Castles v. Tricam Industries Inc et al
Filing
142
ORDER AND OPINION the court DENIES Plaintiff Randolph G. Castles' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Motion for New Trial 140 . Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/22/2021.(asni, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Randolph G. Castles,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Tricam Industries, Inc.,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________)
Civil Action No.: 3:18-cv-00525-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Randolph G. Castles filed this warranty/products liability action against Defendant
Tricam Industries, Inc. (“Tricam”) seeking damages as a result of injuries he sustained when he
slipped and fell off an aluminum extendable articulating step ladder designed, manufactured,
marketed, and/or distributed by Tricam. (ECF No. 1-1.)
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and
Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No.
140.) Tricam opposes Plaintiff’s Motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 141.) For the reasons stated
below, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Motion for a New
Trial.
I.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO THE PENDING MOTIONS
In this matter, Plaintiff alleged that on November 20, 2014, he was injured when he fell off
a “Gorilla Ladder Multi-Position Ladder (Serial No.: 050601-22)” that was “in the extension mode
while working on a sign inside of an Old Navy clothing store located in Charlotte, North Carolina.”
(ECF No. 1-1 at 4 ¶ 4, 5 ¶ 13.) Plaintiff claimed that his fall occurred because the ladder slid from
its position causing him to fall approximately fifteen (15) feet onto a concrete floor. (Id. ¶ 13.)
1
Because Tricam and its co-Defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,1 (together “Defendants”)
allegedly “designed, fabricated, manufactured, produced, assembled, imported, marketed,
distributed, sold and/or otherwise placed the Subject Ladder into the stream of commerce,”
Plaintiff filed an action on November 15, 2017, against Defendants in the Lexington County, South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas bearing case number 2017-CP-32-04244, alleging claims for
negligence and breach of warranty. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4 ¶ 11, 5 ¶ 15–8 ¶ 26.) On February 22, 2018,
Defendants removed the case to this court and answered the Complaint on March 1, 2018. (ECF
Nos. 1, 6.)
After the parties concluded discovery, the court conducted a jury trial at which the parties
presented evidence and argument starting on June 1, 2021, and finishing on June 3, 2021. (See
ECF Nos. 129, 131, 134.) Specific to the instant Motions, the court heard argument from the
parties on June 3, 2021, regarding Tricam’s Motion for Directed Verdict after the conclusion of its
case. Tricam argued that a six-year statute of repose applied to Plaintiff’s claims under North
Carolina law and Plaintiff argued that a twelve-year period was applicable. (See, e.g., ECF No.
139 at 8:15–9:24.) Upon its review, the court announced the following decision from the bench
on the statute of repose:
With respect to the statute of repose, North Carolina substantive law applies to the
case. Because the statute of repose is a substantive definition of[,] rather than a
procedural limitation on[,] rights, the Court applies the North Carolina law in this
case. So based on these pretrial briefs, it appears that the parties did not dispute
that North Carolina law applies, so that in and of itself is not at issue.
Then we move to the statute of repose. On the North Carolina law, the “plaintiff is
required to plead and prove that the statute of repose is not a bar to the maintenance
of the action,” and I would cite to Whittaker v. Todd, 625 S.E.2d 860[] [(N.C. Ct.
App.] 2006[)]. And then if the plaintiff fails to prove that its cause of action is
brought before the repose period has expired, plaintiff's case is insufficient as a
matter of a law, citing to Robinson v[.] Bridgestone/Firestone, 703 S.E.2d 883[]
1
Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. from this action on May 27,
2021. (See ECF No. 125).
2
[(N.C. Ct. App.] 2011[)].
And then the North Carolina Supreme Court has generally explained that “Unlike
an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim,
the period contained in the statute of repose begins when the specific event occurs,
regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has
resulted.” Black v[.] Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469 [(N.C. 1985)].
And then again in the products liability arena, those claims, the specific event that
triggers the running of the statute of repose is “the date of initial purchase for use
or consumption,” and there I cite to the Cramer v. Ethicon case, which is 2021 WL
243872 at page 4, and that’s a Western District of North Carolina case, January 25,
2021, and it cites to the North Carolina General Statute, Section 1-46.1(1). In either
a six-year or a twelve-year statute of repose, that applies in products liability cases,
but particularly as we indicated in the Cramer, it expounded that if the cause of
action on October 1, 2009, if it accrued before then, then that’s the statute of
limitation that applies.
