Munson v. Columbia, City of et al

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER re 43 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Motion Hearing, 18 MOTION to Dismiss . Follows oral order of 10/19/2016. Signed by Honorable Margaret B Seymour on 11/4/2016. (mdea )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
S. Lyman Munson,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
City of Columbia; City of Columbia Police )
Department; Ronnie Hingleton,
)
individually and in his official capacity as )
Housing Inspector for the City of
)
Columbia; Lisa Sumpter, individually and )
in her official capacity as Code
)
Enforcement Inspector for the City of
)
Columbia; David Hatcher, individually and )
in his official capacity as Housing Official )
for the City of Columbia, Teresa Wilson, as )
City Manager for the City of Columbia,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-01528-MBS

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff S. Lyman Munson filed a verified Complaint against Defendants to
recover for alleged violations of the United States Constitution and state law, and for
declaratory relief and permanent injunction on May 11, 2016. On June 6, 2016, Defendants
City of Columbia (“the City”) and City of Columbia Police Department (“Columbia Police
Department”) filed a Motion to Dismiss/Strike based on several grounds including:
insufficient service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
redundancy, and the doctrine of Younger abstention. 1

Plaintiff filed a response in

opposition on June 23, 2016. On October 19, 2016 Plaintiff filed an affidavit verifying true

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Reserving its rights pursuant to the motion to dismiss/strike, the City and Columbia Police
Department also filed an Answer to the Complaint on June 6, 2016.
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and correct depictions of the property at issue before and after the City’s alleged removal
of trees and shrubs thereon as more particularly described in the Complaint. ECF No. 42.
A hearing on Defendants’ motion was held on October 19, 2016, and the court hereby
issues the following opinion and order.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss on the basis of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and 12(f). In both those cases, the standard of review is the same. See, e.g.,
Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir.1999) (stating, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and
should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff); Monster Daddy LLC
v. Monster Cable Prod., Inc., No. 6:10-1170, 2010 WL 4853661, at *6 (D.S.C. Nov. 23,
2010) (stating, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “the court must view the
pleading under attack in a light most favorable to the pleader” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Therefore, the court will consider Defendants’ motion to dismiss taking the facts
as alleged in the Complaint as true and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of this motion, the facts as stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint allege that

upon return home from a business trip on May 2, 2015, Plaintiff found many trees and
shrubs at his property at 4015 Lamar Street in Columbia, South Carolina, cut down to or
near to the ground. Plaintiff filed a police report for trespass and malicious destruction of

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property. While at work the next day, Plaintiff was informed by a neighbor that Defendants
Hatcher, Hingleton, and Sumpter had arrived at 4015 Lamar Street to continue cutting
down to or near to the ground the landscaping there. Plaintiff called 911, filed a police
report again for malicious destruction of property and trespass, and Defendant Hatcher
thereupon agreed to refrain from any further action at 4015 Lamar Street pending resolution
of Plaintiff’s dispute. Before leaving the property, the verified Complaint alleges that
Defendant Sumpter stated, “We finally got you [Plaintiff].”
Plaintiff raised constitutional and other state law claims associated with these
actions to Defendant Theresa Wilson. Defendant Wilson denied any wrongdoing by the
City. Rather, Defendant Hatcher produced a Notice of Violation of the City of Columbia
Code of Ordinances section 8-301 allegedly issued by Defendant Hingleton to Plaintiff, the
owner of 4015 Lamar Street, on January 9, 2015. Section 8-301 (“Weed and Debris
Ordinance”) states: “It shall be unlawful for the owner and/or occupant of property to fail
to cut grass, weeds and other overgrowth vegetation on property when the grass, weeds
and other overgrowth vegetation is of a greater height than one foot on the average . . . .”
City

of

Columbia

Code

of

Ordinances

§

8-301,

available

at

https://www2.municode.com/library/sc/columbia/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO
OR_CH8ENHESA_ARTVIIWEDE_S8-301RERE (last visited June 20, 2016). The City
then served Plaintiff with Summons Number CE10193 on May 4, 2016, to prosecute
Plaintiff for an alleged violation of section 8-301, to which Plaintiff requested a jury trial.
This municipal court action is still pending.
The Complaint alleges nine causes of action against varying named Defendants for
allegedly removing trees and shrubs on private property absent exigent circumstances or a

