Sibert v. Raycom Media, Inc. et al
OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim as to Adam Cannavo, Raycom Media, Inc.; denying 7 Motion to Remand; dismissing Lyle Schulze for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 8/29/2017.(cbru, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
William D. Sibert,
Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-1544-CMC
Raycom Media, Inc., Adam Cannavo, and
OPINION AND ORDER
ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND AND DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff William D. Sibert (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking recovery from his
employer, Raycom Media, Inc. (“Raycom”) and two co-employees, Adam Cannavo (“Cannavo”)
and Lyle Schulze (“Schulze”), for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). This matter
is before the court on two motions: Plaintiff’s motion to remand (ECF No. 7) and Defendants’
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 5). Both motions turn on whether Plaintiff
has a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the various Defendants,
as explained further below, and both will be addressed in this Order.
Defendants Raycom, Cannavo, and Schulze removed the action to this court based on
diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserts this case lacks complete diversity, as he and Schulze are
both citizens of South Carolina. Whether removal is proper depends on whether Schulze was
fraudulently joined in this action.
For the reasons below, the court finds Schulze was fraudulently joined and therefore is
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
against Cannavo and Raycom, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to those defendants.
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 1
Plaintiff was employed by WIS-TV as a Senior Editor when WIS-TV was bought by
Raycom. ECF No. 1-1, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2. In 1998, well before this purchase, Plaintiff was diagnosed
with multiple sclerosis (“MS”). Id. at ¶ 7. Although Plaintiff “had to adapt his lifestyle to less
strenuous activities,” this disease did not interfere with his work performance, and Plaintiff’s
supervisors “worked with him with his illness and have minimally been required to reasonably
accommodate him on occasions.” Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8. In November 2016, Plaintiff “was summoned by
his superiors to a meeting with Raycom representatives” to discuss the differences in station
operation and his job position after the sale. Id. at ¶ 11. Because this meeting was scheduled at a
meeting room over 100 yards from Plaintiff’s work station, walking to this location would cause
him physical difficulty and pain. Id. Plaintiff requested the meeting be moved to a location nearer
to his work station, but this request was denied. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff was therefore unable to attend
the meeting, suffered substantial stress and anxiety, and consequently missed an entire day of
Plaintiff alleges he was thereafter harassed by Schulze, the manager and Vice President of
WIS-TV, and Cannavo, a human resources specialist for Raycom in Charlotte, as well as other
employees of Raycom. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff was notified verbally his job description was changing,
and he would be required to carry cameras and other equipment and would no longer be able to
In light of the standards discussed below, the court accepts allegations of the Complaint as true.
rely on cameramen and other employees for this function. Id. However, his duties and title were
not changed until on or about March 15, 2017, when Plaintiff was notified by his supervisor he
would not be able to fulfill the new requirements of his job because of his disability, and would
therefore need to contact human resources to apply for an accommodation. Id. at ¶ 15. Although
Plaintiff did so, Cannavo responded Raycom would not be able to accommodate Plaintiff and
therefore Plaintiff suffered loss, including having to use leave to make up for a reduction in pay.
Id. at ¶ 16.
1. Motion to Remand
As Defendants have removed based on diversity, jurisdiction in this court depends on
whether Schulze, who has the same citizenship as Plaintiff, is fraudulently joined. 2 In response to
Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Defendants argue the court should ignore the citizenship of Schulze
as Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for IIED against him because Plaintiff’s claim falls exclusively
within the scope of the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. See S.C. Code Ann. §42-1540 (2009). Without Schulze as a defendant, this court would have diversity jurisdiction over this
The citizenship of Cannavo and Raycom is undisputedly diverse from Plaintiff. Defendants note
Plaintiff was employed by WIS-TV, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place
of business in Alabama. The parties appear to agree the citizenship of the company employing
both Plaintiff and the individual defendants is diverse from Plaintiff.
