Dawson v. Bush et al

Filing 124

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 112 Report and Recommendation and granting 83 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 59 Motion for New Trial; finding as moot 96 Motion for Relief from Judgment; denying 107 Motion for Default Judgment. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 2/19/15.(elim, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
WILLIAM DOUGLAS DAWSON, JR.,
#248371,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ASS. WARDEN DENNIS BUSH;
)
WARDEN LARRY CARTLEDGE; and
)
ASS. WARDEN FLORENCE MAUNEY, )
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Defendants.
)
)

No. 4:13-cv-02236-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Thomas E. Rogers, III’s
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that this court grant the motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants Associate Warden Dennis Bush (“Bush”), Warden Larry
Cartledge (“Cartledge”), and Associate Warden Florence Mauney (“Mauney”) (hereafter
“defendants”) and deny plaintiff William Douglas Dawson’s (“Dawson”) motion for
default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R in full and
grants summary judgment as to all defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
Dawson is an inmate currently housed at the Lee Correctional Institution (“LCI”)
within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). Prior to his transfer to
LCI and at all times relevant to Dawson’s allegations, he was housed at the Perry
Correctional Institution (“PCI”). Dawson alleges that on July 30, 2012, Bush, then a
major, “placed [his] life and safety in mortal danger” when he restrained Dawson in
handcuffs before escorting him out of the wing after a large fight occurred in the wing.

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2d. Am. Compl. 3. Dawson alleges that Bush should have either escorted him off the
wing before placing him in handcuffs or put the wing on lock down. Id. at 4. Dawson
alleges that Bush “was purposefully trying to have [him] assaulted or even killed.” Id.
Dawson then claims that he tried to address the issue with Cartledge and Mauney but that
both defendants ignored him. Id. at 5. Dawson alleges that he was placed in lock-up to
serve disciplinary detention (“DD time”) that evening where he remained without cause.
Id.
Dawson filed the present action on August 19, 2013 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Bush, Cartledge, and Mauney violated his constitutional rights under the
First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 6. Specifically, Dawson alleges
that Bush put his life in serious danger and that Cartledge denied him the freedom of
association. Id. Dawson further alleges that Cartledge and Mauney discriminated against
him and violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by placing him in
disciplinary detention for no reason and refusing to return him to general population
while releasing other inmates. Id. Dawson seeks injunctive relief as well as money
damages.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on May 23, 2014. Dawson
responded on July 9, 2014. On July 28, 2014, Dawson filed a motion for default
judgment against defendants for failure to comply with United States Magistrate Judge
Bristow Marchant’s ruling on Dawson’s motion to compel. The magistrate judge issued
the R&R on defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Dawson’s motion for default
judgment on August 22, 2014, recommending that the court grant defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and deny Dawson’s motion for default judgment. Dawson filed

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objections to the R&R on September 10, 2014. This matter is now ripe for the court’s
review.
II. STANDARD
A. Objections to Report and Recommendation
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s report to which specific, written objections are made, and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that report. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The magistrate judge’s recommendation does not carry presumptive
weight, and it is the responsibility of this court to make a final determination. Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). A party’s failure to object may be treated as
agreement with the conclusions of the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 150 (1985).
B. Pro Se Plaintiff
Dawson appears pro se in this case. Federal district courts are charged with
liberally construing complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a
potentially meritorious case. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). The
requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure
in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim, nor does it mean the
court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
C. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will
not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary
judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
Dawson objects to the R&R on twelve grounds. Because Dawson’s objections
are repetitive and overlapping, the court condenses Dawson’s list into six broad
objections but will address each specific objection within the relevant section below.
Dawson asserts that the magistrate judge erred in: (1) finding that there was no violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights; (2) finding that the PLRA requirements apply to the
SCDC’s grievance procedure and that he failed to meet the exhaustion requirements; (3)
finding that Dawson never filed a grievance regarding his equal protection rights; (4)
finding that Dawson was not held illegally without cause; (5) finding that defendants
were not in default because the court granted an extension; and (6) finding that there was
no violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court will address each objection
in turn.
A. Eighth Amendment Violations
Dawson first objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that he has failed to state an
Eighth Amendment violation. Pl.’s Objections 1.1 The Eighth Amendment “protects

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Dawson specifically objected to the magistrate judge’s finding on page 4, line 11. Pl.’s Objections 1.
However, page 4, line 11 of the R&R does not reflect the magistrate judge’s findings but rather is an

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inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). The guarantees of the Eighth Amendment
extend to protect inmates “from physical harm at the hands of fellow inmates resulting
from the deliberate or callous indifference of prison officials to specific known risks of
such harm.” Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Davis v.
Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979)). The same standard that courts apply to
denial of medical care claims, deliberate indifference, is applied to failure to protect
claims. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that a
failure to protect claim “is no different in any meaningful respect from the indifferent-tomedical-needs claim and is governed by the same standard of deliberate indifference”).
The Supreme Court has stated:
[W]e see no significant distinction between claims alleging inadequate
medical care and those alleging inadequate “conditions of confinement.”
Indeed, the medical care a prisoner receives is just as much a “condition”
of his confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the
temperature he is subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is afforded
against other inmates. There is no indication that, as a general matter, the
actions of prison officials with respect to these nonmedical conditions are
taken under materially different constraints than their actions with respect
to medical conditions.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).
“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence
will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding that deliberate indifference requires “more
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety”). Under the
deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff must satisfy both a subjective and an objective

outline of the defendants’ argument. Therefore, the court will address the objection more generally as it
applies to the magistrate judge’s actual findings.

