Williams v. Horry-Georgetown Technical College

Filing 86

ORDER denying 71 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas E Rogers, III on 10/21/2013.(dsto, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
SHARON BROWN WILLIAMS,

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Plaintiff,
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-vs)
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HORRY-GEORGETOWN TECHNICAL )
COLLEGE;
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

Civil Action No.: 4:11-cv-429-RBH-TER

ORDER

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The undersigned
entered an Order (Document # 68), which, among other things, denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Protective Order, in which she asked to be relieved of the burden of being further deposed or being
questioned regarding her employment history with the Charleston County School District. The
undersigned denied Plaintiff’s Motion and ordered that Defendant was allowed an additional three
hours to conclude its deposition of Plaintiff. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider (Document # 71) that Order.
Discovery orders are “inherently interlocutory,” McCook Metals LLC v. Alcoa, Inc., 249
F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir.2001), and, thus, may be contested under Rule 54(b). See Quigley v. United
States, 865 F.Supp.2d 685, 699 (D.Md.2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54) (“[A]ny order or other
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties does not end the action ... and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities”); Crouch v.
City of Hyattsville, Md., No. DKC 09–2544, 2010 WL 4868100, at *2 (D.Md. Nov. 23, 2010)

(holding that an order dismissing some, but not all of the claims as to the parties was an interlocutory
order and not a final judgment to which a Rule 59(e) motion might apply).
A court’s discretion to review an interlocutory order is “not subject to the strict standards
applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment,” Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms,
Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir.2003), but is “within the plenary power of the Court ... to afford such
relief ... as justice requires.” Fayetteville Investors, 936 F.2d at 1473. Although Rules 59(e) and
60(b) do not govern reconsideration of an interlocutory order, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that
at least parts of those rules may guide a court's analysis. Id. at 1470, 1472; Pritchard v. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc., 3 F. App'x 52, 53 (4th Cir.2001). In considering whether to revise interlocutory
decisions, district courts in this Circuit have looked to whether movants presented new evidence,
United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 218 F.R.D. 468, 474 (M.D.N.C.2003), or whether the court has
“obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law.” Id.
In her Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff repeats the same arguments she raised in her
Motion for Protective Order. She offers no new evidence, applicable law or arguments nor does she
assert that the undersigned misapprehended her position. As such, her Motion for Reconsideration
(Document # 71) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge
October 21, 2013
Florence, South Carolina