Fields v. Richland County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 52

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court overrules Fields's objections, adopts the Report 45 , and incorporates it herein. Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court the Sheriff's Department's 29 and the School District's 30 motions to dismiss are GRANTED and these two defendants are DISMISSED from the action. Accordingly, the only remaining claim is Fields's § 1983 claim against Lott. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis on 08/22/2018. (dsto, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
BENJAMIN P. FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, RICHLAND SCHOOL
DISTRICT TWO, and LEON LOTT,
Defendants.

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§ CIVIL ACTION 3:17-0443-MGL-TER
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ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND GRANTING DEFENDANT RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT’S
AND DEFENDANT RICHLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT TWO’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This case arises out of Plaintiff Benjamin P. Fields’s (Fields) employment with the Richland
County Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff’s Department) as a a School Resource Officer at Spring
Valley High School (SVHS), one of Defendant Richland School District Two’s (the School District)
schools. Fields was also employed by the School District as a conditioning teacher and football
coach.
The genesis of Fields’s complaint concerns an altercation he had with an allegedly
recalcitrant student at SVHS. Fields was fired for purportedly mishandling the situation.
Fields brings the following six causes of action against the Sheriff’s Department and the
School District in his amended complaint: (1) defamation against the Sheriff’s Department, (2)
negligence, gross negligence, recklessness and willfulness against the Sheriff’s Department; (3)
public policy discharge against the Sheriff’s Department; (4) defamation against the School District;

(5) negligence, gross negligence, recklessness and willfulness against the School District; and (6)
a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Leon Lott (Lott). The motions to dismiss concern
all Fields’s claims, with the exception of his § 1983 claim against Lott.
The matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the
United States Magistrate Judge suggesting the Sheriff’s Department’s and the School District’s
motions to dismiss be granted and these two defendants be dismissed from the action. The Report
was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South
Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or11
recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on May 25, 2018, Fields filed his objections on June
8, 2018, and the Sheriff’s Department and the School District filed their replies to the objections on
June 22, 2018. The Court has reviewed the objections, but holds them to be without merit. It will,
therefore, enter judgment accordingly.
First, Fields argues the Magistrate Judge erred in suggesting the Court dismiss his
defamation claims against the Sheriff’s Department and the School District. The Court disagrees.
“The tort of defamation allows a plaintiff to recover for injury to [his] reputation as the result
of the defendant’s communication to others of a false message about the plaintiff.” Holtzscheiter
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 497, 501 (S.C. 1998). Fields alleges both the Sheriff’s

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Department and the School District defamed him by accusing him of “engaging in . . . inappropriate
and egregious conduct[.]” Amended Complaint ¶ 45, 65.
There is no dispute Fields is a public figure. Consequently, to establish his defamation
claims, Fields must demonstrate the defendants acted with actual malice in defaming him. See New
York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). Actual malice is present when one makes a statement
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id.
Actual malice under the New York Times standard is not to “be confused with the concept of
[common law] malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.” Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991).
The problem with Fields’s defamations claims is this: even if he is able to show actual malice
under the New York Times standard, the South Carolina Torts Claim Act (SCTCA or the Act) bars
his recovery from the Sheriff’s Department and the School District. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-78-60(17). This is so because of the plain language of the statute, which states “[t]he
governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from . . . employee conduct . . . which
constitutes . . . actual malice[.]” Further, as the Magistrate Judge recognized, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals has held “[t]he SCTCA clearly excludes a governmental entity’s liability for an
individual’s loss stemming from a state employee’s conduct that constitutes actual malice. . . .
[T[herefore[,] . . . the SCTCA bars [the plaintiff’s] slander claim against the [governmental
entity] because [the plaintiff] must prove the [governmental entity] employee’s conduct constituted
actual malice in order to recover on [the defamation] claim.” Gause v. Doe, 451 S.E.2d 408, 409
(S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
Fields argues the Magistrate Judge erred in relying on Gause when suggesting the Court
dismiss his defamation claims. Objections 5. The argument is wholly without merit. Gause is
directly on point.