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right to be heard. Defendants City of Columbia and City of Columbia Police Department
are specifically named in three causes of action, including:
(1) Cause of Action One: Declaratory judgment that the application of section 8-301 of
the City Code of Ordinances (“Weed and Debris Ordinance”) to remove trees and shrubs
from private property absent exigent circumstances or a right to be heard is in violation of
the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s right to substantive and procedure due process and a permanent
injunction as to any further action by the City regarding the same; (2) Cause of Action
Seven: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for adopting and promulgating the unconstitutional
application of section 8-301, and failing to supervise and adequately train the City’s
employees with regard to the rights of person with whom its employees come into contact;
and (3) Cause of Action Eight: Trespass.
Defendants Hingleton, Hatcher, and Sumpter are named in the caption in their
individual and official capacities, and the Complaint asserts they violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Causes of Action Two through Five assert violations of Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures and Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection
under the law. Causes of Action Eight and Nine assert state law claims of trespass and civil
conspiracy. The Complaint also asserts a malicious prosecution claim in Cause of Action
Six against Defendants Hatcher and Hingleton. The Complaint is somewhat ambiguous
with respect to Defendant Theresa Wilson. The caption does not signify Defendant Wilson
is being sued in her individual capacity, but that Defendant Wilson is being sued as City
Manager for the City of Columbia. However, paragraph six avers that Defendant Wilson

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is sued in both her individual and official capacities. Moreover, while the Complaint
attributes particular causes of action to Defendants Hatcher, Hingleton, and Sumpter, no
particular cause of action is attributed to Defendant Wilson except for the trespass claim
brought against all Defendants generally.
The City and the Columbia Police Department moved to dismiss and/or strike
portions of the Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5), 12(b)(6) and 12(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, stating three grounds: (1) insufficient service of process; (2)
Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities are redundant
to the claims made against the City; (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against the City of Columbia Police Department. Further, the City and Columbia
Police department sought dismissal based on Younger abstention. The court will address
each in turn.

III.

DISCUSSION

(1) Insufficiency of Service of Process
After Defendants Columbia and Columbia Police Department filed this Motion to
Dismiss/Strike, the parties agreed at the hearing that Plaintiff perfected service. Thus,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process
is now moot. It is therefore ordered that the City’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(5) is denied as moot.
(2) Claims Against the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacities
The City moved to dismiss or strike pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(f) Plaintiff’s
claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities, claiming that “[s]uch

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claims are redundant to the same claims made against the City of Columbia.” ECF No. 18
at 2. As an initial matter, “[a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not address the redundancy of
claims; it questions only their validity. Redundant claims may all be valid.” Capresecco
v. Jenkintown Borough, 261 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (internals citations and
alternations omitted).
Striking a portion of a pleading, moreover, is viewed with disfavor and reserved
only as a drastic remedy. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th
Cir. 2001) (quoting 5A A. Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1380 (2d ed.1990)). Despite these hurdles, Plaintiff’s counsel stipulated at
the hearing that for purposes of the claims brought specifically against the City for
declaratory relief and permanent injunction, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and trespass,
the underlying or similar claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and Fourth
Amendment and trespass (Causes of Action Two through Five & Eight) against the
individual Defendants are brought against them in their individual capacity only. The
references in the Complaint to actions taken by Defendants in their official capacities is to
illustrate liability of the City under those causes of action, and would otherwise be
duplicative of the claims specifically asserted against the City. Therefore, the court finds
that the individual Defendants are sued only in their individual capacity in Plaintiff’s
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action (Violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Right to Due Process, Substantive Due Process, and Equal Protection,
Violation of the Fourth Amendment Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches or
Seizures, and Trespass, respectively), and orders that the Complaint be amended to reflect
this clarification. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004). Inasmuch as