For the reasons set forth below, the court finds Defendants have met their burden of
demonstrating Schulze was fraudulently joined. Accordingly, the court denies the motion to
remand (ECF No. 7) and Schulze is dismissed without prejudice.
The party removing an action bears the burden of demonstrating jurisdiction properly rests
with the court at the time the petition for removal is filed. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291 (1938); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151
(4th Cir. 1994). Removal jurisdiction is strictly construed. Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151. If federal
jurisdiction is doubtful, remand is necessary. Id.
To be removable to federal court, a state action must be within the original jurisdiction of
the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. District courts have original jurisdiction “where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between . . . citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
When a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a non-diverse defendant, a district court may retain
jurisdiction and disregard the non-diverse party. See Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th
Cir. 1999). To show fraudulent joinder of a party, a removing party “must demonstrate either
‘outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts’ or that ‘there is no possibility that
the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state
court.’” Hartley v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Marshall
v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993)). “The party alleging fraudulent joinder
bears a heavy burden -- it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving
all issues of law and fact in the plaintiff’s favor.” Hartley, 187 F.3d at 424.
The Fourth Circuit has described this standard as “even more favorable to the plaintiff than
the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Id. (citations
omitted). All the plaintiff needs to show is that there is a “glimmer of hope,” Mayes, 198 F.3d at
466, or a “slight possibility of a right to relief” in state court. Hartley, 187 F.3d at 426.
b. South Carolina law
In determining whether Plaintiff can establish a cause of action for IIED against a
defendant, this court looks to South Carolina law. Bettius & Sanderson, P.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 839 F.2d 1009, 1019 (4th Cir. 1988) (“When hearing a case pursuant
to diversity jurisdiction, a federal court must determine issues of state law as it believes the highest
court of the state would determine them.”). The Workers’ Compensation Act provides “rights and
remedies” that “shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee . . .as against his
employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death.” S.C.
Code Ann. §42-1-540 (2009). The South Carolina Supreme Court has held “an employee's action
against a company for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . caused by the action[s] of
another employee are [sic] within the scope of the Act since these actions arise from personal
injury.” Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d 700, 701 (S.C. 1993), as modified on reh'g
(Apr. 7, 1993) (citing Loges v. Mack Trucks, 417 S.E.2d 538 (S.C. 1992)). When the tortfeasor/coemployee is the alter ego of the employer, the employer’s liability may fall outside the exclusivity
of the Act. Id. However, the alter ego exception applies only to dominant corporate owners and
officers. 3 McClain v. Pactiv Corp., 602 S.E.2d 87, 89 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
South Carolina courts have limited the intentional tort exception to the Act’s exclusivity to
“injuries inflicted by an employer who acts with a deliberate or specific intent to injure.” Peay v.
U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64, 65–66 (S.C. 1993). “The same standard also would apply to injuries
intentionally inflicted by a co-employee.” Id.; see also Dickert, 428 S.E.2d at 702 (“[I]t is against
public policy to extend this immunity to the co-employee who commits an intentional tortious act
upon another employee. The Workers’ Compensation Act may not be used as a shield for a coemployee’s intentional injurious conduct.”). “This exception is applicable to the intentional
infliction of emotional distress,” and “would also apply to injuries intentionally inflicted by a coemployee.” Edens v. Bellini, 597 S.E.2d 863, 870 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, while an
employer may not be sued in civil court for IIED based on a non-alter ego employee’s actions due
to the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer or employee who acts with
deliberate or specific intent to injure another employee, even in the course and scope of his
employment, may not shelter himself within the exclusivity provision.
The intentional injury exception to §42-1-540 has been construed quite narrowly. Edens,
597 S.E.2d at 870-71. Liability cannot “be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the
The alter ego doctrine only applies to an employer’s liability outside the Act for its own deliberate
infliction of injury or that of an alter ego. Dickert, 428 S.E.2d at 701. The alter ego doctrine is
not at issue in this case. Neither individual defendant is alleged to be a corporate owner or officer.
gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach
of statute, or other misconduct . . .short of a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose
of inflicting an injury.” Id. at 871. Even actions such as “knowingly ordering employees to
perform an extremely dangerous job,” or “refusing to respond to an employee’s medical needs and
restrictions” fail to rise to the level “of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of
accidental character.” Id.
[W]hat is being tested here is not the degree of gravity or depravity of the
employer’s conduct, but rather the narrow issue of intentional versus the accidental
quality of the precise event producing injury. The intentional removal of a safety
device or toleration of a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for an
accidental injury later. But in any normal use of the word, it cannot be said, if such
an injury does happen, that this was deliberate infliction of harm comparable to an
intentional left jab to the chin.
Id. (citing Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 103.03 (2002)).
In his motion to remand, Plaintiff argues 1) he may bring a tort claim against an individual
co-employee for IIED; 2) the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar his action; 3) his injury is
proprietary, not personal 4; and 4) his claim falls within the deliberate intent to injure exception to
Plaintiff is incorrect that a claim for IIED cannot be pursued via the Workers’ Compensation Act
because it is a proprietary and not a personal injury. Dickert, 428 S.E.2d at 701 (citing Loges v.
Mack Trucks, 417 S.E.2d 538 (S.C. 1992) (The South Carolina Supreme Court has held “an
employee's action against a company for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault
and battery caused by the action of another employee are within the scope of the [Workers’
Compensation] Act since these actions arise from personal injury.”)
the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. ECF No. 7. Defendant argues
Plaintiff has no possibility of recovery against Schulze because his claim is barred by the
exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Schulze is not an alter ego of the
employer, Plaintiff failed to allege Schulze acted with specific intent to injure, and Plaintiff has a
remedy for his alleged damages. ECF No. 16.
Plaintiff alleges the meeting scheduled at a remote location 5 caused him extreme stress and
anxiety, culminating in him missing a day of work. Further, Plaintiff alleges ongoing harassment
by Schulze and changes to his work duties, eventually leading to him becoming unable to work
full time and having to use leave to supplement his income.
Despite the deferential fraudulent joinder standard, Plaintiff simply does not have a
“glimmer of hope” of recovery against Schulze. Plaintiff has failed to allege Schulze acted with a
deliberate or specific intent to injure him. 6 The factual allegations, including those raised in the
motion to remand and reply, do not give rise to reasonable inference that Schulze acted with
Although Plaintiff does not name Schulze by name as his supervisor in the Complaint, his motion
to remand notes Schulze is his supervisor and was the one who “purposefully” scheduled the
meeting far away from Plaintiff’s work station. ECF No. 7-1 at 4.
Plaintiff argues in his motion “[a]lthough Plaintiff’s complaint does not specifically say the words
‘deliberately intended to injure,’ the actions alleged, if proven, show that Defendant Schulze
deliberately intended to injure Plaintiff.” ECF No. 17 at 2-3.
deliberate intent to injure. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show a
possibility of recovery on the other elements of his IIED claim.
In addition to the requirement to allege facts inferring Schulze acted with a deliberate or
specific intent to injure him – in order to avoid the Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity
provision – Plaintiff must also allege sufficient facts to make out the other elements of a claim for
IIED against Schulze that is plausible on its face. In order to recover for IIED under South Carolina
law, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress, or was
certain, or substantially certain, that such distress would result from his conduct; 7
(2) the conduct was so ‘extreme and outrageous’ so as to exceed ‘all possible bounds of
decency’ and must be regarded as ‘atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
(3) the actions of the defendant caused plaintiff’s emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was ‘severe’ such that ‘no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it.’
Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C., 650 S.E.2d 68, 70 (S.C. 2007) (citing Ford v. Hutson, 276
S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 1981)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations against Schulze of scheduling a meeting far from Plaintiff’s
work station and changing his job duties, coupled with a vague reference to workplace harassment,
are simply not “so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency” or
While IIED can also apply to severe emotional distress inflicted recklessly, such a claim would
fall under the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
“atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Hansson, 650 S.E.2d at 70; see Save
Charleston Foundation v. Murray, 333 S.E.2d 60 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (“There is some conduct
involving personal interaction and causing emotional distress that, as a matter of law is beyond the
embrace . . .of [outrage] 8.”); Shipman v. Glenn, 443 S.E.2d 921 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) ( granting
summary judgment for defendant when the plaintiff’s supervisor verbally abused and threatened
her, and ridiculed her speech impediment).
In addition, the stress and anxiety complained of by Plaintiff was not so severe that “no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Hansson, 650 S.E.2d at 70; see Shipman, 443
S.E.2d at 922 (Plaintiff’s emotional distress of becoming upset, stressed and worried, causing her
to be physically ill to the point of leaving work early, causing her to live in constant fear of her
supervisor, which adversely affected her personal life and ability to function in her job, fell “far
short of that needed for an action of this kind”). Under South Carolina law, Plaintiff does not have
a glimmer of hope he can recover on his IIED claim.
The South Carolina tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is also known as “outrage.”
Gattison v. South Carolina State College, 456 S.E.2d 414, 416 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
For the above reasons, Schulze is fraudulently joined and his citizenship is disregarded for
diversity purposes. Therefore, remand is improper and Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.
Defendant Schulze is hereby dismissed from this action without prejudice. 9
2. Motion to Dismiss
All Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c). Because the court finds Schulze was fraudulently
joined, it addresses these legal arguments only as to the other Defendants; however, because the
allegations against Schulze apply to the liability of Raycom, the factual allegations against all
Defendants are considered. Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot maintain this civil IIED action
against 1) either individual Defendant due to the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Act;
2) against any Defendant because there was no deliberate intent to injure; and 3) against any
This court’s inquiry into fraudulent joinder is to make a determination as to jurisdiction only, and
thus the court is unable to make a decision as to dismissal on the merits. Therefore, the dismissal
must be without prejudice. See Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir.
2014) (dismissing non-diverse defendant without prejudice due to the temporary jurisdiction
allowed by the doctrine of fraudulent joinder); Hogan v. Raymond Corp., 536 F. App’x 207, 211
(3d. Cir. 2013) (“The fraudulent joinder inquiry is a jurisdictional one and not a merits
determination. Thus, instead of dismissing [the plaintiff’s] claims against [the non-diverse
defendant] with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), the District Court should have dismissed them for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).”); Albert v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs.,
Inc., 356 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Once [the district court] determined that [the nondiverse defendants] were fraudulently joined, the district court had no jurisdiction to resolve the
merits of the claims against them. In cases where the district court has determined that it lacks
jurisdiction, dismissal of a claim must be without prejudice.”).
Defendant because Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the elements of IIED
against. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff argues he has established the elements of IIED against all Defendants
and his claim is not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. ECF
No. 10. Similar to his motion to remand, Plaintiff contends he has suffered a proprietary instead
of personal injury 10, the intentional tort exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act applies, and
he has no remedy under the Workers’ Compensation Act 11. Id.
a. Legal Standard
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is assessed under the same standards
as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009). A motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted only if, after accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any
set of facts in support of his claim that entitles him to relief. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
Although the court must take the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, it “need not accept the legal conclusions [the plaintiff would draw] from
the facts.” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Eastern Shore
See footnote 2, supra.
Provided he could make out the elements of a claim for IIED, Plaintiff would have a claim under
the Workers’ Compensation Act against his employer for actions undertaken by a co-employee.
See Dickert, 428 S.E.2d at 701.
Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000)). The court may also
disregard any “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Id.
