Yin v. Columbia International University

Filing 66

ORDER AND OPINION RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 40 Report and Recommendation, granting in part denying in part 20 Motion to Dismiss. The court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's claims fo r race, sex, national origin, and pay discrimination and retaliation. The court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's state law claim for defamation. In addition, the court DENIES Defendants Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 20.) Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 9/26/2016. (asni, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Lishu Yin,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
Columbia International University,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-03656-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Lishu Yin (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pro se against her former employer,
Defendant Columbia International University (“Defendant”), alleging that she was subjected to
discrimination based on her race, sex, and national origin and retaliation, all in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. (ECF No. 1 at
36.) Plaintiff also alleges a claim for pay discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act of
1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and defamation under state law. (Id.)
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Motion to Strike (id.) pursuant to
Rule 12(f).1 Defendant moves for dismissal on the basis that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
ministerial exception, which is a First Amendment doctrine that precludes claims brought by
ministers of a church. (ECF No. 20-1 at 9–10.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and
Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) D.S.C., the matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge
Paige J. Gossett for pretrial handling. On April 11, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report
and Recommendation in which she recommended that the court grant Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for defamation, but deny the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and
EPA claims and the Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 40 at 19.) Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed
1

The court observes that “Rule” refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which Objections are
presently before the court. (ECF Nos. 43, 44.) For the reasons set forth below, the court
ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES
IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO PENDING MOTION

The facts of this matter are discussed in the Report and Recommendation. (See ECF No.
40 at 1–6.) The court concludes, upon its own careful review of the record, that the Magistrate
Judge’s factual summation is accurate and incorporates it by reference. The court will only
reference herein facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff that are pertinent to the
analysis of her claims.
Founded in 1923, Defendant is a private, multi-denominational Christian institution of
higher education located in Columbia, South Carolina.

CIU, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Columbia_International_University (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). Defendant offers a variety of
degrees including a Graduate Certificate in Teaching English as a Foreign Language (“TEFL”)
and a Master of Arts in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages (“TESOL”). Id.
Plaintiff, an Asian-American, has a Doctor of Philosophy in curriculum and instruction
with a minor in instructional technology from Mississippi State University. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1.)
On July 1, 2008, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a full-time resident faculty member for the TEFL
program. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Beginning in March 2011, Plaintiff alleges she started having
problems with white faculty members who excluded her from TEFL program meetings, changed
the TEFL curriculum, and gave away two of Plaintiff’s courses to less qualified white
individuals. (Id. at 8–9 ¶ 3.) On April 4, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that she complained to two
individuals, Dean Dr. Milton Uecker and Dr. Connie Mitchell. (Id. at 9 ¶ 4.) “With tears, . . .

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[Plaintiff] addressed to both Uecker and Mitchell that the reason she was mistreated was because
of her race and national origin.” (Id.)
On April 11, 2011, Dr. Uecker told Plaintiff about the creation of the new TESOL
program in the College of Education. (Id. at 10 ¶ 5.) After transferring from the TEFL program,
Plaintiff served as a “major professor of TESOL.” (Id.) Soon thereafter, Dr. Uecker resigned
and Dr. Mitchell became the Dean of the College of Education. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that once
Dr. Mitchell became dean, she began mistreating Plaintiff. (Id.)
On March 22, 2012, Dr. Mitchell told Plaintiff about a proposed merger of the TESOL
and TEFL programs. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that she was inappropriately excluded from
the merger planning meetings. (Id.) On April 10, 2012, Defendant’s Provost Jim Lanpher told
Plaintiff that a final decision on the merger had not occurred. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant “placed misleading statements in the Graduate Programs Academic Catalog to
confuse prospective students and lure them into the TEFL program, and away from . . .
[Plaintiff’s] TESOL program, which at the time was enjoying better enrollment.” (ECF No. 40
at 3 (referencing ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 10).)
On March 1, 2013, Defendant offered Plaintiff a contract that contained language
requiring her to “agree to waive her right to a civil trial . . . .” (ECF No. 1 at 12 ¶ 11.) “In the
spring of 2013, the College of Education . . . hired two new faculty members, both white, despite
having a budget for only one new faculty member.” (ECF No. 40 at 3 (referencing ECF No. 1 at
12 ¶ 14).) Plaintiff alleges that “[f]rom this point on, Mitchell began to publically and privately
humiliate, threaten, and mistreat . . . [Plaintiff], the only female minority professor/employee in
the College of Education.” (ECF No. 1 at 12 ¶ 14.) “On September 20, 2013, at the end of a
Dissertation Committee meeting, Dr. Mitchell dismissed . . . [Plaintiff] from the committee in

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front of its other members.” (ECF No. 40 at 4 (referencing ECF No. 1 at 13 ¶ 15).) “Dr.
Mitchell stated that . . . [Plaintiff] was no longer needed because the two newly hired faculty
members could take her place.” (Id.)
On September 30, 2013, Plaintiff met with Dr. Mitchell for Plaintiff’s annual faculty
evaluation. Plaintiff describes her meeting with Dr. Mitchell as follows:
Mitchell revenged . . . [Plaintiff] by writing untruthful statements on . . .
[Plaintiff’s] faculty evaluation regarding the working relationship with TEFL . . .
[Plaintiff] refused to sign the evaluation form and requested Mitchell to give a
specific example. Mitchell yelled at . . . [Plaintiff] and threatened her, ‘if you
don’t sign it, you will see what [Provost] Jim Lanpher will do to you.’ After she
slammed . . . [Plaintiff’s] door and left, a . . . [Defendant’s] employee walked into
. . . [Plaintiff’s] office and saw . . . [Plaintiff] tearing up at her desk . . . . [Plaintiff]
told him that she did not want to work there anymore. He prayed for . . .
[Plaintiff].
(ECF No. 1 at 13 ¶ 16.)
On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she complained about mistreatment received
based on her sex, race, and national origin to Provost Lanpher. (ECF No. 1 at 5, 13–14.) On
January 23, 2014, Plaintiff learned from Dr. Mitchell that Defendant was not going to renew her
contract and was eliminating the TESOL program. (Id. at 15–16 ¶ 24.) On February 6, 2014,
Defendant’s President, William H. Jones, sent correspondence to Plaintiff officially
acknowledging her termination as follows:
It is with sadness that I inform you that your appointment to the position of
Program Director for the Master of Arts in Teaching English to Speakers of Other
Languages (TESOL) program will not be renewed for the fiscal year 2014–2015,
and you will not be offered a faculty contract. As the Dean of the College of
Education Dr. Connie Mitchell explained to you on January 23, 2014 the MA
TESOL program is being eliminated. As a result, your employment with
Columbia International University (CIU) will end on June 30, 2014.
(ECF No. 1-2 at 81.)
After learning about the termination of her employment, Plaintiff filed a Charge of
Discrimination (the “Charge”) with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
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Commission (“EEOC”) and the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (“SCHAC”) on May
15, 2014. (ECF No. 1-2 at 39.) In the Charge, Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated
against because of her race, sex, and national origin and retaliated against in violation of Title
VII. (Id.) After receiving notice of the right to sue from the EEOC as to the Charge, Plaintiff
filed an action in this court on September 11, 2015, alleging claims for race, sex, national origin,
and pay discrimination, retaliation, and defamation. (ECF No. 1 at 35.) In response to Plaintiff’s
Complaint, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Strike on November 9, 2015.
(ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January
11, 2016, to which Defendant filed a Reply Brief on January 22, 2016. (ECF Nos. 30, 32.)
Thereafter, on January 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant’s Reply Brief. (ECF
No. 33.)
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., the
Magistrate Judge issued the aforementioned Report and Recommendation on April 11, 2016.
(ECF No. 40.) On April 28, 2016, the parties each filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation.

(ECF Nos. 43, 44.)

Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant’s

Objections to Report and Recommendation on May 3, 2016. (ECF No. 47.) Defendant filed a
Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Objections on May 13, 2016, and a Response to
Plaintiff’s Objections on May 16, 2016. (ECF Nos. 49, 50.) On May 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed
Sur-Replies to Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Objections and to
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections. (ECF Nos. 53, 54.)
II.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Title VII and EPA claims via 28 U.S.C. §
1331, as they arise under a law of the United States, and also via 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and

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29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which empower district courts to hear claims brought under Title VII and §
206 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, respectively. The court
may properly hear Plaintiff’s state law claim for defamation based on supplemental jurisdiction
since this claim is “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that . . . it
form[s] part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
III.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation

has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court reviews de novo only
those portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which specific objections2
are filed, and reviews those portions which are not objected to - including those portions to
which only “general and conclusory” objections have been made - for clear error. Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
200 (4th Cir. 1983); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit
the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B.

