Jordan v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 29

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The court adopts the Report and Recommendation, and the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 3/24/2014. (gnan )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
Natalie Rose Jordan,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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)
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of
)
Social Security,1
)
)
Defendant.
)
__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 4:12-2278-TMC

ORDER

The plaintiff, Natalie Rose Jordan (“Jordan”), brought this action pursuant to the Social
Security Act (“SSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying her claim for Social Security
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil
Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), DSC, this matter was referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial handling.
Now before this court is the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”),
recommending that the court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 22.)2 In the Report,
the magistrate judge sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which are incorporated here
by reference. Jordan has filed objections to the Report (ECF No. 25) and the Commissioner has
responded to those objections (ECF No. 27). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for review.

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on February 14, 2012.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Colvin should be substituted for Michael J. Astrue.

2

The magistrate judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final
determination remains with the United States District Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The
court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is
made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate
judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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Jordan filed her DIB application on March 17, 2009, alleging disability due to an elbow
injury, von Willebrand’s disease, arthritis, and an enlarged heart. Her application was denied at
all administrative levels and upon reconsideration. On October 21, 2010, an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) heard testimony from Jordan and a vocational expert (“VE”) regarding her alleged
disability. Subsequently, the ALJ issued a decision denying Jordan’s claim.
Specifically, the ALJ found that Jordan suffered from the severe impairments of lateral
epicondylitis, derangement of the elbow, and back strain, but that the alleged severity of the
symptoms was not credible. As a result, the ALJ found that Jordan should be limited to light
work with certain additional restrictions, including only occasional use of her right arm, and that
she could return to her past work as a cashier. The Appeals Council denied Jordan’s request for
review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Jordan now seeks judicial
review of that decision in this court.
Jordan’s objections to the Report restate her original arguments on appeal. Specifically,
Jordan asserts that the ALJ improperly concluded that she could return to her past relevant work
as a cashier because the cashier position requirements conflict with her RFC.3 The Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) states that a cashier II position requires reaching, handling, and
fingering frequently. See DOT § 211.462-010, 1991 WL 671840. However, the ALJ limited
Jordan to only occasional use of her right arm.
An ALJ may use the DOT and VE testimony to determine whether a claimant can return
to previous employment. However, the VE’s testimony should be consistent with the DOT and,
if it is not, the VE must provide a reasonable explanation for the conflict. See Social Security

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Jordan also objects to the Report’s finding that the ALJ properly considered her impairments in combination.
However, the court agrees with the Report’s analysis of that issue and so will not discuss it further here.

2 

Ruling 00-4p. In addition, the ALJ has a duty to ask the VE if her testimony is consistent with
the DOT. Id.
In this case, the ALJ complied with his duty. He asked the VE at the beginning of her
testimony to explain any inconsistencies between her testimony and the DOT and the VE said
that she would. The ALJ then posed a hypothetical that accounted for all of Jordan’s symptoms,
including the limitation of occasional use of the right upper extremity. Even with this limitation,
the VE responded that Jordan could return to her past work as a cashier. The DOT description
does not say explicitly if a cashier must use one or both arms frequently, but after providing an
adequate hypothetical and asking the VE to explain any inconsistencies, the ALJ is entitled to
rely on the VE’s testimony. See Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.
Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that testimony elicited by hypotheticals
adequately relating all of claimant’s impairments may constitute substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s decision). Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Jordan could
return to her past work as a cashier is supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, after a thorough de novo review of the record, the court adopts the Report and its
recommended disposition. Therefore, for the reasons set out above and in the Report, the
Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Anderson, South Carolina
March 24, 2014

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