Sturdivant v. Dale
Filing
130
ORDER AND OPINION: The Court overrules Plaintiff's objections, adopts the 125 Report and Recommendation, and incorporates it herein. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 105 ) is GRANTED with respect to the federal causes of actions. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action, this case is DISMISSED in its entirety. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 6/28/2016. (prou, )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
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Civil Action No.: 4:10-3263-BHH
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
vs.
ORDER AND OPINION
)
)
Robert Dale,
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Defendant. )
______________________________ )
Retha Pierce Sturdivant,
On December 21, 2010, Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
Defendant violated her constitutional rights during the course of her arrest on December
25, 2007, and her subsequent imprisonment.1 Plaintiff also brings state law claims for
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, and civil conspiracy. In accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., this matter was referred to
United States Magistrate Thomas E. Rogers, III, for consideration of pretrial matters. The
Magistrate Judge prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation which recommends
that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 125.) Plaintiff filed
timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 128.) For the reasons
set forth herein, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Report and Recommendation sets forth in detail the relevant facts and
standards of law, and the Court incorporates them and summarizes below only in
1
In an action filed July 23, 2014, Plaintiff brought claims against other parties for conduct arising out of the
same arrest. This separate case, however, has been dismissed in its entirety. See Pierce v. Bryant et al,
No. 4:14-cv-02927-BHH (closed May 26, 2016).
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relevant part. Plaintiff filed this matter on December 21, 2010, alleging violations of her
constitutional rights and state law claims. (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff brings suit
against Defendant under § 1983 for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment,
alleging, inter alia, that Defendant “did imprison and prosecute the Plaintiff maliciously
and without probable cause.” (Id. at 4.) She also brings a § 1983 claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment.2 (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff brings
state law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, and civil
conspiracy. (Id. at 5–6.)
On August 3, 2015, Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 105.) After consideration of the
response filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 112), the
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the motion
for summary judgment be granted with respect to the federal causes of action and that
the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of
action. (ECF No. 125.) He further recommended that the case be dismissed in its
entirety. (Id.) The Court has reviewed the objections to the Report, but finds them to be
without merit. Therefore, it will enter judgment accordingly.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility for making a final
2
Plaintiff brings this claim under the Fifth Amendment; however, as explained further below, this claim is
properly alleged under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
As always, the Court says only what is necessary to address Plaintiff’s objections against the already
meaningful backdrop of a thorough Report of the Magistrate Judge, incorporated entirely by specific
reference, herein, to the degree not inconsistent. Exhaustive recitation of law and fact exists there.
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determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976).
The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report
and Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge
or may recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). The Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only
“general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the Magistrate
Judge’s conclusions are reviewed only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
In reviewing these pleadings, the Court is mindful that Plaintiff claims to be
proceeding pro se.4 (ECF No. 122.) When dealing with a pro se litigant, the Court is
charged with liberal construction of the pleadings. See, e.g., De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330
F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). The requirement of a liberal construction does not mean,
however, that the Court can ignore a plaintiff’s clear failure to allege facts that set forth a
cognizable claim, or that the Court must assume the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact where none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir.
2012).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s filing (ECF No. 128) is nearly
identical to her response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 105).
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Plaintiff’s objections indicate they were filed by her attorney (ECF No. 128); however, given Plaintiff’s
representations to the Court, her pleadings are construed liberally.
3
Indeed, she fails to raise any arguments that would invoke de novo review. Accordingly,
the Court is tasked only with review of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions for clear error.
The Magistrate Judge first found that Plaintiff’s § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim fails on the merits and the Court agrees. Noting that Plaintiff was arrested without a
warrant and that the parties addressed false arrest rather than malicious prosecution, the
Magistrate Judge correctly found that “the proper claim is one for false arrest.” (ECF No.