I also cite to the Ferro v. Volvo Penta of the Americas, which is 2017 WL 37171,
at page 3, it’s an Eastern District of North Carolina [case] in August of 2017 that
was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, which stated that, “Finally, turning to Ferro’s
products liability claims, Ferro expressly concurs on appeal with the district court’s
application of the statute of repose.” And in that case, they applied both the sixyear and twelve-year statute of repose to the replacement parts bought at different
times for the same boat engine, and so the six-year and the twelve-year were
applied.
So here, the statute of repose begins to run when the product at issue is purchased
for use rather than when an injury occurs. So[,] if the purchase occurred before
October 2009, and in the instant case we have the plaintiff’s initial interrogatory
which stated that it was -- they bought the ladder before the accident occurred,
which was in – the accident was in 2014, and then later on we have the supplemental
response that the ladder was bought at a Home Depot in Lexington, South Carolina.
We’ve learned during this trial that the Home Depot witnesses testified that the
product was made in August of 2005, so it would have had to be distributed, based
on their . . . routine product or habit of, by October of 2005, and that the Lexington
Home Depot did not open until December 7 of 2006. As a result, it doesn’t appear
that the fact-finder would have a legally sufficient basis to determine that plaintiff
did not buy the ladder until after October 1, 2009.
So as a consequence, and consistent with North Carolina precedent, I would find
that the purchase is subject to the six-year statute of repose. Plaintiff filed this
lawsuit in November of 2017, which is outside the relevant statute of repose, and
plaintiff would have had that burden. So[,] I’m going to find that this is time barred
and defendant’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law is granted on that
particular issue.
3
(ECF No. 139 at 25:3–27:23.) Thereafter, the court entered Judgment for Tricam on June 3, 2021,
due to the granting of its Motion for Directed Verdict.2 (ECF No. 138.)
On June 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under
Rule 59(e) and a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). (ECF No. 140.) On July 14,
2021, Tricam filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motions contending that the court should deny the
Motions in all respects. (ECF No. 141.)
II.
A.
LEGAL STANDARD3
Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59(a)
A motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) may be granted “on all or some of the issues . .
. to any party . . . for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at
law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). This rule allows a trial court to set aside the verdict
and order a new trial only if “(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is
based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice even though there
may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.” Atlas Food Sys. &
Servs. Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996). In evaluating a motion
for a new trial, the district court has the discretion to “weigh the evidence and consider the
credibility of witnesses.” Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 647 (4th Cir. 2001); Swentek v.
USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 559 (4th Cir. 1987).
B.
Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment under Rule 59(e)
Rule 59 allows a party to seek an alteration or amendment of a previous order of the court.
2
The court observes that at the time it granted Tricam a directed verdict, Plaintiff’s only claims
for consideration by the jury were for negligence, to include inadequate design or formulation of
the subject ladder.
3
Because the court sits in diversity jurisdiction, it must apply federal procedural law. See, e.g.,
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a court may “alter or amend the judgment if the movant
shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence that was not
available at trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.” Robinson
v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers
Union, 34 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1994). It is the moving party’s burden to establish one of these
three grounds in order to obtain relief. Loren Data Corp. v. GXS, Inc., 501 F. App’x 275, 285 (4th
Cir. 2012). The decision whether to reconsider an order under Rule 59(e) is within the sound
discretion of the district court. Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995). A motion
to reconsider should not be used as a “vehicle for rearguing the law, raising new arguments, or
petitioning a court to change its mind.” Lyles v. Reynolds, C/A No. 4:14-1063-TMC, 2016 WL
1427324, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2016) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5
(2008)).
III.
A.
ANALYSIS
The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the court erred by “finding that the Plaintiff’s products liability claims
were time barred by North Carolina’s repealed six-year statute of repose.” (ECF No. 140 at 6.)
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that his “position [is] that, while the six-year statute of repose may
have been in effect at the time that the subject ladder was purchased, under the plain language of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-46.1 and the legislation adopting it, his claims against the Defendant are
governed by the twelve-year statute of repose because they accrued over five years after § 146.1(1)’s effective date.” (ECF No. 140 at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that “the twelve-year
statute of repose applied in this case because the Plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until
November 20, 2014, which was after October 1, 2009, the effective date of § 1–46.1.” (ECF No.
