Guess v. Brown, as Richland County Administrator et al

Filing 21

ORDER adopting #16 Report and Recommendation, adding Richland County Counsel as a defendant, dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without prejudice, notifying Plaintiff of the court's intention to impose a narrow pre-filing injunction. (Show Cause Response due by 6/25/2024) Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 6/4/2024. (cbru, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Thurmond Guess, Sr.,

vs.

Civil Action No. 3:24-1797-CMC
Plaintiff,

ORDER

Leonardo Brown as Richland County
Administrator; Richland County Counsel
[sic]; Darrell Jackson, Sr.; Rose Ann English;
Alfred T. Guess; and Marjorie Guess,
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on review of Plaintiffs’ pro se Complaint. ECF No. 1. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(c), DSC, this matter was
referred to United States Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant for pre-trial proceedings and a Report
and Recommendation (“Report”).
On May 16, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”)
recommending the Complaint be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and
service of process. ECF No. 16. The Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff of the procedures and
requirements for filing objections to the Report and the serious consequences if he failed to do so.
Plaintiff filed objections on May 30, 2024. ECF No. 19.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of any portion of the Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection
is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made

by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b). The court reviews the Report only for clear error in the absence of an objection.
See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that
“in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but
instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept
the recommendation.”) (citation omitted).
The Report recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 16. Specifically, it
recommends dismissal of the Monell claim because Plaintiff has shown no policy or custom at
work here, and alleged only actions specific to his own case. Id. at 4. As for the other constitutional
claims, the Report found all individual Defendants other than Brown are private citizens and thus
are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Brown is the current County
Administrator, and as such Plaintiff alleged no facts showing Brown denied him due process on
an easement filed in 1990. Id. The Report also notes this action is duplicative of two other cases
previously filed and summarily dismissed. See Case No. 3:23-cv-2957; No. 3:23-cv-6408.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends this action be dismissed as duplicative. Id. at 6.
In his objections, Plaintiff alleges he has sufficiently pleaded the elements of an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Monell claim. ECF No. 19 at 2. He contends he warned Brown and
the County Council they were “acting under color of state law” and violating the constitution, but
Brown and the Council sent a letter they were not going to give the property back. Id. Plaintiff
also asserts the court misconstrued Monell and that he named the County Council as a Defendant,

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which was left off the Report. 1 Id. at 2-3. He also objects to the finding that this is a duplicative
action. Id. at 3.
The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge the Complaint does not set forth a viable federal
claim under § 1983. Plaintiff’s objections are overruled for the reasons stated in the Report:
Defendants other than Brown are not state actors, and he fails to state a claim against Brown under
§ 1983. Claims under Monell are restricted to municipalities and not a single actor, and Plaintiff
does not state a policy or custom at play here nor impact on anyone other than him. There are no
separate claims made against Richland County Council, and if his intention was to allege a Monell
claim against the Council, he does not identify a policy or custom that impacted him. After
reviewing the record of this matter, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge, and Plaintiff’s objections, the court adopts and incorporates the Report and
Recommendation by reference in this Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is hereby summarily
dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
In addition, the court previously warned Plaintiff that if he continued to file cases with the
same or similar allegations, a pre-filing injunction may be entered. Case No. 3:23-6408, at ECF

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The court notes this is the first time Plaintiff has clearly indicated he wishes Richland County
Council to be considered a separate Defendant from Leonardo Brown. Based on the wording and
spelling in his Complaint, the court interpreted one Defendant as “Leonardo Brown, as Richland
County Administrator, Richland County Counsel.” See ECF No. 1 at 2. Based on Plaintiff’s
assertions in his objections, it appears he intended to list two Defendants, Leonardo Brown, as
Richland County Administrator, and Richland County Council, with the same address. The court
hereby directs the clerk to separate those Defendants on the docket. However, this change does
not impact the court’s ultimate finding in this case.
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No. 19. The Magistrate Judge reiterated this in the Report as well. Federal courts may issue
prefiling injunctions when vexatious conduct hinders the court from fulfilling its constitutional
duty. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004). Before enjoining the
filing of further actions, however, the district court must afford the litigant notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 819. In determining whether a prefiling injunction is substantively
warranted, a court must weigh all the relevant circumstances, including (1) the party's history of
litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2)
whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended to harass;
(3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party's filings; and
(4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions. Id. at 819. Moreover, even if a judge, after weighing the
relevant factors, properly determines that a litigant's abusive conduct merits a prefiling injunction,
the judge must ensure that the injunction is narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances at
issue. Id. at 818.
In this case, the court finds Plaintiff has a history of filing pro se cases regarding the same
issue: the easement he alleges was fraudulently obtained back in 1990. Despite multiple court
orders explaining why his allegations are not cognizable in federal court, Plaintiff continues to file
highly similar cases – this is his third. Both Magistrate Judges and the undersigned have explained
why there is not a good faith basis for his claims. This is creating a considerable burden on the
court to continue to explain the same reasoning to Plaintiff multiple times. However, it does not
appear there is an alternative sanction that would accomplish the same end. Accordingly, the court
hereby notifies Plaintiff of its intention to impose a narrow pre-filing injunction, prohibiting him
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from filing additional cases (or additional motions to amend his Complaint in any of his previous
or current cases) regarding the same allegedly fraudulent easement in federal court. Plaintiff shall
have 21 days to respond to this notice to show cause why a pre-filing injunction should not be
granted. Failure to do so will result in the injunction being entered without further input from
Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
Senior United States District Judge

Columbia, South Carolina
June 4, 2024

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