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the City has been sued by naming the individual Defendants in their official capacity for
Causes of Action Six and Nine, malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy, Plaintiff shall
amend the caption, removing reference to the individual Defendants in their official
capacity, and specifically add the City as a Defendant subject to those causes of action. As
to any cause of action intended to be brought against Defendant Wilson in her individual
capacity, Plaintiff is permitted to amend the Complaint as necessary to assert any and all
claims with specificity so as to give Defendants adequate notice.
(3)

Plaintiff’s Claims against Defendant City of Columbia Police
Department

The City moved to dismiss the Columbia Police Department, asserting that it is not
a separate legal entity from the City for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
opposition, Plaintiff agreed that the City and the Columbia Police Department were treated
as the same entity for damages claims under section 1983 but questioned whether the same
was true for purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief. At the hearing, the City
submitted that Columbia Police Department would be bound by any Order of the Court
against the City for declaratory or injunctive relief too. See, e.g., Assad’ad-Faltas v. City
of Columbia, SC, No. 3:13-2715, 2013 WL 12098808 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2013), adopted by
2014 WL 12526336 (D.S.C. June 26, 2014) (holding that City of Columbia Police
Department is “not a person amenable to suit under § 1983” as the Columbia Police
Department is merely the vehicle through which the City fulfills its policing functions).
Therefore, the City’s motion to dismiss Defendant Columbia Police Department pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted.

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(4)

Motion to Dismiss Based on Doctrine of Abstention

The City moved to dismiss the entire action based on the abstention doctrine
outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. The City argues that
it has charged Plaintiff with violating section 8-301 of the City Code of Ordinances, and
that proceeding is still pending. The City claims that Plaintiff’s pursuit of this federal
action will interfere with the City’s prosecution of Plaintiff for violation of section 8-301
of the City Code, and that Plaintiff otherwise has neither exhausted his avenues for relief
with regard to the matters raised in the Complaint in the state court system, nor alleged
inadequate remedy at law or irreparable injury if the district court does not act. The City
finally states that Plaintiff can raise the constitutional and state law claims asserted in this
action in defense to the City’s prosecution of a violation of section 8-301.
Generally speaking, federal courts have an “unflagging” obligation to decide cases
within the scope of federal jurisdiction. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584,
591 (2013) (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976)). Younger represents a narrow class of cases in which a federal court declines
to exercise jurisdiction to avoid offending principles of judicial comity between the federal
and state courts. To apply Younger, the court must determine whether: (1) there are
ongoing state proceedings, judicial in nature, and instituted prior to any substantial progress
in a federal proceeding; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and
(3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the claims advanced in the
federal suit. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Courts must
be mindful, however, that the “existence of a pending state proceeding between the parties

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that parallels the facts of the federal action is not in itself sufficient.” Addiction Specialist,
Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005).
Younger is not applicable here. As an initial matter, South Carolina municipal
courts lack jurisdiction in civil matters.

S.C. Code Ann. § 14-25-45.

The court’s

consideration of the City and Columbia Police Department’s motion to dismiss based on
the abstention doctrine in Younger, therefore, may apply only to Plaintiff’s action for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. A district court “‘has no discretion to dismiss
rather than stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state
proceeding.’”

Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248 (2006) (quoting Deakins v.

Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988)).
Plaintiff’s cause of action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, moreover
is narrowly stated, requesting declaratory judgment that the section 8-301 is
“unconstitutional as it is applied to raze trees and shrubs on private citizen’s property
absent exigent circumstances and without any right or opportunity to be heard,” (ECF No.
1 Compl. ¶ 45.), and, similarly, injunctive relief against the City from issuing any further
“Notices of Violation . . . pursuant to the Weeds and Debris Ordinance relating to trees or
shrubs, absent exigent circumstances and without any right or opportunity to be heard”
(ECF No. 1 Compl. ¶ 46). Whereas, section 8-301 applies to “grass, weeds, and other
overgrowth vegetation” and specifically excludes “trees and shrubs” from its scope. See
City

of

Columbia

Code

of

Ordinances

§

8-301,

available

at

https://www2.municode.com/library/sc/columbia/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO
OR_CH8ENHESA_ARTVIIWEDE_S8-301RERE (last visited June 20, 2016) (“It shall
be unlawful for the owner and/or occupant of property to fail to cut grass, weeds and other

