaintiff’s harm is caused by “materially identical” replacement
components, “it is hard to see how the manufacturer’s breach of its duty to provide a
suitable warning with respect to the original product is not at least one of the proximate
causes of a resulting injury.” Id. at *8 n.16.
4
In addition to the decisions that have clearly adopted Quirin or some Quirin-like
standard, the court is aware of two decisions—including one of its own—that have left
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Del. Jan. 19, 2017) (“The so-called ‘bare metal defense’ is recognized by maritime law,
such that a manufacturer has no liability for harms caused by—and no duty to warn about
hazards associated with—a product it did not manufacture or distribute.” (quoting Carper
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2014 WL 6736205, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014)); Stallings v.
Georgia-Pac. Corp., 2015 WL 7258518, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 17, 2015) (holding that
“[a] company is not responsible for the asbestos contained in another manufacturer’s
product,” and granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to produce evidence that
defendant-manufacturer provided the asbestos-containing replacement components that
the decedent was exposed to), aff’d on other grounds, 2017 WL 87023 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
2017),5 Crews v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2014 WL 639685, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,

the door open for Quirin, but have not adopted its analysis. In Dandridge v. Crane Co.,
this court recognized the Quirin approach as
a rational exception to the rule that a defendant “cannot be held
responsible for the asbestos contained in another product,”[] because a
product that “inevitably” subjects its user to “the possible hazards of
asbestos exposure” and a product that actually contains asbestos bear
comparable causal relationships to their users’ injuries.
No. 2:12-cv-00484-DCN, 2016 WL 319938, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2016) (quoting
Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 496). However, the court ultimately found that the plaintiff had
failed to present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, even if Quirin
applied. Id.
Similarly, in Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc., the court found that the defendant was
entitled to summary judgment, regardless of whether maritime law or New York law
applied, because there was no evidence that the defendant “placed the asbestoscontaining components into the stream of commerce, played an active role in their use, or
manufactured pumps that required such components.” 2016 WL 270450, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 2016). Though the Holzworth court cited to New York law on the matter, the
court recognized that “the relevant maritime law and state law are congruous.” Id. at *3.
The court further explained that the New York standard was equally, if not more
permissive, than either the Quirin or Conner standards.
5
The Stallings decision, much like the Lindstrom decision, never explicitly
addressed failure-to-warn claims. 2015 WL 7258518, at *1 (noting that the plaintiff
sought relief “under theories of strict liability and negligence”). Nevertheless, the court
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2014) (holding that “Crane Co. had no duty to warn Plaintiff about the dangers of thirdparty products that were used with its valves because it neither had any control over the
production of these products nor placed them into the stream of commerce”), Cabasug v.
Crane Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1041 (D. Haw. 2013) (relying on Conner and holding
that “under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts that it did not
place into the stream of commerce, whether the manufacturer’s product originally
contained asbestos components or was designed to include asbestos components), and
Faddish v. Buffalo Pumps, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (applying the
bare metal defense to grant equipment manufacturer-defendants summary judgment
where plaintiff failed to present evidence that “any of [the] [asbestos-containing]
replacement parts” that caused the plaintiff’s injury were “made by any defendant or that
defendants had any involvement with their installation”).6
This rift has developed around a number of issues.7 Some courts have debated the
scope of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lindstrom. Compare Devries v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
188 F. Supp. 3d 454, 458 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that Lindstrom extends to failure-towarn claims, and therefore, “maritime law imposes no duty upon a product manufacturer
to warn of the dangers associated with another manufacturer’s ‘product’ (or component
part)”) and Cabasug, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (calling Lindstrom “instructive” on the
finds that the Lindstrom decision can be read to support the Conner approach, and for the
same reasons, the court places the Stallings decision on the Conner side of the ledger.
6
Though the Faddish court cited heavily to Florida law, the court only applied
Florida law to the extent it was compatible with maritime law. 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1368
(“[I]n the context of this case, Florida law is appropriately applied unless it conflicts with
the substantive rule of federal admiralty law.”). The court viewed Florida law and
maritime law as “parallel.” Id. at 1369.
7
The court does not mean to suggest that these are the only issues that have
emerged, but simply views them as the most prevalent and meaningful issues that have
driven courts’ analyses.
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scope of a manufacturer’s duty to warn “for its determination that a manufacturer is not
liable for a third party’s replacement asbestos products”); with Andrews, 2015 WL
12831315, at *6 (distinguishing Lindstrom as “a manufacturing defect case [that] did not
consider or discuss a failure-to-warn claim”). Courts have also reached different
conclusions on which approach is more consistent with the majority position under state
law. Compare Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016) (“[T]he recent
trend in state court asbestos litigation has been to recognize limited circumstances in
which a manufacturer can have duties to warn regarding a product that the manufacturer
did not make, sell, or otherwise control.”) with Cabasug, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (finding
that “[p]laintiffs can hardly suggest that Lindstrom and Conner are outliers in their
conclusions where they too cited state law cases in support of their analyses,” and finding
that the state law cases the plaintiffs provided in opposition were largely inapplicable to
the question before the court). Most importantly, courts have taken different positions on
which view best serves the policies animating product-liability and maritime law.
Compare Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *8 (finding that “the manufacturer of the finished
product containing asbestos may well be better placed to warn when compared to the
manufacturer of an aftermarket wear item”); with Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 801
(finding that public policy considerations “weigh[] against holding manufacturers liable
for harm caused by asbestos products they did not manufacture or distribute because
those manufacturers cannot account for the costs of liability created by the third parties’
products”). The court analyzes each of these issues in turn.

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1.

Scope of the Lindstrom Decision

As noted above, the Conner court relied heavily on the Lindstrom decision in
concluding that a manufacturer owes no duty to warn with respect to “asbestos products
that the manufacturer did not manufacture or distribute.” See Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at
801 (construing this position as an “adoption” of Lindstrom). In contrast, the Quirin
court distinguished Lindstrom on the grounds that the Lindstrom decision did not
discuss failure-to-warn claims. Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 768. More recently, the MDL
court has identified this issue as “the source of divergence between the Conner and
Quirin decisions.” Devries, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 463. Courts that have adopted a Quirinlike approach to the failure-to-warn issue have generally avoided a direct challenge to the
holding in Lindstrom, either by explicitly distinguishing it or implicitly suggesting that it
did not require an application of the bare metal defense to failure-to-warn claims. See
Hedden, 2015 WL 5775570, at *11 (citing Lindstrom for the general principles of
causation but nevertheless holding that a defendant may be liable under the circumstances
outlined in Quirin); Kochera, 2015 WL 5584749, at *3 (same); Andrews, 2015 WL
12831315, at *6 (distinguishing Lindstrom as “a manufacturing defect case [that] did not
consider or discuss a failure-to-warn claim”); but see Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *1
(reading Lindstrom to hold that a manufacturer can never be liable “unless the
manufacturer made, sold, or otherwise controlled the precise aftermarket asbestos
components that released the asbestos fibers that injured the plaintiff,” and refusing to
adopt such a view). Thus, the interpretation of Lindstrom has served as something of a
gateway issue into the Quirin-Conner debate.

