Harrison v. Kennedy et al
Filing
52
ORDER AND OPINION The R & R of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 49 ) is ADOPTEDIN PART and REJECTED IN PART. The Court REJECTS the determination of the Magistrate Judge that there is no dispute of material fact regarding when S HA was given Plaintiff's RFTA, and therefore declines to adopt: (i) the sentence beginning on Page 6, line 18 and ending on Page 7, line. 3; (ii) the clause beginning on Page 7, line 10 and ending on Page 7, line 12, and; (iii) thefull paragraph s beginning on Page 8, line 14 and ending on Page 10, line 5. The R & R is otherwise ADOPTED. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 34 .) as to Plaintiff's claim under the Housing Act of 1937 and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's disability claims. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 10/26/2018.(sshe, )
RECEtVEO USOC
CLERK.CHARLESTON.SC
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLIN21)18 OCT
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Eugene P. Harrison, a/k/a Eugene
Paul Harrison, Sr.,
Plaintiff,
V.
Jennifer C. Kennedy, HCV Senior
Specialist Individually and/or in her
Official Capacity as an Employee
of the Sumter Housing Authority,
Defendants.
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26 AH II: 26
Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-0057-RMG
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of the
Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 49) recommending that the Court grant Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 34). Plaintiff filed objections to the R & R. (Dkt. Nos. 51.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts in part and rejects in part the R & Rand grants in part
and denies in part summary judgment.
I.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully denied housing under the Housing Choice Voucher
Program, and discriminated against based on a disability. Plaintiff alleges that on October 18,
2017, he received a Section 8 Choice Housing Voucher. (Dkt. No. 1.) The voucher contained a
statement that a copy of the lease and a request for tenancy approval ("RFTA") must be given to
the agency by the expiration date for the voucher. (Dkt. No. 34-3 at 9 - 10.) The voucher also
stated it would expire on December 17, 2017, unless the family requested an extension and the
SHA granted the extension. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he returned the signed RFTA on
December 16, 2017, but that Defendant Jennifer Kennedy, a case worker for the Sumter Housing
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Authority ("SHA") refused to approve his voucher. (Dkt. No. 1.) In support of their motion for
summary judgment, Defendant included the last page of a document with Plaintiffs signature
which allegedly was his RFTA. (Dkt. Nos. 34 at, 12; 34-3 at 15.) The document has a stamped
time of December 18, 2017 at 12:23pm, after his voucher had expired. (Id.) There is no evidence
that Plaintiff informed SHA or Defendant of a disability, and the record contains forms for housing
accommodations signed by Plaintiff where he failed to identify himself or anyone in his family as
having a disability or need for an accommodation. (Dkt. No. 34-3 at 17 - 18.)
Defendant moved for summary judgment, which Plaintiff opposed. (Dkt. Nos. 34, 37.)
The Magistrate Judge recommended granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
Plaintiff filed objections. (Dkt. Nos. 49, 51.)
II.
Legal Standard
A. Summary Judgment
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there is
no genuine issue of any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of identifying
the portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, any admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Court will construe all inferences and ambiguities against the
movant and in favor of the non-moving party. US. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,655 (1962).
The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242,252 (1986). However, an issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 257.
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"When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "In the language of the Rule,
the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial."' Id at 587. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial."' Id. (quoting First Nat'/ Bank
ofAriz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,289 (1968)).
B. Pro Se Pleadings
This Court liberally construes complaints filed by prose litigants to allow the development
of a potentially meritorious case. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519 (1972). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore
a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a viable claim, nor can the Court
assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. See Weller v. Dep 't of
Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
C. Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with
this Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 - 71 (1976). This Court is charged with
making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which
specific objection is made. Additionally, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). In
the absence of any specific objections, "a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but
instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept
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the recommendation." See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F .3d 310, 315 (4th
Cir. 2005). Plaintiff filed objections and the R & R is reviewed de novo.
III.
Discussion
The Magistrate Judge ably set forth the facts in this case, and the standards applicable to
the Plaintiffs claims. However, the Court finds that there is a dispute of material fact regarding
whether the agency properly decided the voucher expired by the time Plaintiff returned the RFTA.
Therefore the Court rejects the Magistrate Judge's determination that there is no dispute that
Plaintiffs RFTA was given to SHA after December 17, 2017, but otherwise adopts the R & R.
Plaintiff brings his claims under the Housing Act of 1937. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437. Under the
Act, the initial term of the voucher must be at least 60 calendar days. 24 C.F .R. § 982.303. The
agency determined that the voucher had expired by the time Plaintiff returned his RFTA. While
the agency has the right to make this determination, the decision still can be set aside if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5
U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A). See Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663, 671 (N.D.
Ill. 2015) (denying dismissal of claim under Housing Act of 193 7 where "allegations suggest that
[the public housing agency's] termination decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was
predicated on incorrect grounds and may have resulted from [the public housing agency's] failure
to follow its own procedures."); Whitaker v. Clementon Hous. Auth., 788 F. Supp. 226,234 (D.N.J.
1992) (denying summary judgment because "we find that there clearly exist disputed issues of
material fact regarding the basis for HUD's decision in this matter, and thus, the issue of whether
HUD's action should be set aside or upheld under § 706 of the APA cannot at this juncture be
determined by the court.").
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Here, there is a dispute of material fact regarding whether the SHA was given Plaintiffs
RFT A prior to December 17, 2017, the expiration date sixty days after the issuance of his voucher.
Defendant presents a single page with Plaintiffs signature time stamped on December 18, 2017.
However, it is unclear from the page whether it actually is Plaintiffs RFTA. 1 More importantly,
there is no evidence in the record regarding whether that time stamp was actually applied
immediately when the RFTA was received or at a later time, and Plaintiff unequivocally asserts
that he "returned the signed tenancy form on the 16th of December[,] beating the deadline [of]
December 17th .... " (Dkt. No. 1 at if9.) Therefore, Plaintiffs claim that his RFTA was improperly
denied survives summary judgment.
The Court also adopts the Magistrate Judge's determination regarding Plaintiffs disability
claims. (Dkt. No. 49 at 10.) Even if the Court assumed Plaintiff has a disability, there is no
evidence that Plaintiff ever informed SHA or Defendant that he has a disability, that SHA or
Defendant were otherwise aware he had a disability or that he requested any accommodation or
extension of time from SHA based on that disability. Furthermore, housing accommodations
signed by Plaintiff fail to list himself or anyone in his family as having a disability or need for an
accommodation. Plaintiff therefore cannot make out a disability claim, either for discrimination
or the lack of extension of his voucher.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the R & R of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 49) is ADOPTED
IN PART and REJECTED IN PART. The Court REJECTS the determination of the Magistrate
Judge that there is no dispute of material fact regarding when SHA was given Plaintiffs RFTA,
and therefore declines to adopt: (i) the sentence beginning on Page 6, line 18 and ending on Page
1 Defendant
asserts it is Plaintiffs RFTA in an affidavit. (Dkt. No. 34-3 at ifl2.)
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7, line. 3; (ii) the clause beginning on Page 7, line 10 and ending on Page 7, line 12, and; (iii) the
full paragraphs beginning on Page 8, line 14 and ending on Page 10, line 5. The R & R is otherwise
ADOPTED. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 34.) as to Plaintiffs claim under the Housing Act of 1937 and GRANTS Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs disability claims.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Richard Mar
United States District Court Judge
October 'Lt. , 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
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