125 at 5–6); see Dorn v. Town of Prosperity, 375 Fed. App’x 284, 286 (4 Cir. 2010) (“‘As
a general rule, an unlawful arrest pursuant to a warrant will be more closely analogous to
the common law tort of malicious prosecution. An arrest warrant constitutes legal
process, and it is the tort of malicious prosecution that permits damages for confinement
pursuant to legal process. On the other hand, wrongful warrantless arrests typically
resemble the tort of false arrest.’”) (quoting Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995)).
The Magistrate Judge then correctly determined that Plaintiff’s claim was barred
by the Heck doctrine because Plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest and finding for
Plaintiff on her false arrest claim would invalidate her conviction. (ECF No. 125 at 6–8);
see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1994) (“Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court
must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.”); State v. McGowan, 557 S.E.2d 657, 659 (S.C. 2001) (“[A] person may not
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be convicted of resisting arrest . . . where the underlying arrest [was] unlawful.”). In other
words, it would require the Court to negate an element of the resisting arrest conviction
by finding the underlying arrest unlawful. Because Heck bars such a claim, the
Magistrate Judge correctly found that summary judgment is appropriate on her § 1983
claim for false arrest. The Court finds no error in his analysis and conclusion.
The Magistrate Judge next found that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails on the
merits and the Court agrees. He thoughtfully recounted the evidence in the record
relating to this claim and correctly concluded that “Plaintiff fail[ed] to present sufficient
evidence to show that [Defendant’s] use of force in restraining her from leaving the
scene and then handcuffing her was unreasonable.” (ECF No. 125 at 9–11); see
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)
(“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, . . . the “reasonableness” inquiry in an
excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”). The Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge’s finding that “[t]he force used by [Defendant] was minimal, swift, and for the
purpose of preventing Plaintiff from walking away from the scene.” (Id. at 11.) See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 387 (an excessive force analysis “must embody an allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the
amount of force necessary in a particular situation”). Because Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that Defendant’s use of force was objectively unreasonable, the Court finds
that summary judgment is appropriate on her § 1983 excessive force claim.
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The Magistrate Judge next found that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for cruel and
unusual punishment fails on the merits and the Court agrees. Here, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment when he refused to allow her
to use the restroom during the traffic stop and subsequent arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)
Noting that Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that her
claim arose under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948
(4th Cir. 1987) (finding that when a plaintiff claiming cruel and usual punishment is a
pretrial detainee, “the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”). He then properly stated the applicable law and thoroughly
recounted the evidence in the record relating to this claim, ultimately finding no indication
that Defendant intended to punish Plaintiff by refusing to allow her to use the restroom.
See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (“To establish that a particular
condition or restriction of his confinement is constitutionally impermissible ‘punishment,’
the pretrial detainee must show either that it was (1) imposed with an expressed intent to
punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective,
in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.”).
The Magistrate Judge found support for his conclusions in the affidavit provided
by Defendant’s expert, Melvin Tucker (“Tucker”). (ECF No. 125 at 12.) Tucker offered
several reasons why it would be impractical and potentially dangerous for a police officer
to escort an arrestee to a restroom. (ECF No. 105-8); see Brown v. Faggart, No. 1:09CV-573, 2013 WL 316152, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Brown v.
Ewart, 517 F. App’x 134 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “enhancing the officer’s safety or the
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safety of others” is a legitimate governmental objective) (citing Robles v. Prince George’s
Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 262, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2002)). The Court finds no error in the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis and conclusion, and finds summary judgment proper on
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual punishment.
Finally, having found summary judgment proper on Plaintiff’s federal claims, the
Magistrate Judge recommended the Court decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims. (ECF No. 125 at 13–14); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Shanaghan v.
Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]rial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining
whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been
extinguished.”). The Court agrees that it would be appropriate to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction here and thereby dismisses the action in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the relevant motions, responses, and objections, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections are without merit and the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusions evince no clear error. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and by the
Magistrate Judge, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections, adopts the Report, and
incorporates it herein. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 105) is GRANTED with respect to the federal causes of actions.
Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
causes of action, this case is DISMISSED in its entirety.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
Greenville, South Carolina
June 28, 2016
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