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In Devries, the MDL court explained its interpretation of Lindstrom, making it
clear that it read Lindstrom’s reference to “both negligence and strict liability theories” to
encompass failure-to-warn claims. Devries, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 459 n.7. Thus, in the
MDL court’s view, Lindstrom requires a plaintiff show “evidence of exposure to asbestos
from the defendant’s ‘product’” in any products liability action brought under maritime
law. Id. at 460–61. “Implicit in this rule is the holding that a product manufacturer has
no duty to warn about hazards arising from another manufacturer’s product (or
component part).” Id. at 460 n.11.
The court has no doubt that this is a fair reading of the Lindstrom decision.
Indeed, other courts have adopted similar readings. See, e.g., Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at
*1 (reading Lindstrom to hold that a manufacturer can never be liable “unless the
manufacturer made, sold, or otherwise controlled the precise aftermarket asbestos
components that released the asbestos fibers that injured the plaintiff”); Cabasug, 989 F.
Supp. 2d at 1039 (calling Lindstrom “instructive” on the scope of a manufacturer’s duty
to warn “for its determination that a manufacturer is not liable for a third party’s
replacement asbestos products”). Moreover, the court is hesitant to deviate from the
MDL court’s position, given the MDL court’s expertise in this area of the law.
Nevertheless, the court is convinced that the better reading of Lindstrom does not extend
to failure-to-warn claims. The Lindstrom court’s reference to “negligence and strict
liability theories” is at least ambiguous, 424 F.3d at 492, and the decision contains no
discussion of failure-to-warn claims. This alone has been enough to convince some
courts—including one in this district—that Lindstrom does not extend to such claims.
Andrews, 2015 WL 12831315, at *6 (distinguishing Lindstrom as “a manufacturing

15

defect case [that] did not consider or discuss a failure-to-warn claim”); Quirin, 17 F.
Supp. 3d at 768 (distinguishing Lindstrom on the ground that it “did not discuss a failureto-warn claim”).
The court also finds that applying Lindstrom in the failure-to-warn context is
conceptually problematic. The Lindstrom court held that to prove causation, a plaintiff
must prove that “he was exposed to the defendant’s product, and [] the product was a
substantial factor in causing the injury he suffered.” 424 F.3d at 492. This rule is
straightforward enough when a manufacturer breaches its duty by supplying a defective
product because the product serves as a physical embodiment of the breach. Thus,
causation can only be traced to the manufacturer through the manufacturer’s own
product. The same is not true when a manufacturer breaches its duty to warn of a
product’s unreasonably dangerous condition. In that situation, the breach does not arise
out of the creation of the product itself but instead out of the manufacturer’s failure to
warn of the danger the product creates. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965).
Conceptually then, the plaintiff’s task is to establish a causal link between his injury and
the manufacturer’s omission, not the product itself.
It might be argued that this is a distinction without a difference—if the
manufacturer’s product did not cause the plaintiff’s injury, there is no way causation
could be traced to the manufacturer’s failure to warn. To be sure, these inquiries will
frequently merge, but the fact remains that a manufacturer’s failure to warn is distinct
from the act of creating the product. The court believes that, in certain narrow
circumstances, a manufacturer’s failure to warn of risks associated with its own product

16

can cause a plaintiff to suffer injury through another manufacturer’s product.8 As the
Eastern District of Louisiana explained in Bell, where the plaintiff’s injury is attributable
to “a replacement aftermarket wear item—i.e., a part that is designed to wear down and
be replaced,” and that replacement wear item “is materially identical to a wear item in the
originally shipped product, it is hard to see how the manufacturer’s breach of its duty to
provide a suitable warning with respect to the original product is not at least one of the
proximate causes of a resulting injury.” 2016 WL 5780104, at *6 n.16.9 Thus, the
distinction may be quite narrow, but the court finds that it is not meaningless. See id.
(stating that “such an exception . . . may well be quite narrow,” “[b]ut that does not
justify a categorical rule” that an equipment manufacturer’s failure to warn cannot
proximately cause “a sailor’s exposure to a hazardous substance contained in an
aftermarket replacement component part”). Because Lindstrom’s analysis does not
8

For the purposes of this discussion, the court assumes that the harm-causing
“product” in question is the asbestos-containing component, not the piece of equipment
itself. If the harmful “product” is considered to be the piece of equipment, then
Lindstrom poses no obstacle to a finding of liability in this case because Chesher was
clearly exposed to Crane valves and de-aerating feed-tanks.
9
The court recognizes that, unlike some courts that have applied Quirin, the Bell
decision speaks in terms of the manufacturer’s duty to warn with respect to its original
product and not with respect to replacement components. Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *6.
In fact, the Bell decision specifically rejects what it reads to be Quirin’s holding—that “a
manufacturer can be liable for failing to warn regarding asbestos when a manufacturer
makes a product in which the use of asbestos components is ‘essential to the proper
function of the . . . product.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70). This
court does not read Quirin so broadly. As discussed in greater detail below, the court
finds that Quirin is constrained to cases where (1) the defendant actually incorporated
asbestos-containing components into its original product, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771, and
(2) the defendant “specified” the use of asbestos-containing replacement components, or
such components were “essential to the proper functioning” of the product. Id. at 769,
771. When these constraints are recognized, the court believes the practical effect is that
Quirin imposes a duty to warn with respect to asbestos-containing replacement
components under the same circumstances in which Bell indicates that a defendant’s
failure to warn with respect to the original asbestos-containing components constitutes a
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
17

account for this distinction, the court finds that it is better read to apply only to
manufacturing or design defect claims, not failure-to-warn claims.
2.

