Motsinger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 95

OPINION AND ORDER granting (19) Motion to Consolidate Cases in case 4:12-cv-02567-JMC; granting (86) Motion to Consolidate Cases in case 4:11-cv-01734-JMC. Signed by The Honorable J Michelle Childs on 5/23/2013.Associated Cases: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC, 4:11-cv-01734-JMC(hcic, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
William Workman and Carlotta Motsinger, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________ )
Carlotta Motsinger,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC
OPINION AND ORDER

Civil Action No.: 4:11-cv-01734-JMC

This matter is before the court on Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company’s (“Nationwide”) Motion to Consolidate [Dkt. No. 19]. Nationwide argues the
action captioned William Workman and Carlotta Motsinger v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company, Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC, should be consolidated with
related action Carlotta Motsinger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Civil
Action No.: 4:11-cv-01734-JMC, (together, the “Actions”) for the purpose of trial.1
Plaintiffs William Workman (“Workman”) and Carlotta Motsinger (“Motsinger”) oppose
the Motion.

1
This order will cite docket entries from both Actions, as both are relevant to the courts
ruling on the Motion to Consolidate. Each citation is followed by the appropriate case
number.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 10, 2008, Workman was driving a vehicle in which Motsinger was
a passenger. The vehicle collided with another car, and that accident is the basis of the
Actions. At the time of the incident, Motsinger had two active automobile insurance
policies, both underwritten by Nationwide. Motsinger subsequently filed a claim with
Nationwide and sought coverage as a Class I insured, claiming that she and Workman
were common law husband and wife at the time of the accident. See Concrete Servs.,
Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 331 S.C. 506, 509, 498 S.E.2d 865 (1998) (Class I insureds
include the named insured, and the named insured’s spouse and relatives residing in the
household.). As a Class I insured, Motsinger would also be entitled to “stack”2 all UIM
coverage available under her two Nationwide automobile insurance policies. See Id.
Nationwide brought a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas
for Horry County seeking a determination as to the validity of Workman and Motsinger’s
common law marriage. See Summons and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment [Dkt.
No. 20-1, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. Motsinger and Workman subsequently
filed an Answer and Counterclaim, [Dkt. No. 20-2, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734JMC], arguing that the state circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine
the validity of a common law marriage. Additionally, Motsinger and Workman filed a
counterclaim, alleging that Nationwide engaged in bad faith practices by seeking a
determination as to the validity of their common law marriage, because such a

2
“Stacking refers to an insured’s recovery of damages under more than one insurance
policy in succession until all of his damages are satisfied or until the total limits of all
policies have been exhausted.” Nakatsu v. Encompass Indem. Co., 390 S.C. 172, 178,
700 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Moorer,
330 S.C. 46, 60, 496 S.E.2d 875, 883 (Ct. App. 1998)).

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determination delayed the processing of their claim and ultimately led to its denial. Id.
On or about May 14, 2010, the parties stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice of their
respective claims and counterclaims in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County.
Stipulation of Dismissal [Dkt. No. 52-2, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC].
On September 8, 2009, Nationwide filed a declaratory judgment action in family
court. See Summons and Complaint for Declaratory Judgement [Dkt. No. 4-2, Civil
Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]; [Dkt. No. 20-3, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734JMC]. Subsequently, Motsinger brought her own action against Workman in family
court seeking a determination that she and Workman had a common law marriage at the
time of the accident. See Summons and Complaint [Dkt. No. 20-4, Civil Action No.
4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. Upon stipulation by Motsinger and Workman, the family court
issued an order finding that the two were married at the time of the car accident at issue
here. See Stipulation and Settlement Agreement [Dkt. No. 20-5, Civil Action No. 4:11cv-01734-JMC]. Nationwide sought to intervene in the matter, citing its own pending
action before the family court. See Motion to Intervene and Motion to Vacate Order
[Dkt. No. 4-7]. As a result of the Motion to Intervene, the family court judge vacated the
prior order finding a common law marriage. The subsequent order found that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because there was never a justiciable or
actual controversy between Motsinger and Workman. See Family Court Order [Dkt. No.
21-8, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC].
On or about September 23, 2010, Motsinger individually filed an action against
Nationwide in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, alleging that the
aforementioned conduct was evidence of bad faith in failing to resolve her claim, that

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Nationwide breached its contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing, and that
Nationwide engaged in litigation regarding the common law marriage issue that
amounted to an abuse of process. See Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 56, Civil
Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC]. On July 20, 2012, Workman and Motsinger jointly
filed an action against Nationwide3 in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County,
alleging that Nationwide’s conduct amounted to tortious interference with their common
law marriage and that Nationwide, along with its attorneys, conspired to disrupt their
common law marriage.

