Evans v. Richardson, et al

Filing 98

ORDER adopting 94 Report and Recommendation to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 10/9/19.(mflo, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Reginald Evans,

C/A No. 3:16-3202-JFA
Plaintiff,

v.
ORDER
Carolina Richardson, Treasurer for Sumter
County, South Carolina; Sumter County,
South Carolina; Yolanda Jefferson, Agent
of Sumter County, South Carolina; and
Kristi Fisher Curtis,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Reginald Evans (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this second
complaint claiming a violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the case was
referred to a Magistrate Judge for review. The Magistrate Judge assigned to this action1 prepared
a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and opines that Plaintiff’s second complaint
should be dismissed without prejudice such that he can bring his claims in the appropriate
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 94).

1

The Magistrate Judge’s review is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil
Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.). The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report

to which specific objections are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge
with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct
a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report to which an objection
is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the
Report of the Magistrate, this Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
III.

DISCUSSION

This case has a long history before this Court as it was originally filed on September 23, 2016.
(ECF No. 1). The Magistrate Judge’s Report thoroughly and accurately recites the factual and
procedural background giving rise to this action in detail. (ECF No. 94). Currently before the Court
for review is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF No. 89). Plaintiff alleges Defendants
violated his constitutional rights by taking property belonging to his mother’s estate in an unlawful
tax sale. (ECF No. 1). The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint without prejudice. (ECF No. 94).
A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Claims
Despite a Fourth Circuit ruling that the Tax Injunction Act bars this Court from considering
Plaintiff’s claims (ECF No. 34), Plaintiff continues to seek relief in this court for Defendants’
alleged unlawful tax sale of property within his mother’s estate. (ECF No.1, 41, 89). Although
Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend his complaint twice, he still has not stated a claim upon

which relief can be granted because the Court still lacks jurisdiction over his claims. “The district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the court of such State.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341. As the Magistrate Judge points out, Plaintiff does have an adequate remedy in state court.
However, Plaintiff disagrees.
In his Objections, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that his
claims are barred by the Tax Injunction Act because his claims were for constitutional violations.
(ECF No. 97). While Plaintiff is correct that he has brought this cause of action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the substance of Plaintiff’s claim concerns an “unlawful tax sale,” and therefore, is
governed by the Tax Injunction Act. (ECF No. 97). In Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Service Dist.
No. 1, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Tax Injunction Act and the comity doctrine
precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 when those claims involved alleged unauthorized collections of real and personal property
taxes. Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Service Dist. No. 1, 220 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2000).
Additionally, Plaintiff argues he does not have an available state remedy because he was denied
leave to proceed in forma pauperis in state court. (ECF No. 97). Plaintiff’s inability to get into to
state court does not automatically warrant review by the federal court. If the Court lacks
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the Court’s hands are tied. Therefore, the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice such that he can seek relief for his claims in the appropriate
court.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims against Defendant, Jefferson, are Dismissed
Plaintiff has named Yolanda Jefferson as a Defendant; however, Plaintiff fails to explain how

Defendant Jefferson is an agent of Sumter County such that she can be sued under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. In the Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Jefferson because the Magistrate Judge finds Defendant Jefferson is not a person acting
under the color of state law for the purposes of §1983. (ECF No. 94). In his Objections, Plaintiff
argues that “Jefferson can be construed as a state actor in this action” because Defendant Jefferson
was entangled with Defendant Richardson and Sumter County. Plaintiff’s example of Defendant
Jefferson’s entanglement is that Defendant Jefferson made statements to Plaintiff “on how closely
she worked with and know[s] Sumter County officials and she was going to take the property.”
(ECF No. 97).
However, Plaintiff’s example still fails to establish how Defendant Jefferson’s conduct can
be attributed to the state. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Supreme Court held that “the conduct
that allegedly caused the deprivation of a federal right must be fairly attributable to the State”
before an action can be considered to be state action. Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753 (1982). The Court established a two-part test for determining when
person’s action can be considered state action. “First the deprivation must be caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible…Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be
a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because
his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.” Id. In his Complaint and Objections, Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate how Defendant Jefferson or her conduct fits into any of the categories
set forth in the two-part test. (ECF No. 89, 97). Assuming Defendant Jefferson made the statements
alleged in Plaintiff’s Objections, these statements do not rise to the level of conduct contemplated

by the Supreme Court in Lugar to allow suit under § 1983. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant Jefferson acted as a person and a LLC in this action, however, the Court has not found
any support for this assertion. The Report points out and the Court agrees, Plaintiff has only shown
that Defendant Jefferson is private party who purchased his mother’s property. (ECF No. 94).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Jefferson are summarily dismissed. (ECF No. 89).
C. Plaintiff’s Claims against Magistrate Curtis are Dismissed
Plaintiff alleges Defendant, Magistrate Curtis, violated his Fourteenth Amendment Right to
due process and Fifth Amendment Right to equal protection. (ECF No. 89). The Magistrate Judge
recommends dismissing the claims against Magistrate Curtis because she is entitled to judicial
immunity. (ECF No. 94). In his Objections, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Curtis is not entitled
to judicial immunity because she acted in absence of all jurisdiction. (ECF No. 97). Plaintiff
explains Magistrate Curtis acted without jurisdiction by denying him a jury trial and signing a writ
fully aware Defendant Jefferson did not own the property. (ECF No. 97). This Court finds, as the
Magistrate Judge did, that Plaintiff’s allegations concern Magistrate Curtis’ rulings. (ECF No. 94).
The Supreme Court has held that judges have absolute immunity for claims arising out of their
judicial actions. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Therefore, Magistrate Curtis is entitled
to judicial immunity and Plaintiff’s claims against Magistrate Curtis are dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the applicable laws, the record in this case, as well as the Report,

this Court finds the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation fairly and accurately summarizes the facts
and applies the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report (ECF No. 94).

Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s second amended complaint without prejudice. (ECF No.
89).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 9, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge