Motsinger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 108

ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Dismiss in case 4:12-cv-02567-JMC. Signed by The Honorable J Michelle Childs on 7/3/2013. Associated Cases: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC, 4:11-cv-01734-JMC. (hcic, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
William Workman and Carlotta Motsinger, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
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Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )
Carlotta Motsinger,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

OPINION AND ORDER

Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC

Civil Action No.: 4:11-cv-01734-JMC

This matter is before the court on Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company’s (“Nationwide”) Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal [Dkt. No. 11,
Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]. Nationwide has moved for partial summary
judgment and dismissal of Plaintiffs’ tortious interference with a contractual relationship
and civil conspiracy claims, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate elements of each claim.1 For the reasons stated herein,
Nationwide’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.

1
Motsinger’s claims for bad faith and fair dealing and abuse of process are also pending
before the court.

1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 10, 2008, William Workman (“Workman”) was driving a vehicle
with passenger Carlotta Motsinger (“Motsinger,” and together with Workman,
“Plaintiffs”). The vehicle collided with another car, and that accident is the basis of the
claims. At the time of the incident, Motsinger had two active automobile insurance
policies, both underwritten by Nationwide. Motsinger subsequently filed a claim with
Nationwide and sought coverage as a Class I insured, claiming that she and Workman
were common law husband and wife at the time of the accident. See Concrete Servs.,
Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 331 S.C. 506, 509, 498 S.E.2d 865 (1998) (Class I insureds
include the named insured, and the named insured’s spouse and relatives residing in the
household.). As a Class I insured, Motsinger would also be entitled to “stack”2 all UIM
coverage available under her two Nationwide automobile insurance policies. See Id.
Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas
for Horry County seeking a determination as to the validity of Workman and Motsinger’s
common law marriage. See Summons and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment [Dkt.
No. 20-1, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. Motsinger and Workman subsequently
filed an Answer and Counterclaim, [Dkt. No. 20-2, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734JMC], arguing that the state circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine
the validity of a common law marriage. Additionally, Motsinger and Workman filed a
counterclaim, alleging that Nationwide engaged in bad faith practices by seeking a
determination as to the validity of their common law marriage, because seeking a

2
“Stacking refers to an insured’s recovery of damages under more than one insurance
policy in succession until all of his damages are satisfied or until the total limits of all
policies have been exhausted.” Nakatsu v. Encompass Indem. Co., 390 S.C. 172, 178,
700 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Moorer,
330 S.C. 46, 60, 496 S.E.2d 875, 883 (Ct. App. 1998)).

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determination delayed the processing of their claim and ultimately led to its denial. Id.
On or about May 14, 2010, the parties stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice of their
respective claims and counterclaims in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County.
Stipulation of Dismissal [Dkt. No. 52-2, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC].
On September 8, 2009, Nationwide filed a declaratory judgment action in family
court. See Summons and Complaint for Declaratory Judgement [Dkt. No. 4-2, Civil
Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]; [Dkt. No. 20-3, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734JMC]. Subsequently, Motsinger brought her own action against Workman in family
court seeking a determination that she and Workman had a common law marriage at the
time of the accident. See Summons and Complaint [Dkt. No. 20-4, Civil Action No.
4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. Upon stipulation by Motsinger and Workman, the family court
issued an order finding that the two were married at the time of the car accident at issue
here. See Stipulation and Settlement Agreement [Dkt. No. 20-5, Civil Action No. 4:11cv-01734-JMC]. Nationwide sought to intervene in the matter, citing its own pending
action before the family court. See Motion to Intervene and Motion to Vacate Order
[Dkt. No. 4-7]. Subsequently, the family court judge vacated the prior order finding a
common law marriage. The order found that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the case because there was never a justiciable or actual controversy between
Motsinger and Workman. See Family Court Order [Dkt. No. 21-8, Civil Action No.
4:11-cv-01734-JMC].
On or about September 23, 2010, Motsinger individually filed an action against
Nationwide in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, alleging that the
aforementioned conduct was evidence of bad faith in failing to resolve her claim, that

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Nationwide breached its contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing, and that
Nationwide engaged in litigation regarding the common law marriage issue that
amounted to an abuse of process. See Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 56, Civil
Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. On July 20, 2012, Workman and Motsinger jointly
filed an action against Nationwide3 in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County,
alleging that Nationwide’s conduct amounted to tortious interference with their common
law marriage and that Nationwide, along with its attorneys, conspired to disrupt their
common law marriage.

See Summons and Complaint [Dkt. No. 1-1].

Nationwide

properly removed the actions to this court based on the court’s diversity jurisdiction. See
Notice of Removal [Dkt. No. 1, Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]; [Dkt. No. 1,
Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. Nationwide subsequently filed an Answer and
Counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether a common law marriage
existed between Plaintiffs. On May 22, 2013, this court, finding that there were common
questions of law and fact, consolidated Motsinger’s action filed individually against
Nationwide with her action filed against Nationwide jointly with Workman. [Dkt. No. 26,
Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]; [Dkt. No. 97, Civil Action No.: 4:11-cv-01734JMC].
Nationwide filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal [Dkt.
No. 11, Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC], moving for partial summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ tortious interference with a contractual relationship and civil conspiracy

The initial complaint named Jennifer Barton Van Meter, a claims adjuster for
Nationwide, as a defendant. However, the parties have stipulated to dismiss the action
filed against Barton Van Meter with prejudice. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as
to Defendant Jennifer Barton Van Meter [Dkt. No. 22]. Thus, Nationwide is the only
defendant in both Actions.
3

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claims. Nationwide argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate elements of these claims.

Plaintiffs filed their

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal [Dkt. No. 12, Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv02567-JMC].
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court
considers the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, to see that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1)
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. The court is not to weigh the evidence but rather determine if there is
a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L.E.2d 202 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th
Cir. 1990). “[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.”
Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 1356, 89 L.E.2d 538 (1986)). The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the
initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.E.2d

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265 (1986). Once the movant has made his threshold demonstration, the non-moving
party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations
averred in his pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific,
material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548. Under
this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. Conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude
the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759
F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248.

“Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but an

important mechanism for weeding out claims and defenses that have no factual basis.”
Greene v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (D.S.C. 2008) (internal
quotations and bracket omitted) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327).
DISCUSSION
Nationwide moves for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ tortious
interference with a contractual relationship and civil conspiracy claims. In their motion,
Nationwide argues Plaintiffs cannot prove the elements of these claims. To prevail in a
claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship, the plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) defendant had knowledge of the
contract; (3) defendant intentionally procures the contract’s breach; (4) defendant acted
without justification; and (5) resulting damages. See Eldeco, Inc. v. Charleston Cnty. Sch.

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Dist., 372 S.C. 470, 480, 642 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2007) (citing Kinard v. Crosby, 315 S.C.
237, 240, 433 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1993)); see also Broach v. Carter, 399 S.C. 434, 441, 732
S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ct. App. 2012). The plaintiff must show an actual breach of the
contract. Eldeco, Inc., 372 S.C. at 481 (citing First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Thomas, 317
S.C. 63, 73, 451 S.E.2d 907, 913 (Ct. App. 1994)). The elements of civil conspiracy in
South Carolina are (1) the combination of two or more people; (2) for the purpose of
injuring the plaintiff; (3) which causes special damages. Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C.
555, 556-67, 633 S.E.2d 505, 511 (2006) (citing LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia,
Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E.2d 711 (1988)).
The foundation for these claims rests upon the determination of whether Plaintiffs
entered into a common law marriage. Plaintiffs allege Nationwide’s legal actions taken
to determine the status of their marriage amounted to tortious interference with the
marriage. Plaintiffs rely on the same theory in making their civil conspiracy claim.
However, the determination of whether Plaintiffs are married has not yet been made and
is a threshold factual issue. [See Dkt. No. 81, Civil Action No.: 4:11-cv-01734-JMC]
(finding that Nationwide had standing to bring a declaratory judgment action seeking a
determination as to whether Motsinger and Workman were common law married).
Accordingly, Nationwide’s motion is denied without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

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Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal [Dkt. No. 11, Civil
Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC] is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
July 3, 2013
Greenville, South Carolina

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