The Rule 12(b)(6) standard has often been expressed as precluding dismissal unless it is
certain that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any legal theory that plausibly could be
suggested by the facts alleged. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Markari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.
1993). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (quoted in Giarratano, 521 F.3d at
Thus, in applying Rule 12(b)(6), the court also applies the relevant pleading standard.
Despite the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8, a plaintiff in any civil action must include more
than mere conclusory statements in support of a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal
conclusions); see also McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Dept. of Trans., 780 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir.
2015) (noting “Iqbal and Twombly articulated a new requirement that a complaint must allege a
plausible claim for relief, thus rejecting a standard that would allow a complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later
establish some set of [undisclosed] facts to support recovery.” (emphasis and alteration in original,
internal quotation marks omitted)); Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing
Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Companies, Inc., 679 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012) for proposition
Plaintiff need not forecast evidence sufficient to prove the elements of a claim, but must allege
sufficient facts to establish those elements).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate Defendant
Schulze acted with a deliberate or specific intent to injure, as needed to bring a tort action outside
the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision. The same is true for Defendant Cannavo
– there are no allegations of facts suggesting deliberate intent to injure as to Cannavo. Therefore,
Plaintiff is unable to bring his claim for IIED against Cannavo outside the exclusivity provision of
the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) as to Cannavo. Other than a vague allegation of harassment “by Defendants Schulze
and Cannavo, and other employees,” Plaintiff’s only allegation against Cannavo is that he denied
Plaintiff’s request for accommodation and told him he would have to use FMLA. ECF No. 1-1 at
16. Similar to the allegations against Schulze, these are simply not sufficient to state a claim for
IIED even assuming arguendo Plaintiff could get past the exclusivity provision of the Workers’
Compensation Act. Plaintiff does not allege conduct extreme and outrageous enough, or emotional
distress severe enough, to state a claim for IIED against Cannavo.
This standard applies to an employer as well as co-employees. See Peay, 437 S.E.2d at 6566; Edens, 597 S.E.2d at 870. Plaintiff’s allegations against Raycom include those against Schulze
and Cannavo, harassment “by other employees” (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 8), a change in his job
description (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15) and a denial of his request for reasonable accommodations (Id. at ¶ 16
(“Raycom would not be able to accommodate him”)). In Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff alleges he “found himself put in various positions that Defendants
knew or should have known would enflame his condition and put him in grievous pain.” ECF No.
10 at 6. Plaintiff’s allegations against Raycom suffer the same deficiency – they do not rise to the
level required in Edens to allege intentional, versus accidental, injury. In fact, other than the
allegations against Schulze as Raycom’s employee (which, as noted above, are insufficient),
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts from which one might infer intent to injure on behalf of Raycom.
Although he argues allegations that “Defendants were aware of his condition and the pain he
suffered, but nonetheless chose to force him to walk extended distances and carry heavy gear”
(ECF No. 10 at 11) are sufficient to allege deliberate intent to injure, this is contrary to the high
standard required by South Carolina law. Therefore, his claim against Raycom is precluded by
the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
In addition, as discussed above, none of Plaintiff’s allegations of emotional distress rise to
the level to be considered “so extreme and outrageous so as to exceed all possible bounds of
decency.” Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations fail on the last prong of the IIED claim, the severity of
the distress experienced. Like the claim against Cannavo, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for IIED
Plaintiff has not shown a “glimmer of hope” of recovering against Schulze, who is thus
fraudulently joined. Plaintiff’s motion for remand (ECF No. 7) is denied and Schulze is dismissed
without prejudice. For the same reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for IIED against Cannavo
and Raycom, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 5) is granted. Although Plaintiff
requests leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 10, fn1), he has failed to suggest the existence of
facts that would cure the deficiencies in his IIED claim. Nor has he submitted a motion for leave
to amend or a proposed Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to amend is denied
and this matter is dismissed without prejudice as to Cannavo and Raycom.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
Senior United States District Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
August 29, 2017
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