Majority Rule Under State Law

Courts on both sides of the issue have also drawn support from cases applying
state law. See Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *5 (noting decisions under Pennsylvania, New
York, Maryland, and California law that indicated—to varying degrees of certainty—that
a manufacturer may have a duty to warn regarding a product the manufacturer does not
produce); Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (“[A] number of state courts . . . that have
considered this issue have similarly held that a defendant manufacturer is not liable for a
third party’s asbestos products when the defendant is not part of the “chain of
distribution” of the asbestos product.”); see also Cabasug, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1039
(noting that the Conner decision demonstrated how its position was “consistent with
several state court decisions addressing replacement parts”); Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at
770 (“The California Supreme Court, which approved of the bare metal defense . . . , also
left room for an exception to the rule.”). Looking to state law is particularly significant in
this case, given the split that has emerged in the federal courts addressing this issue under
maritime law.10 Princess Cruises, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 143 F.3d 828, 834 (4th Cir.
10

While the court believes that this issue is best characterized as “unsettled”
under maritime law, it notes that the trend appears to be moving away from Conner’s
strict application of the bare metal defense. If one counts Quirin, then courts in six
separate jurisdictions—the Northern District of New York, Eastern District of Louisiana,
Southern District of Indiana, Southern District of Illinois, District of South Carolina, and
Northern District of Illinois—have held, or at least suggested, that an equipment
manufacturer may be held liable on a failure-to-warn theory for harm caused by asbestoscontaining replacement components. Osterhout, 2016 WL 6310765, at *3; Bell, 2016
WL 5780104, at *6; Hedden, 2015 WL 5775570, at *14; Kochera, 2015 WL 5584749, at
*4; Andrews, 2015 WL 12831315, at *6; Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769–71. Similarly, if
one includes the MDL court, then courts in six jurisdictions—the District of Delaware,
Western District of Kentucky, Northern District of New York, District of Hawaii,
18

1998) (“When no federal statute or well-established rule of admiralty exists, admiralty
law may look to the common law or to state law, either statutory or decisional, to supply
the rule of decision.”).
Courts that have endorsed a strict application of the bare metal defense often
discuss three state court decisions: Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2008),
Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008), and O’Neil v. Crane Co.,
266 P.3d 987 (Cal. 2012). See Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 798–800 (discussing
Simonetta, Braaten, and O’Neil as decisions which “have [] held that a defendant
manufacturer is not liable for a third party’s asbestos products when the defendant is not
part of the ‘chain of distribution’ of the asbestos product”); see also Cabasug, 989 F.
Supp. 2d at 1039–41 (reviewing and endorsing the Conner court’s evaluation of
Simonetta, Braaten, and O’Neil); Devries, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 463 (describing Conner’s
interpretation of Lindstrom as “consistent with [the rules set forth under] state law in
O’Neil, Simonetta, and Braaten—decisions which each considered and relied upon
Lindstrom in determining its respective rule of law regarding negligent failure-to-warn”).
However, there are problems with relying on Simonetta, Braaten, and O’Neil to hold that
Southern District of Florida, and Eastern District of Pennsylvania—have adopted, or at
least suggested, the opposite conclusion. Evans, 2017 WL 240079, at *1; Stallings, 2015
WL 7258518, at *4; Crews, 2014 WL 639685, at *5; Cabasug, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1041;
Faddish, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 798–801. However, if one
looks only to courts that have taken a position after Quirin was decided, the count is five
to four in favor of Quirin—and that is counting the MDL court’s reaffirmation of the
Conner approach in Devries, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 460–61, but not counting Quirin itself.
Moreover, of the two Northern District of New York decisions that appear to have
reached different conclusions—the Osterhout decision, which adopted Quirin, in no
uncertain terms, 2016 WL 6310765, at *3, and the Crews decision, which applied the
bare metal defense, 2014 WL 639685, at *5—the Osterhout decision was issued more
recently. See Osterhout, 2016 WL 6310765 (decided October 27, 2016); Crews, 2014
WL 639685 (decided February 18, 2014). When all of these decisions are considered
together, the court finds that the scales tip slightly in favor of the Quirin approach, but not
enough to foreclose the need for further analysis.
19

an equipment manufacturer can never be liable for injury caused by asbestos-containing
replacement components. As an initial matter, each of these decisions stopped short of
foreclosing the availability of a failure-to-warn claim in the circumstances outlined in
Quirin—namely, where (1) the defendant actually incorporated asbestos-containing
components into its original product, Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771, and (2) the defendant
“specified” the use of asbestos-containing replacement components, or such components
were “essential to the proper functioning” of the product. Id. at 769, 771.
In the companion cases of Simonetta and Braaten, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the equipment manufacturer defendants did not have a duty to warn
of the risks associated with asbestos-containing replacement components because they
were not part of the “chain of distribution” of the hazardous products, even if those risks
were foreseeable. Simonetta, 197 P.3d at 138 (“Because [defendant] was not in the chain
of distribution of the dangerous product, we conclude not only that it had no duty to warn
under negligence, but also that it cannot be strictly liable for failure to warn.”); Braaten,
198 P.3d at 504 (“As we held in Simonetta, a manufacturer has no duty under common
law products liability or negligence principles to warn of the dangers of exposure to
asbestos in products it did not manufacture and for which the manufacturer was not in the
chain of distribution.”). But in Simonetta, it was “undisputed that [the defendant] sold
the evaporator without insulation and that it did not manufacture, sell, or select the
asbestos insulation” in question. Simonetta, 197 P.3d at 138. Thus, the Simonetta
plaintiffs’ claims would have also failed under Quirin, which requires a showing that the
manufacturer actually incorporated asbestos into the product when it was originally sold.
See Dandridge, 2016 WL 319938, at *4 (holding that summary judgment would be

20

appropriate under Quirin where “there [was] no evidence that [the defendant] ‘actually
incorporated asbestos-containing materials into the products it sold’”).
The Braaten decision came somewhat closer to addressing the circumstances
outlined in Quirin. In that case, there was evidence that “some of the defendants’
products originally contained packing and gaskets with asbestos.” Braaten, 198 P.3d at
496. The court found these facts were not sufficient to support a failure-to-warn claim
against the defendants for asbestos-containing products they did not supply, but explicitly
stated that
we need not and do not reach the issue of whether a duty to warn might
arise with respect to the danger of exposure to asbestos-containing
products specified by the manufacturer to be applied to, in, or connected to
their products, or required because of a peculiar, unusual, or unique
design.
Id. Because Quirin requires those very conditions to be met, the court concludes that the
decision in Braaten also falls short of foreclosing a failure-to-warn claim under Quirin.
Moreover, the Washington law has moved toward the Quirin approach in the
years since Simonetta and Braaten were decided. As the MDL court has acknowledged,
the Supreme Court of Washington appears to have since retreated
somewhat from its earlier adoption of the so-called ‘bare metal defense’ in
Simonetta . . . and Braaten . . . [by later] distinguish[ing] the facts in
Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 282 P.3d 1069 (Wash. 2012), and
holding that a product manufacturer can at least sometimes be liable for
failure to warn of the hazards of asbestos exposure that necessarily occurs
as a result of the intended use of the product for the purpose for which it
was designed—even if the product itself did not contain asbestos when
manufactured and supplied, and the asbestos was released from another
manufacturer’s product.
Devries, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 456 n.4 (alterations in original) (quoting Schwartz v. Abex
Corp., 106 F. Supp. 3d 626, 646 (E.D. Pa. 2015)). The critical distinction offered by the
Macias court was that, in Simonetta and Braaten, “the manufacturers’ products did not, in
21