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overgrowth vegetation on property when the grass, weeds and other overgrowth vegetation
is of a greater height than one foot on the average . . . .”); Columbia Police Department,
General Maintenance Guidelines: Yards, http://www.columbiapd.net/yards.html (stating
Overgrowth and Weeds include “all grasses, annual plants and vegetation, other than trees
or shrubs provided; however, this term shall not include cultivated flowers and gardens”)
(last visited June 20, 2016); Columbia Police Department, Frequently Asked Questions,
www.columbiapd.net/f.a.q.html (providing “what constitutes an overgrown lot . . . Weeds
and plant overgrowth, including grasses, annual plants and vegetation greater than 12
inches in height on average are in violation. Trees, shrubs, cultivated flowers and gardens
are excluded”) (last visited June 20, 2016). Plaintiff’s pursuit of this federal court action
regarding the City’s and individual Defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional removal or trees
and shrubs from 4015 Lamar Street, therefore, will not affect the City’s municipal court
prosecution of Plaintiff for the alleged failure to remove any weeds, debris or overgrowth
vegetation from 4015 Lamar Street.
The mere fact that this federal court action relating to trees and shrubs at 4015
Lamar Street may have arisen out of the same factual background as the City’s municipal
court action relating to weeds, debris, and overgrowth vegetation is insufficient reason to
apply Younger. See Addiction Specialist, 411 F.3d at 408 (stating that “the mere fact that
the factual background of a case arose out of a land dispute is not enough to say that the
federal proceeding would interfere with state proceedings that involve important state
interests for Younger abstention purposes”). This matter involves the constitutionality of
the City’s removal of trees and shrubs from private property absent exigent circumstances
or an opportunity to be heard. Resolution of this issue will not cast any “aspersion of the

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capabilities and good faith” of the municipal court to adjudicate whether Plaintiff failed to
remove weeds, debris, or overgrowth vegetation from his property, “disrupt” any important
interest of the State in regulating weeds, debris, or overgrowth vegetation on any property,
nor effectively “annul” the results of any municipal action regarding weeds, debris, or
overgrowth vegetation on Plaintiff’s property. See Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d
385, 394 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (using these points to determine
whether the core concepts of Younger apply). The City is not prosecuting Plaintiff’s
alleged failure to remove trees and shrubs from 4015 Lamar Street; thus, Plaintiff’s federal
court action claiming the City’s conduct in this regard is unconstitutional would provide
no defense to the municipal court action that Plaintiff failed to remove weeds, debris, or
overgrowth vegetation from his property. See, e.g., Addiction Specialist, 411 F.3d at 410
(discerning that the matter involved the township’s discriminatory enforcement of certain
policies and laws rather than opposition to the constitutionality of the policy or law itself
and finding that injunction enjoining township’s alleged discriminatory enforcement of
land use policies is not tantamount to invalidating the land use policies themselves). For
the reasons explained above, Defendant’s Motion to dismiss based on abstention is denied.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
As set forth herein, this Court hereby DENIES as moot the City’s motion to dismiss

for insufficient service of process, GRANTS the City’s motion to dismiss against the City
of Columbia Police Department, DENIES the City’s motion to dismiss based on
abstention, and GRANTS the City’s motion to strike or dismiss various claims made by
Plaintiff against the individual Defendants in their official capacity with leave for the
Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to clarify the claims asserted against the City and any
individual Defendant within 10 days of the filing of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Margaret B. Seymour
Margaret B. Seymour
Senior United States District Judge
November 4, 2016
Columbia, South Carolina

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d