Martin v. Byers et al

Filing 218

ORDER finding as moot 103 Motion for Hearing; finding as moot 125 Motion for Hearing; granting 145 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 146 Motion for Hearing; finding as moot 150 Motion for a perjury judgmen t; finding as moot 160 Motion for Hearing; finding as moot 174 Motion for Sanctions; denying 178 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 201 Motion for Hearing; finding as moot 205 Motion for Sanctions; finding as moot 206 Motion for Sanctions; adopting 211 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 1/28/2014. (gcle, 1/28/14)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
ANTHONY FRED MARTIN, No.
242768,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM BYARS, et. al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:12-cv-02100-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on United States Magistrate Judge Thomas E.
Rogers, III’s report and recommendation that the court grant the motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants William Byars, Warden Michael McCall, Lieutenant Brian
DeGeorgis, Sergeant Dennis Arrowood, Officer Brandon Eich, and Officer Travis
Thurber. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the report and
recommendation, ECF No. 211, and grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
ECF No. 145. Because the court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants, it
denies plaintiff Anthony Fred Martin’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 178, and
finds that Martin’s nine remaining pending motions – five motions for a hearing, one
motion for a perjury judgment, and three motions for sanctions – are moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a South Carolina state prisoner who, during the relevant time period,
was housed in the Special Management Unit of Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”) in
Pelzer, South Carolina.

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A. Factual Allegations
Because defendants have moved for summary judgment, the court construes the
facts in the light most favorable to Martin. On December 20, 2011, during a routine
inspection of Martin’s cell, Martin alleges that defendant Arrowood became sexually
aroused and masturbated in front of Martin. While Arrowood’s masturbation “subjected
[Martin] to the spirit of homosexuality against [his] will,” Arrowood neither touched
Martin nor made any sexual comments during the incident. 2d Am. Compl. Ex. 2 at 5.
Martin contends that defendants Thurber and Eich participated in this inspection of
Martin’s cell, but did not stop Arrowood’s behavior. Id. at 3-5. Martin further alleges
that, on December 31, 2011, Arrowood gave Martin a menacing look and defendant
DeGeorgis sang both the theme song to the 1980s television show The Dukes of Hazzard
as well as the chorus of a song called “I’ve Got Friends in High Places.” Id. at 7. During
this incident, DeGeorgis allegedly referred to himself as “Luce Boot Dingleberry.” Id.
On January 4, 2012, Arrowood allegedly stood outside Martin’s cell door and
masturbated. Even after Arrowood, DeGeorgis, Thurber, and others were reassigned to
other parts of the prison, “officers who worked on the night shift would still come by the
cell door masturbating themselves while [Martin] slept.” Id. at 9. According to Martin,
“the acts of masturbation continued” even when he was moved to a different part of the
prison. Id. On March 12, 2012, Arrowood returned as the night shift supervisor of a
dormitory within the Special Management Unit.
B. Procedural History
Martin filed a second amended civil complaint against Arrowood and other PCI
officers, as well as former PCI warden Michael McCall and former South Carolina

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Department of Corrections director William Byars on February 7, 2013, seeking relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. § 1983 imposes civil liability on state actors who deprive
United States citizens of their constitutional rights. The second amended complaint
alleges that Arrowood and others violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment by sexually assaulting Martin and acting with deliberate
indifference to him. 2d Am. Compl. Ex. 2 at 4. The second amended complaint also
states that Martin “raises” the issue of “conspiracy.” Id.
Defendants answered the second amended complaint on February 13, 2013. On
April 22, 2013, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Martin filed his own
motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2013.1 The matter was referred to the
magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation (“the R&R”) on November 7,
2013, recommending that the court grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
deny Martin’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the magistrate judge
recommended that Martin had not exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“the PLRA”) and so defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Martin’s § 1983 claims. The magistrate judge also recommended that,
regardless of the exhaustion issue, defendants would still be entitled to summary
judgment because Martin cannot show that the conditions of his confinement amount to
cruel and unusual punishment or any other type of constitutional violation.
On November 18, 2013, Martin filed an objection to the R&R. Defendants
replied to Martin’s objection on December 5, 2013 and Martin filed a sur-reply on
December 16, 2013. The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for the court’s review.
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Martin has filed a number of other motions, nine of which remain pending. These motions are
best described as discovery-related.
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s report to which specific, written objections are made, and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that report. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The magistrate judge’s recommendation does not carry presumptive
weight, and it is the responsibility of this court to make a final determination. Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). A party’s failure to object may be treated as
agreement with the conclusions of the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 150 (1985).
Martin appears pro se in this case. Federal district courts are charged with
liberally construing complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a
potentially meritorious case. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). The
requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure
in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim, nor does it mean the
court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the ECF of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will
not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary

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judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
Like his pleadings in this case, Martin’s objections are difficult to parse. While
he makes several arguments related to the discovery motions he has filed with the court,
his sole objection to the R&R appears to be that “the magistrate has failed to make a
report and recommendation on the issue of conspiracy.” Pl.’s Objections 1.
Though the court need only address the objection that Martin now raises, it briefly
touches on two of the magistrate judge’s recommendations: (1) Martin failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit; and (2) Martin’s allegations, if true,
do not amount to a constitutional violation. First, Martin’s claims are undoubtedly
procedurally barred. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“the PLRA”) requires that a
prisoner exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action in federal
court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The South Carolina Department of Corrections requires
that a prisoner file a Step 1 grievance form within fifteen days of the alleged incident.
Ann Hallman Aff. ¶ 3. If the prisoner’s grievance is not resolved, he may file a Step 2
grievance form within five days of the receipt of the warden’s response to the Step 1
grievance form. Id. ¶ 4. In this case, Martin filed a Step 1 grievance form on December
29, 2011, within fifteen days of the initial alleged incident with Arrowood. 2d Am.
Compl. Ex. 4. When the form was returned to him, Martin’s Step 1 grievance form was
returned to him as incomplete because he did include information regarding any informal
attempts he made to resolve his grievance. Id. Martin has presented no evidence that he

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re-filed his Step 1 grievance form, or that he filed a Step 2 grievance form regarding the
alleged incidents that form the basis of his lawsuit. Moreover, the PLRA explains that
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the
commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e). A “sexual act” requires penetration of some sort. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2246. Martin has not alleged either that he was physically injured or that any sexual act
occurred. As the magistrate judge recommended, Martin’s claims are procedurally
barred. Second, Martin’s claims would still fail, even if they were not procedurally
barred, because he does not allege any facts that would rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (explaining that
only “extreme deprivations” and deliberate indifference to “serious” medical needs will
substantiate Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference or conditions-of-confinement
claims); Catoe v. York Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 13-cv-01655, 2013 WL 4499455, at *3
(D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (collecting cases).
What remains to be considered is Martin’s objection that the magistrate judge did
not sufficiently address the conspiracy issue raised in the second amended complaint.
The Fourth Circuit has explained that “[t]o establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983,
Appellants must present evidence that the Appellees acted jointly in concert and that
some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in Appellants'
deprivation of a constitutional right.” Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th
Cir. 1996). A plaintiff seeking to show civil conspiracy under the South Carolina
common law must show the following three elements: “(1) the combination of two or
more people, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes special
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damages.” Pye v. Estate of Fox, 633 S.E.2d 505, 511 (S.C. 2006). A plaintiff seeking to
prove common law conspiracy must also show that he has suffered damages as a result of
a conspiracy that go beyond the damages he has alleged in his other causes of action. Id.
(“Because the quiddity of a civil conspiracy claim is the damage resulting to the plaintiff,
the damages alleged must go beyond the damages alleged in other causes of action.”).
The court cannot fault the magistrate judge for failing to address the “conspiracy
issue” as that issue was not clearly pleaded as a claim in any of Martin’s complaints. To
the extent that Martin has pleaded a conspiracy cause of action – whether it be a claim for
§ 1983 conspiracy or for common law conspiracy – that claim fails. Martin has not
shown any overt acts carried out by the purported co-conspirators that would justify a
conspiracy claim under § 1983. In a similar vein, Martin has not alleged that the alleged
conspiracy caused him any damages that exceed the damages he suffered from
defendants’ other alleged bad acts. Even if Martin had brought a claim for conspiracy,
summary judgment in favor of defendants would still be appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s R&R,
ECF No. 211, and GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 145.
Because the court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants, it DENIES
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 178, and FINDS AS MOOT
plaintiff’s remaining motions for a hearing, for sanctions, and for a perjury judgment,
ECF Nos. 103, 125, 146, 150, 160, 174, 201, 205, and 206.

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AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 28, 2014
Charleston, South Carolina

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