140 at 15 (citing, e.g., Buffa v. Cygnature Constr. & Dev., Inc., No. 14CVS134, 2014 WL
5
11207652, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2014) (“[T]he Court finds that for purposes of the
application of the products liability statute of repose, this action accrued on the date that the owners
first became aware of the alleged problems in the residence as opposed to the date when the subject
windows were first purchased and installed in the residence. Therefore, the twelve (12) year statute
of repose set forth in N.C.G.S. § 1-46.1 applies to this action rather than the former N.C.G.S. § 150(a)(6).”)).) “Therefore, because Plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed on November 15, 2017, this case
was brought prior to the expiration of the twelve-year statute of repose which would have expired
at the very earliest on December 7, 2018.” (ECF No. 140 at 8.)
In its response to Plaintiff’s Motions, Tricam first asserts that because Plaintiff focused his
arguments entirely on Rule 59(e), he “waived any argument under Rule 59(a)” because he did not
“explain how any grounds for new trial apply to this case.” (ECF No. 141 at 4.) Tricam then
addresses the differences between a statute of limitation and statute of repose: “Statutes of
limitation are procedural limits that begin ‘when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues, typically
when the plaintiff is injured or discovers he or she has been injured.’ Statutes of repose are
substantive limits that begin to run at the ‘defendant’s ‘last act or omission.’’” (Id. (quoting
Christie v. Hartley Const., Inc., 766 S.E.2d 283, 286–87 (N.C. 2014)).) Based on the foregoing,
Tricam ultimately argues that Plaintiff “misstates North Carolina law when he claims that his date
of injury is relevant for purposes of determining accrual or for determining which statute of repose
applies.” (Id. at 4–5 (“‘[A]ccrual’ of a plaintiff’s claim is irrelevant to statutes of repose because
‘[t]he time of the occurrence or discovery of the plaintiff’s injury is not a factor in the operation of
a statute of repose.’” (quoting Christie, 766 S.E.2d at 287)).)
Additionally, Tricam asserts that statutes of repose confer substantive vested rights that
vest when a triggering event occurs, and those rights cannot be taken away or enlarged by a
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subsequent statute. (Id. at 5–6 (citing McCrater v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 104 S.E.2d 858,
860 (N.C. 1958)).) Moreover, “‘[t]he requirement of filing a claim within the time limited’” by a
statute of repose is “a condition precedent to [a plaintiff’s] right to compensation.” (Id. at 6
(quoting McCrater, 104 S.E.2d at 860).) “Thus, even though the General Assembly enacted a
longer statute . . . the old repose period still applied because the defendant had a vested right in the
repose period as soon as the triggering event occurred.” (Id. at 7 (citing McCrater, 104 S.E.2d at
859, 861).)
B.
The Court’s Review
At the outset, the court agrees with Tricam that Plaintiff did not provide any argument or
basis for the court to grant him a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). Therefore, the court denies
Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial. E.g., Warren v. Thompson, 224 F.R.D. 236, 239 n.7 (D.D.C.
2004) (“A trial court is not required to ‘parse through transcripts’ in an effort to identify the
grounds of a post-trial motion.” (citation omitted)).
As to Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend, the court observes that the premise of that
Motion is that the court committed clear error of law by applying a six-year statute of repose to his
claims instead of a twelve-year statute of repose. Clear error occurs when the court “is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Harvey, 532
F.3d 326, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). As expressed in the above
referenced language from the trial, the court cited to specific case law supporting its decision that
the six-year statute of repose was applicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Of particular note, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina outlined that “the statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs,
regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” Black,
325 S.E.2d at 474–75 (citation omitted). Moreover, in Cramer decided earlier this year, the United
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States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina expounded on Black and cited
extensive case law applying a “six-year statute of repose in cases where the product in question
was first purchased or delivered, as here, before October 1, 2009.” Cramer, 2021 WL 243872, at
*4.
Upon its review of the aforementioned, and after considering Plaintiff’s arguments and
case law referenced in support, the court is not persuaded that in applying the North Carolina
statute of repose, it was required to use the date Plaintiff was injured (November 20, 2014) by the
subject ladder as opposed to the manufacture (2005)/purchase (2007) date of the ladder. Therefore,
the court finds that it did not make a mistake in applying a six-year statute of repose to Plaintiff’s
negligence claims. Accordingly, the court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Plaintiff Randolph G. Castles’ Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment and Motion for New Trial. (ECF No. 140.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
November 22, 2021
Columbia, South Carolina
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