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In that case, the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied the New York Times standard of
actual malice in determining the Myrtle Beach Police Department was not liable under the SCTCA
for a defamation claim raised by a public official:
In a case involving the defamation of a public official, the plaintiff
must prove the defendant acted with actual malice. Sanders v.
Prince, 304 S.C. 236, 403 S.E.2d640 (1991). To meet this standard,
the plaintiff must show either that the defendant knew the statement
was false or that the defendant made the statement with reckless
disregard of its falsity. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S.254,84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)).
Gause, 451 S.E.2d at 409.
Nevertheless, according to Fields, “[w]hat the Report and Recommendation fails to consider
in [relying on Gause] . . . is that Gause is a 1994 South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion that
remains subject to U.S. Supreme Court and/or South Carolina Supreme Court analysis on the
issue.” Objections 5. With this statement, Fields appears to be asking the Court to ignore this South
Carolina Court of Appeals opinion.
But, this court “must rule as the [South] Carolina courts would, . . . departing from an
intermediate court’s fully reasoned holding as to state law only if convinced that the state’s highest
court would not follow that holding.” Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.2002)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Gause is a “fully reasoned holding as to state
[defamation] law” and the Court is unpersuaded the South Carolina Supreme Court would not follow
the holding in Gause. It is also for those reasons the Court need not grant Fields’s request to certify
this question to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Fields also asserts the Magistrate Judge failed to “accurately correlate[ ] the term ‘actual
malice’ as found in the SCTCA with the ‘malice’ (i.e. constitutional malice) standard identified in
Times.” Objections 5. According to Fields, the definition employed by the Magistrate Judge “is not

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in line with the malice standard set forth in Times and therefore dismissal of [Fields’s] claim on this
basis is misguided.” Id. This is simply not so.
The Gause court applied the New York Times definition of actual malice to the SCTCA’s use
of the term and, in so doing, held the plaintiff’s defamation claim was barred by the Act. Fields’s
defamation claim is no different. Accordingly, the Court will overrule this objection.
In Fields’s second objection, he contends the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending the
Court dismiss his claims for negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and willfulness. The Court
is unpersuaded.
To establish these claims, a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant owed to him a duty of
care. See Solanki v. Wal-Mart Store, 763 S.E.2d 615, 619 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014). Fields contends
the Sheriff’s Department and the School District “engaged in special circumstances–in releasing
statements and press releases–concerning [Fields], his actions, and his employment, wherein a duty
was created between the respective Defendants and Plaintiff.” Objections 7.
Fields neglects to direct the Court to the source of the alleged duty the Sheriff’s Department
and the School District owed to him–be it statutory, common law, contract, status, property interest,
or something else; and the Court has been unable to locate one. Saying special circumstances
created the duty, without more, is not enough.
Fields also claims the “voluntary actions of making a statement pertaining to [Fields] and
his employment,” Objections 7, created a duty of care. It is well-established law that “one who
assumes to act, even though under no obligation to do so, thereby becomes obligated to act with due
care.” Miller v. City of Camden, 451 S.E.2d 401, 404 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994). But, Fields fails to
explain how the making of statements creates such a duty. Consequently, the Court will also
overrule this objection.

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Third, according to Fields, the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding the Court should dismiss
his public-policy discharge claim against the Sheriff’s Department. The Court is unconvinced.
Fields claims the Sheriff’s Department terminated his employment, even though he complied
with internal policy, specifically Policy 601. Fields states “Policy 601 sets forth a clear mandate of
the actions and procedures to be carried out by its officers in various situations. In the instant
matter, Policy 601 established that Plaintiff’s actions at [SVHS], which [the Sheriff’s Department]
cited repeatedly as a violation, were entirely permissible under the policy.” Objections 9. With this
argument, Fields attempts to get around the fact that he was an at-will employee, which means an
employer is able to terminate an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all without
incurring any liability. Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Corp., 422 S.E.2d 91,92 (S.C. 1992).
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized a “public policy” exception to
the “at will” doctrine, Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 91, 92 (S.C. 1985),
Fields fails to direct the Court to any statute, constitutional provision, or judicial decision supporting
his claim the “public policy” described in Ludwick is violated when an employee is discharged,
despite following internal policies.
And besides, a deputy such as Fields “serves at the sheriff’s pleasure.” Botchie v. O’Dowd,
432 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1993) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 23–13–10). “A sheriff may not compromise
his statutory authority to discharge deputies at his discretion.” Id. Even an employee handbook
containing a grievance procedure is insufficient to overcome the dictates of a statute such as
§ 23–13–10. See Jenkins v. Weatherholtz, 909 F.2d 105 (4th Cir.1990). “To hold otherwise renders
the language of § 23–13–10 meaningless and eviscerates the sheriff’s ability to discharge deputies
at his ‘pleasure.’” Botchie, 432 S.E.2d at 460. Therefore, even if Fields were successful in arguing
his termination offends public policy, he remains unable to overcome the fact he “serves at the
sheriff’s pleasure.” Id. Hence, the Court will overrule this objection as well.

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After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case pursuant to the standard set
forth above, the Court overrules Fields’s objections, adopts the Report, and incorporates it herein.
Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court the Sheriff’s Department’s and the School District’s
motions to dismiss are GRANTED and these two defendants are DISMISSED from the action.
Accordingly, the only remaining claim is Fields’s § 1983 claim against Lott.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Columbia, South Carolina.

s/ Mary Geiger Lewis
MARY GEIGER LEWIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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