Myers et al v. Columbia, City of et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 5 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis on 6/22/2016.(cbru, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
ESTATE OF MARVIS LAVAR MYERS;
BRITTNEY MYERS (individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marvis
Myers, and as Parent and Guardian on behalf
of two minor children, T. B. and M. J.); T. B.
(a minor child by and through his parent and
guardian, Brittney Myers); and M. J. (a minor
child by and through his parent and guardian,
Brittney Myers),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF COLUMBIA; and TERRANCE
WILLIAMS (in his individual capacity),
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-00852-MGL
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT CITY OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has jurisdiction over the matter
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Columbia (City)’s motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against City by way of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
ECF No. 5. Having carefully considered the motion, the response, the record, and the applicable
law, it is the judgment of the Court that City’s motion to dismiss will be denied.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises from the February 6, 2015, death of Marvis Lavar Myers (Decedent),
whom City employed at the time. ECF No. 5-1 at 2. Prior to his death, Decedent worked at City’s
Department of Public Utilities as a construction worker for City’s Wastewater Treatment Division.
Id. Decedent was repairing a damaged sewer line at the time the trench he was in collapsed, causing
his death. Id.; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10-11, 18. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) subsequently fined City for its failure to use a trench box as required due to the depth of
the excavation. ECF No. 5-1 at 2. Plaintiffs filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with
the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission and are awaiting final approval of
disbursement. Id.
Plaintiffs filed this case on March 16, 2016, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
City and alleging violations of South Carolina law against Defendant Terrance Williams in his
individual capacity. ECF No. 1. Importantly, Plaintiffs propound that City maintains a policy and
practice that required Decedent, and continues to require his co-workers, to work in untrenched
boxes five to fifteen times per month; and, according to Plaintiffs, City punishes employees who
raise safety concerns. Id. ¶¶ 19-23. Plaintiffs state that City’s policy and practice jeopardizes
employee safety in favor of expediency and cost cutting measures. Id.
On May 17, 2016, City filed its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim directed against
it, ECF No. 5, to which Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on June 2, 2016, ECF No. 9. The
Court, having been fully briefed on the relevant issues, is now prepared to discuss the merits of the
motion.
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III.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
In its motion to dismiss, City contends that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against it should be
dismissed because violations of regulations promulgated under the OSHA are non-cognizable under
§ 1983. ECF No. 5-1 at 2-4. Further, City propounds that, assuming Plaintiffs intend to allege a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim for a violation
of substantive due process. Id. at 4-5. Specifically, City asserts that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleges
mere negligence against City, and, consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for violation
of § 1983. Id.
Plaintiffs respond by advancing that they have failed to allege a private right of action
pursuant to OSHA regulations; rather, they have argued that City maintains a systematic and
purposeful set of policies and practices resulting in the deprivation of the life, liberty, and bodily
integrity of City’s employees, violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. ECF No. 9 at 6-7. Moreover, Plaintiffs aver that their claim against City does not
contain negligence allegations. Id. at 6. Instead, Plaintiffs declare that the Complaint alleges City’s
systematic and purposeful creation of policies, which disregard all measures of safety, that resulted
in Decedent’s death being more than just merely accidental. Id. at 6-7. Furthermore, Plaintiffs posit
that City’s policies and practices that purportedly resulted in Decedent’s death are “arbitrary” and
“shocking” to the conscience such that they violate Decedent’s substantive due process rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 8.
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IV.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In considering a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s well-pled allegations are taken as true, and
the complaint and all reasonable inferences are liberally construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The Court may consider only the facts
alleged in the complaint, which may include any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint, and matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although the Court must accept the plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true, any conclusory allegations are not entitled to an assumption of truth, and even
those allegations pled with factual support need be accepted only to the extent that “they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). In sum, factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true, even if doubtful in fact. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Here, City correctly notes—and Plaintiffs agree—that a plaintiff is unable to bring a private
cause of action for violations of OSHA regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Byrd v. Fieldcrest
Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that the North Carolina Workmen’s
Compensation Act precluded a private remedy and dismissing the action). In South Carolina, the
South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-540, expressly provides that
all rights and remedies granted therein shall exclude all other rights and remedies owing the
employee and his beneficiaries. Consequently, to prevail on their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that City deprived Decedent of rights secured by the United States
Constitution.
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In its interpretation of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, City contends that Plaintiffs seek to establish
City’s liability based on negligence in failing to use the appropriate safety equipment. ECF No. 5-1
at 4-5. Under this interpretation, Plaintiffs would be unable to prevail on their § 1983 claim because
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to a negligent act of a
municipality. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to negligent acts of public officials).
However, Plaintiffs point to the allegations in their § 1983 claim to show that the Complaint
alleges overarching City policies and procedures that, according to them, “arbitrarily and shockingly
violated” Decedent’s constitutional rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity, and they avouch that
the Complaint contains no negligence allegations. ECF No. 9 at 5. Although Plaintiffs refer to the
Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Plaintiffs
clearly assert that City violated Decedent’s constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 24-33.
As noted above, when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
must assume all of the allegations to be true, must resolve all doubts and inferences in favor of the
plaintiff, and must view the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Edwards v. City
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). At this stage, viewing the Complaint in the
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have pled a plausible claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by alleging that City violated Decedent’s rights to life, liberty, and bodily
integrity under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Notably, as observed above,
the Complaint propounds that City maintains a policy and practice that required Decedent, and
continues to require his co-workers, to work in untrenched boxes five to fifteen times per month and
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harshly punishes employees who raise safety concerns. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19-23. Plaintiffs aver that the
City does this to further its policy and practice of jeopardizing employee safety in favor of
expediency and cost cutting measures. Id. Resolving all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, such
conduct appears to rise above negligent conduct and state a substantive due process claim.
Consequently, the Court concludes that City’s motion to dismiss will be denied.
V.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is the judgment of this Court
that City’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 22nd day of June, 2016, in Columbia, South Carolina.
s/ Mary Geiger Lewis
MARY GEIGER LEWIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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