and of themselves, pose any inherent danger of exposure to asbestos,” whereas in Macias,
when the “the products were used exactly as intended . . . they inherently and invariably
posed the danger of exposure to asbestos.” 282 P.3d at 1077 (emphasis in original).
Such reasoning is quite analogous to the Quirin court’s focus on “inevitability.” Quirin,
17 F. Supp. 3d at 771. Thus, the law of Washington actually appears more consistent
with the Quirin approach than with Conner’s strict application of the bare metal defense.
As for the Supreme Court of California’s decision in O’Neil, the court need look
no further than footnote 6 of the opinion to see that, like the Simonetta and Braaten
decisions, it cannot be read to impose an absolute prohibition on liability for asbestoscontaining replacement parts. In O’Neil, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants’
products were “defective because they were ‘designed to be used’ with asbestoscontaining components.” O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 996. The court first held the “mere
compatibility” with asbestos-containing components was insufficient to impose liability
on the defendants. Id. Then, in footnote 6, the court explained that:
A stronger argument for liability might be made in the case of a product
that required the use of a defective part in order to operate. In such a case,
the finished product would inevitably incorporate a defect. One could
argue that replacement of the original defective part with an identically
defective one supplied by another manufacturer would not break the chain
of causation. Similarly, if the product manufacturer specified or required
the use of a defective replacement part, a stronger case could be made that
the manufacturer’s failure to warn was a proximate cause of resulting
injury. In both contexts, however, the policy rationales against imposing
liability on a manufacturer for a defective part it did not produce or supply
would remain. [] These difficult questions are not presented in the case
before us, and we express no opinion on their appropriate resolution.

22

Id. at 996 n.6 (emphasis in original). Again, the Quirin approach is explicitly restricted to
the circumstances addressed in footnote 6 of the O’Neil decision.11 It is true that the
O’Neil court did not tip its hand on whether or not California law would recognize a
claim in such circumstances. Though it extolled the logical virtues of such a claim, it
also noted that even in the circumstances outlined in footnote 6, “the policy rationales
against imposing liability on a manufacturer for a defective part it did not produce or
supply would remain.”12 Id. at 996 n.6. But the fact remains that the court did not take a
position either way. Because the O’Neil decision explicitly declined to address the issue,
the court finds that it does not weigh for or against the Quirin approach in determining
the majority position under state law.
While the Simonetta, Braaten, and O’Neil decisions provide little, if any, support
for the Conner approach, the Southern District of Florida’s decision in Faddish was far
less equivocal. 881 F. Supp. 2d 1361. Though Faddish was a maritime law case, the
court applied Florida law after determining that Florida law and maritime law were not
inconsistent on the issue. Id. at 1369. Thus, the Faddish decision not only endorsed the
Conner approach under maritime law, but also provided a thorough analysis of the issue
under Florida law. Id. at 1370–72. The Faddish court adopted a strict application of the
bare metal defense, concluding that manufacturers could not be held liable for a
plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos-containing replacement parts where there was “no
evidence that any of these replacement parts [were] made by any defendant or that
defendants had any involvement with their installation.” Id. at 1373. Notably, the court
11

In fact, Quirin’s application is even narrower, given its “actual incorporation”
requirement. See Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771 (imposing liability where defendant
designed products to be used with asbestos and “actually incorporated asbestoscontaining materials into the products it sold”).
12
These policy arguments are discussed in greater detail in part III.B.3. below.
23

reached this conclusion even though there was evidence that some of the defendants’
products contained asbestos-containing components when they were originally
distributed and it was foreseeable13 that such components would need to be replaced. Id.
Thus, the court concludes that the Conner approach is consistent with Florida law.14
Unsurprisingly, this is not enough to conclude that Conner represents the majority
approach. There are a number of state court decisions recognizing exceptions to the bare
metal defense that are at least as permissive as Quirin. See, e.g., In re N.Y.C. Asbestos
13

One might argue that Faddish can be distinguished because it rejected liability
premised on “foreseeability” rather than “inevitability.” The court does think this
distinction is important in the application of the Quirin approach, but finds that the thrust
of the Faddish decision cannot be distinguished so easily, especially when one recognizes
that the Faddish court viewed its decision as consistent with Conner. See Faddish, 881 F.
Supp. 2d at 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
14
The court is aware of several other decisions that applied the bare metal defense
under state law, but stopped short of rejecting a Quirin-like claim. In Morgan v. Bill
Vann Co., the court applied Alabama law to hold that the defendant-manufacturer “[was]
not liable for harm caused by, and owed no duty to warn [the plaintiff] or anyone else
concerning the hazards of, asbestos-containing packing and gaskets that users of [its]
pumps might install, where [it] did not manufacture, sell or distribute such asbestoscontaining components.” 969 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1369 (S.D. Ala. 2013). However, the
Morgan court did not determine the legal merits of the plaintiff’s argument that the
defendant “specified particular gaskets and packing for use [] and is therefore culpable
for any asbestos exposure [] arising from such specifications,” instead rejecting that
argument on the facts. Id. at 1371. Similarly, the court in In re Asbestos Litigation
determined that, under Utah law, a “[d]efendant is not liable under a failure to warn claim
for asbestos-containing products added to its products after sale,” but then noted that
“[plaintiff] has not provided evidence in the record that [d]efendant specified, required, or
recommended asbestos-containing products be added to its products on which [p]laintiff
actually worked,” suggesting that a Quirin-like exception may exist. 2012 WL 1408982,
at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2012). Finally, in Thurmon v. Georgia Pacific, LLC, the
court held that, under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by the
defendant’s own product, but also appeared to recognize that a valve that required the use
of asbestos-containing gaskets would be considered a defective product. 650 F. App’x
752, 758–59 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[I]n order to survive summary judgment, the plaintiffs
had to offer some evidence that Thurmon’s injuries were caused by a Crane Co. valve
that required the use of asbestos-containing gaskets to function properly.”). Perhaps
these decisions provide some additional support for the Conner approach, but the court
finds that even if they were counted, they would be insufficient to tip the scales in favor
of Conner over Quirin.
24

Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 471 (N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he manufacturer of a product has a duty to
warn of the danger arising from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product
in combination with a third-party product which, as a matter of design, mechanics or
economic necessity, is necessary to enable the manufacturer’s product to function as
intended.”); McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson Co., 373 P.3d 150, 160–62 (Or. Ct. App.
2016), review denied sub nom., 381 P.3d 841 (Or. 2016) (rejecting bare metal defense
where it was foreseeable that plaintiff would be exposed to asbestos-containing
replacement components); May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984, 1000 (Md.
2015) (“[A] manufacturer will have a duty to warn under negligence and strict liability
when (1) its product contains asbestos components, and no safer material is available; (2)
asbestos is a critical part of the pump sold by the manufacturer; (3) periodic maintenance
involving handling asbestos gaskets and packing is required; and (4) the manufacturer
knows or should know the risks from exposure to asbestos.”); Schwartz, 106 F. Supp. 3d
at 655 (“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, a product manufacturer has a [] duty to warn about
the asbestos hazards of a component part later used with its product, which it neither
manufactured nor supplied . . . , if the manufacturer knew its product would be used with
that type of asbestos-containing component . . . .”); Garvin v. AGCO Corp., Case No.
2012-cp-40-6675, slip op. at 15–18 (S.C. Ct. C.P. December 10, 2014) (expressing
approval of Quirin and holding that a manufacturer may be liable for harm caused by
asbestos-containing replacement gaskets and packing when “[the] manufacturer
recommends, specifies, or requires that asbestos gaskets and packing be replaced with
like materials”). As noted above, it also appears that Washington has adopted a similar
position, recognizing that liability may be imposed where a manufacturer’s product

25

“inherently and invariably pose[s] [a] danger of exposure to asbestos.” Macias, 282 P.3d
at 1077 (emphasis omitted). In light of the recent trend towards recognizing a
manufacturer’s duty to warn with respect to replacement parts in limited circumstances,
and the fact that Conner’s support at the state level was rather measured to begin with,
the court finds that the Quirin approach is more consistent with the majority view under
state law.
3.

Policy Considerations

Policy considerations have also played an important role in the courts’ treatment
of this issue. E.g., Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 801. Indeed, courts have recognized that
the scope of a legal duty is essentially a matter of policy. See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos
Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 469 (listing various, policy-based factors used to determine whether a
duty exists in a particular situation, including “the most reasonable allocation of risks,
[the] burdens and costs among the parties and within society, . . . economic impact,
. . . the person [] best positioned to avoid the harm[,] . . . the public policy served by the
presence or absence of a duty and the logical basis of a duty.”); Devries, 188 F. Supp. 3d
at 463 (distinguishing state law cases rejecting the bare metal defense on the ground that
“[t]he rule of law set forth in each of these cases reflects a policy determination of that
particular state—a policy determination which need not be consistent with the policy
determination underlying maritime law”); May, 129 A.3d at 994 (“We have recognized
that ‘[a]t its core, the determination of whether a duty exists represents a policy question
of whether the specific plaintiff is entitled to protection from the acts of the defendant.’”
(quoting Gourdine v. Crews, 955 A.2d 769, 783 (Md. 2008))). This does not mean that a
court is free to impose its own policy preferences; the court must ask whether the law has

26

already made this policy determination and account for the doctrinal framework in which
the question arises. However, in this case, since there is no clearly established rule,15 the
court believes policy considerations must be accorded significant weight.
While courts have almost universally recognized the role policy considerations
play in analyzing this issue, they have disagreed on which approach these considerations
favor. Compare Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *8 (finding that “the manufacturer of the
finished product containing asbestos may well be better placed to warn when compared
to the manufacturer of an aftermarket wear item”); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59
N.E.3d at 473 (“The endorsement of a manufacturer’s duty to warn against certain
combined uses of its product and a third-party product comports with the long-standing
public policy underlying products liability in New York.”); with Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d
at 801 (finding that public policy considerations “weigh[] against holding manufacturers
liable for harm caused by asbestos products they did not manufacture or distribute
because those manufacturers cannot account for the costs of liability created by the third
parties’ products”). Courts have justified the bare metal defense on the ground that
recognizing liability for third-party replacement components would impose too great a
cost on the original equipment manufacturers. Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 801; see also
O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 1005–06 (explaining that “a manufacturer cannot be expected to
exert pressure on other manufacturers to make their products safe and will not be able to
share the costs of ensuring product safety” and that “[i]t is [] unfair to require
manufacturers of nondefective products to shoulder a burden of liability when they

15

As the court noted above in footnote 10, the Quirin approach does appear to at
least have more support in recent decisions.
27

derived no economic benefit from the sale of the products that injured the plaintiff”).16
As a general matter, this is a sound proposition. Manufacturers cannot control the risks
associated with every product that might foreseeably be used in conjunction with their
own. Thus, forcing manufacturers to account for such risks only serves to increase the
costs of producing their own product, without improving the incentive structure
surrounding the production of the product that actually caused the plaintiffs’ harm.
However, the assumptions underlying this rationale do not hold in the context of a
Quirin claim, which requires a showing that (1) the defendant actually incorporated
asbestos-containing components into its original product, and (2) the defendant
“specified” the use of asbestos-containing replacement components, or such components
were “essential to the proper functioning” of the defendant’s product. Quirin, 17 F. Supp.
3d at 769, 771. In these narrow circumstances, the original equipment manufacturer is
well-positioned to bear the costs of the risk associated with asbestos-containing
replacement parts. When a manufacturer actually incorporates a particular component
into its product, it cannot claim a lack of control over the risks associated with that
component, as the manufacturer has every opportunity to test that component and become
familiar with such risks. See Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *7 n.16 (recognizing that a
manufacturer has a duty to “investigate and warn” about risks associated with
components that the manufacturer puts into its product); Garvin, Case No. 2012-cp-406675, slip op. at 13 (recognizing that Crane “had every opportunity to test and evaluate
the asbestos gaskets and packing used in its valves”). To the extent the manufacturer
16