Motions to Dismiss Generally
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v.
2

An objection is specific if it “enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—
factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” One Parcel of Real Prop. Known
As 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
147 (1985)).
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Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.”). To be legally sufficient a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim should not be
granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support her
claim and would entitle her to relief. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.
1993). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v.
Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999); Mylan Labs., Inc., 7 F.3d at 1134. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
C.

Motions to Strike Generally
Rule 12(f) allows a court, acting either on its own or on a motion, to “strike from a

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.”3 Id. Generally, such motions “are only granted when the challenged allegations ‘have

3

“‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for
relief, and ‘impertinent’ material consists of statements that do not pertain to, and are not
necessary to resolve, the disputed issues.” CTH 1 Caregiver v. Owens, C/A No. 8:11-2215TMC, 2012 WL 2572044, at *5 (D.S.C. July 2, 2012) (citation omitted). “‘Scandalous’ includes
allegations that cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party to other persons.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The granting of a motion to strike scandalous matter is aimed, in part, at avoiding prejudice to a
party by preventing a jury from seeing the offensive matter or giving the allegations any other
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no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy’ or ‘cause
some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.’” Moore v. Novo
Nordisk, Inc., C/A No. 1:10-2182-MBS-JRM, 2011 WL 1085650, at *8 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2011)
(citations omitted). “A motion to strike is a drastic remedy which is disfavored by the courts and
infrequently granted.” Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 70 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); see also Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 12(f) motions are
generally with disfavor ‘because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because
it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.’”) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (2d ed. 1990)). Moreover, “where
there is any question of fact or any substantial question of law, the court should refrain from
acting until some later time when these issues can be more appropriately dealt with.” United
States v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 405, 408 (D. Md. 1991).
A Rule 12(f) motion falls within the discretion of the district court. Palmetto Pharm.
LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP, No. 2:11-cv-00807-SB-JDA, 2012 WL 6025756, at *4 (D.S.C.
Nov. 6, 2012) (citation omitted); Xerox Corp. v. ImaTek, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 241, 243 (D. Md.
2003). “When reviewing a motion to strike, ‘the court must view the pleading under attack in a
light most favorable to the pleader.’” Piontek v. Serv. Ctrs. Corp., Civil No. PJM 10-1202, 2010
WL 4449419, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2010) (citation omitted).
D.

Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the court to liberally construe her

pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d

unnecessary notoriety inasmuch as, once filed, pleadings generally are public documents and
become generally available.” Id. (citation omitted).
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1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. “The mandated liberal construction means . . .
that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff
could prevail, it should do so.” Mansouri v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., C/A No. 8:14-cv02251-JMC, 2015 WL 5009260, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2015) (citing Barnett v. Hargett, 174
F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999)).
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge first addressed Defendant’s

argument that Plaintiff’s lawsuit “is barred by the ministerial exception to employment
discrimination claims.” (ECF No. 40 at 7.) Upon her review, the Magistrate Judge observed that
she was unable to conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s claims were barred because she was
a “minister” under the ministerial exception during her employment with Defendant. (Id. at 8–
9.) The Magistrate Judge next addressed the legal sufficiency of the allegations as to each of
Plaintiff’s individual claims.

Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s

allegations sufficiently supported claims for disparate treatment under Title VII based on race,
sex, and national origin; retaliation; and violation of the EPA. (ECF No. 40 at 10–14.) The
Magistrate Judge then determined that Plaintiff could not state a plausible claim for defamation
because Defendant’s statements to the EEOC and the SCHAC were privileged. (Id. at 15–18.)
Finally, as to Defendant’s Motion to Strike, the Magistrate Judge was not persuaded that
Plaintiff’s Title VII allegations occurring before July 15, 2013, needed to be stricken from the
Complaint at this time. (ECF No. 40 at 19.)
Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting only Defendant’s

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Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for defamation. (Id. at 20.)
B.

Plaintiff’s Objections
Plaintiff objects to the recommendation that the court should dismiss her claim for

defamation. (ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff argues that her defamation claim should not be dismissed
because Defendant intentionally communicated a false, non-privileged statement about her
productivity to the EEOC and SCHAC as third parties. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff further argues that
the communications at issue were not made in good faith and caused her a great deal of
emotional distress and damage. (Id. at 1, 3.) As a result, Plaintiff requests that she be allowed to
proceed with her defamation claim. (Id. at 4.)
C.

