Oneill v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
ORDER: The Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees in the amount of $4,249.34 is GRANTED. (Doc. #29). Signed by Chief Judge Terry L Wooten on 2/26/2015.(gnan )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
Case No. 4:13-cv-00154-TLW
On October 5, 2014, Plaintiff Josette Oneill brought a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant
to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on the basis that the
Commissioner’s position in this action was not substantially justified. (Doc. #29). The motion
seeks reimbursement for representation in the above-captioned matter in the amount of
$4,249.341 (representing $183.75 per hour for 11.25 hours of work by her attorney and $91.88
per hour for 23.75 hours of work by paralegals). Plaintiff also submitted a signed affidavit
assigning her fee award to her attorney. The Commissioner filed a response on October 20,
2014, stating that she does not object to Plaintiff’s motion and that she would accept the
assignment and pay the fees directly to Plaintiff’s counsel if it is shown that, at the time of this
Order, Plaintiff owes no offset-qualifying debt to the government. (Doc. #30).
Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in certain civil
actions against the United States unless the court finds that the government’s position was
Plaintiff’s motion actually requests $4,258.34 in compensation. However, this appears to be a
typographical error. Plaintiff correctly states that the total compensation for her attorney’s time
is $2,067.19, and the total compensation for the paralegals’ time is $2,182.15. It seems that she
simply erred in adding the two figures together.
substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C.
To determine whether the Commissioner was “substantially justified” in
terminating social security benefits and thus whether an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA
is warranted, the Court asks whether there was arguably substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s position. Anderson v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1984).
An award of fees or costs under the EAJA is payable to the party rather than to the
attorney. Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2524 (2010). However, nothing in Ratliff divests
the Commissioner of her discretion to pay the party’s attorney directly where there is no debt
owed to the government or funds remain after satisfaction of such debt, and the party has
assigned the award to counsel. See, e.g., Walker v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-960-TFM, 2011 WL
1297744, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2011) (“While Ratliff generally confirms that attorney’s fee
awards under the EAJA are payable to the ‘prevailing party’—the litigant—and are thus subject
to offset any debt owed by such litigant to the United States, the opinion does not explicitly
reject the practice of awarding fees to attorneys where the litigant has assigned the right to
receive such fees directly.”).
After careful consideration of the filings by the parties, the Court concludes that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified and that the requested fees should be
awarded. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees in
the amount of $4,249.34 is GRANTED. (Doc. #29). If the Commissioner determines that
Plaintiff owes no offset-qualifying debt to the government on the date of entry of this Order, the
Commissioner may honor Plaintiff’s signed assignment of fees to her counsel.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Terry L. Wooten
Terry L. Wooten
Chief United States District Judge
February 26, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina
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