Of course, the O’Neil court declined to address whether the bare metal defense
would apply in circumstances similar to those outlined in Quirin. O’Neil, 266 P.3d at
996 n.6. However, the court did indicate that the policy considerations underlying the
bare metal defense would still apply. Id.
28

designs or markets its product in such a way that the product will always require the same
risk-bearing component, it exercises control over the risk associated with replacement
components. Cf. Dandridge, 2016 WL 319938, at *3 (“[A] product that ‘inevitably’
subjects its user to the possible hazards of asbestos exposure and a product that actually
contains asbestos bear comparable causal relationships to their users’ injuries.”) (internal
quotations omitted). In a sense, the Quirin requirements serve to limit a manufacturer’s
liability to cases where the harm arises from risks that are effectively incorporated into
the manufacturer’s product, though they may be borne by a replacement component. Cf.
May, 129 A.3d at 999 (“The necessary replacement of asbestos components with
identical components cannot be said to constitute a substantial modification.”). Thus,
where Quirin applies, the equipment manufacturer has at least as much power to control
the risks associated with the asbestos-containing replacement components as the
component manufacturers themselves. Indeed, some courts have suggested that
equipment manufacturers may be in a better position to warn of such risks than the
component manufacturers. See Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *7 n.16 (“The manufacturer
of the finished product containing asbestos may well be better placed to warn when
compared to the manufacturer of an aftermarket wear item.”); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos
Litig., 27 N.Y.3d at 791 (“[T]he end user is more likely to interact with the durable
product over an extended period of time, and hence he or she is more likely to inspect
warnings on that item or in associated documentation than to review warnings supplied
by the maker of the ‘wear item.’”).
The defendant-manufacturer also derives a benefit from the sale of such
components, “as the manufacturer is able to sell its own product to customers precisely

29

because the third party has sold to those customers another item that is essential to the
product’s function.” In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 472. This benefit should
not be conferred without the costs that attend it. Allowing equipment manufacturers to
reap profits conditioned on the proliferation of asbestos-containing replacement
components, while immunizing them from liability relating to such components, creates
an incentive structure that fails to account for the costs such manufacturers impose on
society. This result is socially inefficient—not to mention, palpably unjust. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment c. (“[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those
who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained.”).17 The naval workers who used Crane’s products were certainly in no
17

The court is aware that § 402A is often cited as a basis for restricting a
manufacturer’s liability to its own product. E.g., Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
Nevertheless, in the narrow circumstances outlined by Quirin, the court is convinced that
the rationale of § 402A weighs against the bare metal defense. This position is perhaps
best explained by focusing on what constitutes the harmful “product” at the center of the
analysis. Courts that have strictly applied the bare metal defense have consistently
regarded the asbestos-containing replacement component as the “product,” while courts
that have cited § 402A in support of the Quirin-like approach have regarded the original
piece of equipment as the “product.” See May, 129 A.3d at 999 (“Common sense tells us
that the pumps were what [r]espondents sold to the Navy, and the gaskets and packing are
included within that product.”); Garvin, Case No. 2012-cp-40-6675, slip op. at 17
(“When the asbestos gaskets and packing were replaced with the same materials that
came with the valve, it was not a ‘substantial change’ in the condition of the product.
The product remained the same as when sold—valves containing asbestos gaskets and
packing.”). If the original equipment is considered to be the “product” in question, then
the application of § 402A becomes clear.
While this court prefers to refer to the asbestos-containing replacement
component as separate “products,” this is simply to avoid semantic confusion. The court
reiterates its position that, where the requirements of Quirin are met, the risks associated
with asbestos-containing replacement components are effectively incorporated into the
equipment itself. Thus, the court accepts the logic of the May and Garvin decisions, even
if it does not adopt the same phrasing. Were the court to phrase its analysis in the terms
used by the May and Garvin courts, it would agree that installing asbestos-containing
replacement components does not effect a “substantial change” to the equipment.
30

position to protect themselves against the dangers inherent in such use. If a plaintiff can
prove that an equipment manufacturer’s actions rendered such exposure inevitable, there
is little reason to treat the equipment manufacturer differently than the actual
manufacturer of the asbestos-containing components that caused the plaintiff’s harm. See
In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 792–93 (“‘[T]oday as never before the product
in the hands of the consumer is often a most sophisticated and even mysterious article,’
and given the practical inability of the users of modern products to detect the dangers
inherent in their operation, ‘from the standpoint of justice . . . , responsibility should be
laid on the manufacturer.’” (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627 (N.Y.
1973))).
There is one policy argument specific to maritime law that does favor Conner’s
strict application of the bare metal defense: the goal of uniformity. Devries, 188 F.
Supp. 3d at 463. Concerns with uniformity are at the heart of maritime law. As the
Cabasug court recognized, the Constitution intended maritime law to be
a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules
and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several
States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at
which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character
affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign
states.
Cabasug, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
451 (1994)).
The Conner approach provides a bright-line rule that calls for very little factual
analysis; the court looks for evidence that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos fibers that
the defendant actually manufactured, and if there is no such evidence, the claim fails.
Conner, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (“[U]nder maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for
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harm caused by, and owes no duty to warn of the hazards inherent in, asbestos products
that the manufacturer did not manufacture or distribute.”). The Quirin approach, in
contrast, requires analysis of several additional factors: (1) whether the defendant
actually incorporated asbestos-containing components in its original product, and
(2) whether the defendant specified the use of such components or the defendant’s
product required such components to function properly. Quirin,17 F. Supp. 3d at 769,
771. These factors present interpretive questions that could lead to divergent results. For
instance, courts could disagree on what it means to “specify” the use of a component.
Compare Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *3 n.11 (finding that a manufacturer should not be
permitted to escape liability for “affirmatively recommend[ing]” the use of asbestos
components simply “because the manufacturer did not make, sell, or otherwise control
the asbestos”);18 with Andrews, 2015 WL 12831342, at *2 (distinguishing between

18

As previously noted in footnote 3, the Bell decision analyzed the issue using a
somewhat different framework than most other courts. The above-cited language was
offered in connection with the Bell court’s finding that
[e]ven if defendants do not have a duty to warn arising out of merely
manufacturing a particular product that might be used with asbestos, they
can nonetheless have duties arising out of taking the additional action of
negligently recommending that a plaintiff use asbestos in conjunction with
the manufacturer’s products.
Bell, 2016 WL 5780104, at *3 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Bell court appears to
have been discussing manufacturers’ “recommendations” as a basis for liability under a
negligent misrepresentation theory, not a failure-to-warn theory. While this may
distinguish the cited language from the instant discussion, the court highlights such
language to show that there is room for disagreement regarding the level of
“specification” required to support a finding of liability.
The court wishes to clarify that it has not endeavored to address the Bell courts
negligent misrepresentation theory in this decision. Because the court ultimately finds
that Crane incorporated asbestos-containing components in the equipment it supplied the
Navy and specified the use of such components, the court concludes that plaintiffs have
provided enough evidence to support a failure-to-warn claim under Quirin. The court
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“recommending” the use of asbestos-containing components, and “specifying” the use of
such components). Courts could also disagree on what it means for a product to
“require” asbestos-containing components to function properly. Though this language
would appear to suggest that the asbestos-containing components be mechanically
“essential,” see Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70 (“[A] duty may attach . . . where the
asbestos-containing material was essential to the proper functioning of the defendant’s
product . . . .”), some courts have expanded this concept to include “economic necessity.”
In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 474 (imposing duty to warn “where a
manufacturer creates a product that cannot be used without another product as a result of
the design of the product, the mechanics of the product or the absence of economically
feasible alternative means of enabling the product to function as intended”) (emphasis
added). It is also not entirely clear that all of the courts that have adopted Quirin have
included what this court regards as the first factor of the Quirin-test—whether the
defendant actually incorporated asbestos-containing components in its original product.
See Osterhout v. Crane Co., Case No. 5:14-cv-0208, slip op. 25 (N.D.N.Y. March 21,
2016) (finding duty to warn where “[defendant] shipped its boilers to the Navy
. . . without external asbestos insulation,” but “provided the Navy with engineers to assist
in the erection, insulation, and installation of its boilers”). Given the potential for
disagreement inherent in the Quirin approach, the court has little trouble finding that
adoption of Conner’s strict application of the bare metal defense would likely lead to
more consistent results, better serving maritime law’s uniformity interests.