See Summons and Complaint [Dkt. No. 1-1].

Nationwide

properly removed the Actions to this court based on the court’s diversity jurisdiction. See
Notice of Removal [Dkt. No. 1, Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]; [Dkt. No. 1,
Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-01734-JMC].
Nationwide filed the instant Motion to Consolidate [Dkt. No. 19, Civil Action
No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC], arguing that the Actions involve the same questions of law
and fact pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs filed
their Memorandum in Opposition [Dkt. No. 23, Civil Action No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]
to Nationwide’s motion, arguing that the claims involve different facts, circumstances,
and causes of action. For the reasons stated herein, Nationwide’s motion is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where actions
involve a common question of law or fact, the court may “(1) join for hearing or trial any

The initial complaint named Jennifer Barton Van Meter, a claims adjuster for
Nationwide, as a defendant. However, the parties have stipulated to dismiss Barton Van
Meter with prejudice. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Jennifer
Barton Van Meter [Dkt. No. 22]. Thus, Nationwide is the only defendant in both
Actions.
3

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or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other
orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). Courts enjoy broad
discretion to consolidate actions pending in the same district, like these Actions. See A/S
J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Const. Co., 559 F.2d 928, 933 (4th Cir. 1977).
The Actions here stem from the same series of events: after the car accident,
which was the triggering event for both Actions, Motsinger filed a claim with Nationwide
seeking status as a Class I insured, whereby Nationwide sought to determine its
obligation to pay the claim under a Class I status. In seeking to determine its obligation,
Nationwide sought a judicial declaration classifying the relationship between Motsinger
and Workman, and this litigation caused delay in payment of the claim. Motsinger and
Workman argue that Nationwide’s efforts in seeking classification of their relationship
and the subsequent delay of payment caused them injury and amounted to bad faith.
Accordingly, each Action involves common questions of law and fact including whether
Nationwide was unjustified in seeking a declaratory judgment, whether Nationwide acted
reasonably, and whether Nationwide acted in violation of the insurance contract when it
requested a court classify the relationship between Motsinger and Workman. Because
there are such common questions, the court finds that consolidation is appropriate.
Plaintiffs argue that consolidation is not appropriate here because the Actions
involve different facts, circumstances, and causes of action. [Dkt. No. 23, Civil Action
No.: 4:12-cv-02567-JMC]. Plaintiffs’ argument that the facts are significantly different is
without merit for the reasons described above. In addition, whether the Actions involve
the same theories of liability is not dispositive to the analysis on consolidation. See
Kelley v. U.S., 580 F. Supp. 2d 490, 494 (E.D. Va. 2008) (finding that a husband’s loss of

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consortium claim and a wife’s separately filed personal injury claim were appropriate for
consolidation, despite being different causes of action, because the claims stemmed from
the same event and thus contained common questions of law and fact). The critical
question is whether the actions involve a common question of law or fact, not whether the
plaintiffs have claimed the same cause of action in each action before the court. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 42(a).
The court also weighs the risks of prejudice to the parties and possible juror
confusion to determine if consolidation is proper. The court must consider the risks of
consolidation against the risks of not consolidating, which would include common factual
and legal issues being decided inconsistently, burdening the parties, witnesses and the
judiciary with multiple lawsuits, the time required to conclude several actions as opposed
to one, and the expense of conducting multiple trials as opposed to a single trial. See
Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982).

In other words,

consolidation is appropriate when to do so will “foster clarity, efficiency and the
avoidance of confusion and prejudice.” Allfirst Bank v. Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 178
F. Supp. 2d 513, 520 (citing Arnold, 681 F.2d at 192-93).
Plaintiffs in the present matter have presented no arguments on why consolidation
would prejudice them and this court can find no reason. Plaintiffs are represented by the
same attorney and the Actions require analysis of the same questions of law and fact.
Thus, prejudice would be avoided and efficiency encouraged by having a single trial
where the factual predicate for the Actions can be established once. Accordingly, the
court finds that no prejudice will result from consolidation.

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In the alternative, any

potential prejudice does not outweigh the benefit of judicial economy provided by
consolidation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Nationwide’s Motion to Consolidate [Dkt. No.
19] is GRANTED for the purpose of trial. The Clerk shall enter an amended scheduling
order reflecting the consolidation. The parties are further notified that the earliest filed
case, Carlotta Motsinger v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Civil Action No.:
4:11-cv-01734-JMC, is designated as the lead docket number for purposes of court
deadlines, including the date by which all actions must be concluded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
May 23, 2013
Florence, South Carolina

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