Defendant’s Objections
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the court should not

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for race, sex, national origin, and pay discrimination and retaliation.
(ECF No. 43.) Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge “disregarded key allegations that
supported dismissal of the lawsuit based on the ministerial exception.” (Id. at 1.) Specifically,
Defendant asserts that it required Plaintiff “to further the spiritual and pastoral mission of the
University, and her essential job functions included teaching the gospel, spreading the Christian
faith, and participating in worship.” (Id. at 12.) Moreover, “Plaintiff’s employment contract and
CIU’s Employee Handbook repeatedly referenced . . . [Defendant’s] Christian principles and
further repeatedly emphasized Plaintiff’s role in advancing those principles, as one of her
essential job functions.” (Id.) Based on the foregoing, Defendant contends that the ministerial
exception applies to bar Plaintiff’s claims and they should be dismissed. (Id. at 13.)
However, Defendant did not state an objection to the recommendation that its Motion to
Strike be denied.

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D.

The Court’s Ruling
In light of the foregoing authorities and the parties’ respective positions, the court

considers each of the parties’ respective Objections in turn below.
1. Defendant
In its Objections, Defendant solely argues that Plaintiff’s claims asserting violation of
Title VII and the EPA are barred by the ministerial exception and should be dismissed.
Grounded in the First Amendment,4 the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense5
that “operates to exempt from the coverage of various employment laws the employment
relationships between religious institutions and their ‘ministers.’” E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

“This

constitutionally compelled limitation on civil authority ensures that no branch of secular
government trespasses on the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community’s
existence.” Id. “[T]he exception shelters certain employment decisions from the scrutiny of
civil authorities so as to preserve the independence of religious institutions in performing their
spiritual functions.” Id. at 801. “Where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment
does not stay the application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII to the religious
employer unless Congress so provides.” Id.
“The general rule is that ‘if the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
4

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
5
“We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable
claim, not a jurisdictional bar.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012). “That is because the issue presented by the exception
is ‘whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether the court has
‘power to hear [the] case.’” Id. (citation omitted).
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religious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered clergy.’” Id. (citing Rayburn v. Gen.
Conference of Seventh–Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)). “A court must
therefore ‘determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the
church’ in order to decide whether the ministerial exception applies.” Id. (citing Rayburn, 772
F.2d at 1169).
The court observes that an affirmative defense “may be raised under Rule 12(b)(6), but
only if it clearly appears on the face of the complaint.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Upon review, the court
observes that the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint does not establish that she was a ministerial
employee. In this regard, the Complaint’s allegations do not describe Plaintiff’s duties as
involving “spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.”

Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.

Therefore, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 40 at 8–9) and finds that the
ministerial exception does not at this time bar Plaintiff’s claims asserting violation of Title VII
and the EPA.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation are

overruled.
2. Plaintiff
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the defamation claim should
be dismissed because Defendant had either an absolute or qualified privilege to communicate
with the EEOC and the SCHAC.
The court observes that under South Carolina law, “an ‘absolute privilege exists as to any
utterance arising out of the judicial proceeding and having any reasonable relation to it, including
preliminary steps leading to judicial action of any official nature provided those steps bear

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reasonable relation to it.’” Zeiny v. Wash. Safety Mgmt. Sols., LLC, Civil Action No. 1:092821-TLW-JRM, 2012 WL 1098209, at *17 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2012) (quoting Crowell v. Herring,
392 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990)).

Moreover, a South Carolina appellate court

considered the privilege issue in the context of employer communications with the SCHAC and
determined that such disclosure of information is absolutely privileged. See Williams v. Force
Prot. Indus., Inc., Appellate Case No. 2010-169467, 2012 WL 10844374, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App.
June 20, 2012) (“We find no error in the trial court’s ruling Respondents’ statements to the South
Carolina Human Affairs Commission (SCHAC) were privileged.”) (citing, e.g., Crowell, 392
S.E.2d at 467); cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 41-27-560 (2016) (statute providing absolute privilege to
statements provided by an employer to the South Carolina Employment Security Commission).
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that any statements made by Defendant to either the
EEOC or the SCHAC during their investigation enjoy an absolute privilege under South Carolina
law. Therefore, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 40 at 15) and concludes
that Plaintiff’s claim for defamation is not actionable. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Objection to the
Report and Recommendation is overruled.
V.

CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the court hereby GRANTS IN PART
AND DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Columbia International
University. (ECF No. 20.) The court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claims for
race, sex, national origin, and pay discrimination and retaliation. The court GRANTS the
Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s state law claim for defamation. In addition, the court
DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 20.) The court ACCEPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 40) and incorporates it herein by reference.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
September 26, 2016
Columbia, South Carolina

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