takes no position on whether the negligent misrepresentation theory posited by the Bell
court is viable or what evidence would be required to support it.
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However, uniformity is not the sole interest of maritime law. See Bell, 2016 WL
5780104, at *3 n.11 (“[O]ur interest in uniformity, though powerful, does not require us
to adopt legal conclusions we believe to be in error.” (quoting Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C.
v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 758 F. 3d 592, 601 (5th Cir. 2014)). “[O]ne of the
primary goals of maritime law [is] to protect maritime workers from the perils of working
at sea.” Mack v. Gen. Elec. Co., 896 F. Supp. 2d 333, 338 (E.D. Pa. 2012). For the
reasons outlined above, the Quirin approach serves to protect maritime workers in the
same way that traditional products liability doctrines protect consumers. It forces
manufacturers to account for the risks they impose on others through the sale of their
products, and provides an avenue of relief for those injured by such products.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c. (“[P]ublic policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained.”). Ultimately, the court finds the law’s interest in
protecting the maritime workers more significant than its interest in uniformity, and
therefore, concludes that policy considerations weigh in favor of adopting the Quirin
approach.
4.

Adopting and Clarifying the Quirin Approach

Having determined that the Quirin approach (1) is not foreclosed by Lindstrom,
(2) is more consistent with the majority position under state law, and (3) is favored by the
relevant policy considerations, the court holds that plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims are
not foreclosed by the bare metal defense.

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This leads to a secondary question: what evidence does Quirin require? Plaintiffs
state that Quirin simply requires evidence that the defendant “designed its products to be
used with asbestos-containing materials and actually incorporated asbestos-containing
materials into the products it sold.” Pls.’ Resp. 11 (quoting Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at
771). Crane reads this court’s decision in Dandridge to establish a three-pronged test,
requiring evidence that: “(i) the asbestos containing product was incorporated into the
equipment when sold; (ii) the product needed asbestos containing components to
function; and (iii) the manufacturer provided specifications for such use.” Def.’s Reply 4
(emphasis added).
There is no dispute that that the court views “actual incorporation” of asbestoscontaining components into the original product as an independent, strict requirement of
the test. Indeed, this understanding of Quirin was essential to the court’s holding in
Dandridge. See Dandridge, 2016 WL 319938, at *4 (granting summary judgment after
finding “no evidence that Crane ‘actually incorporated asbestos-containing materials into
the products it sold’” (quoting Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771)). However, the court does
not regard the second and third prongs of Crane’s three-pronged test in the same way. A
review of the Dandridge decision indicates that the language Crane relies on was merely
used to describe the facts the Quirin court highlighted in recognizing a duty-to-warn. Id.
at *4. The court described the Quirin decision as follows:
In Quirin, the court found that a manufacturer’s duty to warn of risks
relating to asbestos-containing materials arose where: (i) the manufacturer
“designed its products to be used with asbestos-containing materials and
actually incorporated asbestos-containing materials into the products it
sold;” (ii) the manufacturer’s product “needed asbestos-containing
components to function properly” when used in the manner intended by
the purchaser; and (iii) the manufacturer “provided specifications” for
such use.
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Dandridge, 2016 WL 319938, at *4 (quoting Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 770–71).
Immediately following this language, the court offered a similar summary of the
Andrews decision, which applied Quirin’s rationale where the manufacturer
“incorporated asbestos-containing components into its product . . . and specified the use
of asbestos-containing replacement parts in its product.” Id. (quoting Andrews, 2015 WL
12831315, at *6). The court then compared Quirin and Andrews, stating that
“[c]rucially, the circumstances presented in both Quirin and Andrews were sufficient to
invoke Quirin’s underlying rationale—that a duty to warn arises when a defendant
manufacturer’s conduct makes the plaintiff’s asbestos exposure “inevitable,” not simply
foreseeable.” Id. (emphasis added). This explanation indicates that the “crucial” aspect
of the analysis is not whether the case was on all fours with every aspect of Quirin, but
whether the rather demanding concept of inevitability applies.
The Quirin decision explicitly states that this concept may apply where “the use
of asbestos-containing materials was specified by a defendant” or “was essential to the
proper functioning of the defendant’s product.”19 Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
Therefore the court holds that, to bring a failure-to-warn claim under Quirin, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the defendant actually incorporated asbestos-containing components into
its original product, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771, and (2)(a) the defendant “specified” the use of
asbestos-containing replacement components, or (b) such components were “essential to
the proper functioning” of the defendant’s product. Id. at 769.
19

The Quirin court leaves open the possibility that there may be other
circumstances where the use of asbestos-containing materials “was for some other reason
so inevitable that, by supplying the product, the defendant was responsible for
introducing asbestos into the environment at issue.” Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769. This
court also holds open this possibility, but takes no position on what such circumstances
would entail.
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C.

Application of Quirin in this Case

Here, plaintiffs have certainly provided evidence that Crane incorporated
asbestos-containing components into the valves it supplied for use on the ships Chesher
served on. Crane admits that it “supplied valves and related parts” to certain of those
ships and that its valves were approved for use on others. Pls.’ Resp. Ex. 8, Answers to
Interrogs. 20–21. Crane separately admits that it enclosed “asbestos-containing gaskets,
packing, or discs” inside of certain of its valves. Id. at 21. From these admissions, it is
reasonable to infer that some of the Crane valves on the ships on which Chesher served
actually incorporated asbestos-containing components at the time they were supplied. If
Crane’s own admissions were not enough, Dr. Anthony Pantaleoni (“Pantaleoni”)
testified that the Navy would have required Crane to include the exact components parts
listed on the Navy-approved valve design drawings, and identified a number of design
drawings that called for the use of asbestos-containing components in valves supplied to
the ships where Chesher served. Pantaleoni Dep. at 24:1–26:24, 57:7–58:7, 63:3–64:22,
72:9–18.
There is also evidence that Crane “specified” the use of such components.
Pantaleoni and plaintiff’s expert, Capt. Arnold Moore (“Moore”), both discuss certain
design drawings of Crane valves installed on the USS Henderson, USS Fox, and USS
Kraus. Both experts agree that these drawings specify the use of asbestos-containing
internal bonnet gaskets and stem packing. Moore Aff. ¶ 17; Pantaleoni Dep. at 24:1–
26:24, 57:7–58:7, 63:3–64:22, 72:9–18. Crane argues that it was the Navy, not Crane,
that required the use of such components, and cites paragraph 23 of Moore’s affidavit for
support. Def.’s Reply 4–6. While that paragraph does acknowledges that the Navy

37

provided specifications for the valves and de-aerating feed tanks it purchased, it also
plainly states that the Navy’s specifications did not prevent manufacturers from designing
their own products and permitted the use of both asbestos and non-asbestos components
on products that were not exposed to superheated steam. Moore Aff. ¶ 23. Thus, to the
extent Crane provided valves that were not exposed to superheated steam, the Moore
affidavit indicates that Crane was ultimately responsible for specifying the use of
asbestos-containing gaskets and packing.20
Crane also highlights Pantaleoni’s testimony that “the Navy would specify what
Crane [] had to provide. And in order for the Navy to accept it[,] Crane would have to
adhere [to] the specification.”21 Pantaleoni Dep. at 24:15–18; see also id. at 48:22–24
(“Once again, the Navy set the requirements as to whether or not it was going to be
asbestos or non-asbestos.”). The court does not doubt that Pantaleoni’s testimony
suggests that it was not Crane’s decision to “specify” the use of asbestos-containing
replacement components. Moreover, the court agrees that when the consumer, not the
manufacturer, makes the decision to utilize asbestos-containing components with a
product that is fully compatible with non-asbestos components, the “inevitability”

20

The Moore affidavit provides similar evidence with respect to the de-aerating
feed tanks. Moore Aff. ¶¶ 19, 21.
21
The court assumes that the “drawings” discussed in the excerpts of Pantaleoni’s
February 26, 2016 deposition are the same “drawings” referenced by Moore in paragraph
17 of his affidavit. See Pantaleoni Dep. at 35:22–36–25, 40:3–41:15, 44:17–20
(referencing drawing numbers 22139, 22152, 22391, and 22414); Moore Aff. ¶ 17
(referencing Crane drawing numbers 22139, 22152, 22391 and 22414). To the extent
Pantaleoni was not talking about the same drawings as Moore, that suggests that
Pantaleoni’s opinion does not directly contradict Moore’s and strengthens the court’s
conclusion that plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
fact as to whether Crane specified the use of asbestos-containing replacement
components.
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rationale underlying Quirin does not apply.22 However, the fact that Pantaleoni’s
testimony supports such an argument does not mean that Crane is entitled to summary
judgment. While Pantaleoni takes the position that the design drawings reflect the
Navy’s decision to require asbestos-containing components, Moore has taken the position
that such drawings reflect Crane’s design specifications. This is a quintessential dispute
of material fact, and such disputes must be resolved by the jury.
D.

Substantial Factor Causation

Crane last attempts to argue that, in the event the court finds that it is legally
responsible for the asbestos-containing replacement components used with its valves and
de-aerating feed tanks, summary judgment is still appropriate because plaintiffs have
failed to produce evidence that their exposure to such components was a “substantial
factor” in causing Chesher’s injury. Def.’s Reply 1–3. The court first notes that
argument was not raised until Crane filed its reply. “The ordinary rule in federal courts is
that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief or memorandum will not be
considered.” Clawson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (D.
Md. 2006); see also Bouchard v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:16-cv-1713, 2016 WL 3753220,
at *3 (D.S.C. July 14, 2016) (“An argument raised for the first time in a reply brief or
memorandum will not be considered.”).
22

Of course, the fact that asbestos-containing components were specified at all
might suggest that the valves could not function without such components. The court
recognizes there is also evidence that there were suitable, non-asbestos substitutes.
Pantaleoni Dep. at 48:18–49:2, 90:1–5 (referencing availability of non-asbestos
components); Moore Aff. ¶ 23 (recognizing that most Navy specifications allowed a
range of materials that included non-asbestos alternatives). Because the court finds there
is sufficient evidence to find that Crane “specified the use of asbestos-containing
components,” it declines to address whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether asbestos-containing components were “essential to the proper functioning” of
Crane’s valves.
39

Additionally, this argument is woefully underdeveloped. Crane relies heavily on
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., where the court
determined that evidence of the decedent’s “frequent” exposure to asbestos-containing
insulation was insufficient to satisfy the substantial factor standard because plaintiff
“presented no evidence regarding the amount of exposure to dust from originally installed
asbestos, or critically, the duration of such exposure during any of these incidents.” 817
F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). However, the McIndoe decision
was also premised on the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s expert testimony on the
“every exposure” theory, which posits that “every exposure to asbestos above a threshold
level is necessarily a substantial factor in the contraction of asbestos-related diseases.”
Id. at 1177. Crane’s summary judgment briefing does not address the opinions of
plaintiff’s expert Dr. Carlos Bedrossian (“Bedrossian”), who will testify that each of
defendants’ products contributed to Chesher’s development of mesothelioma, ECF No.
181-1 at 8, or Dr. Edwin C. Holstein, who is expected to testify about the quantities of
asbestos that are released when removing and replacing asbestos-containing gaskets and
packing. ECF No. 181-5 at 2–3. Consequently, the court is not in a position to assess
Chesher’s exposure to asbestos contained in Crane’s valves because the court has not
determined whether plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions can be considered in the substantial
factor analysis.
The court has scheduled a Daubert hearing to address Crane’s challenge to
Bedrossian’s opinions. Once that challenge is resolved, the court will permit Crane to
file a separate motion for summary judgment renewing its substantial factor argument.
The court is aware that, in appropriate circumstances, it has discretion to consider

40

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. However, in this instance, the court
concludes that the better course of action is for all parties to fully brief the issue after
Crane’s motion to exclude Bedrossian’s testimony has been decided.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Crane’s motion for summary
judgment.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 13, 2017
Charleston, South Carolina

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