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component to show the violation of a constitutional right. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,
241 (4th Cir. 2008). The objective component requires a prisoner to “demonstrate a
substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s exposure to the
challenged conditions.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). “The
subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of
confinement is satisfied by a showing of deliberate indifference by prison officials.” Id.
Deliberate indifference “requires that a prison official actually know of and disregard an
objectively serious condition.” Id.
The magistrate judge found that Dawson failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies regarding his Eighth Amendment claims. The magistrate judge further found
that, even if Dawson had exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his Eighth
Amendment violations, his claim fails because Dawson “has failed to produce any
evidence sufficient to satisfy either the objective or subjective prongs of the Eighth
Amendment analysis.” R&R 7. Dawson alleges that Bush intentionally subjected him to
a serious risk that he would be killed when he handcuffed him in his cell prior to
escorting him out of the wing while other inmates were not on lock-down. Dawson has
failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy either subjective or objective component of
deliberate indifference. Although Dawson claims that he could have been killed by other
inmates, Dawson does not allege that he actually suffered any injury at all. Further, there
is no indication that Dawson was actually under an objective risk of harm. According to
Dawson’s complaint, Bush handcuffed him while he was in his cell and told other
prisoners in the yard to step back while he escorted him out of the wing. Therefore, the

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court adopts the magistrate judge’s finding that Dawson has failed to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation.
B. Prison Litigation Reform Act
Dawson next objects to the magistrate judge’s findings that the PLRA applies to
the grievance procedure and that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding
his Eighth Amendment claims. Pl.’s Objections 1–2. Under § 1997e(a) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) “no action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Fourth Circuit has
held that an administrative remedy is not considered “available” if a prisoner was
prevented from availing himself of it through no fault of his own and that a “a prisoner
has exhausted his available remedies, even if prison employees do not respond.” Moore
v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). “[T]o exhaust administrative remedies,
the PLRA requires only ‘[c]ompliance with prison grievance procedures.’” Id. at 726
(quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217 (2007)). South Carolina courts hold that
exhaustion requires completion of Step 2 of the SCDC grievance procedure; however,
prisoners are not required to appeal the decision of the prison’s internal grievance board
to the Administrative Law Court. See, e.g., Ayre v. Currie, No. 05-3410, 2007 WL
3232177, at *7 n.5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007) (“The fact that the South Carolina Legislature
made a court available . . . does not alter the federal PLRA by extending its
administrative exhaustion requirement to include exhaustion in all state judicial

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forums.”); Charles v. Ozmint, No. 05-2187, 2006 WL 1341267, at *4 (D.S.C. May 15,
2006). It is clear that the PLRA applies to Dawson’s grievances.
Dawson next objects to the magistrate judge’s findings that he failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies regarding his Eighth Amendment claims. Pl.’s Objections 1–
2.2 In Dawson’s Step 1 grievance, received on August 1, 2012, he stated that on July 30,
2012, Bush put his health and life in danger by placing him in handcuffs while he was in
his cell before escorting him off the wing. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 3. Cartledge responded to the
first grievance on June 27, 2013, stating that based on the information Dawson provided,
the grievance was without merit. Id. Dawson submitted a Step 2 grievance on July 1,
2013, stating that Bush was “trying to get one of these inmates to kill me while I was in
restraints.” Id. It is unclear whether prison staff actually responded to Dawson’s Step 2
grievance; however, as stated above, “a prisoner has exhausted his available remedies,
even if prison employees do not respond.” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Therefore, Dawson
exhausted his remedies regarding his Eighth Amendment claims as required under the
PLRA.
Although the magistrate judge incorrectly found that Dawson failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies regarding his Eighth Amendment claims, as discussed above, the
magistrate judge also addressed the merits of his Eighth Amendment claims. Because the
court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings regarding Dawson’s Eighth Amendment
claims and held that Dawson failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the subjective or

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Although Dawson does not specifically object to the magistrate judge’s exhaustion findings as they relate
to his Eighth Amendment claims, he does object to the magistrate judge’s conclusions regarding exhaustion
generally. See Pl.’s Obj. 1–2. Because the magistrate judge found that Dawson met the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirements regarding all claims except his Eighth Amendment allegations, the court will only
address exhaustion as it applies to Dawson’s Eighth Amendment claims.

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objective components of the deliberate indifference test, it is irrelevant whether Dawson
met the exhaustion requirements under the PLRA.3
C. Due Process
Dawson objects to numerous findings in the R&R regarding his confinement in
lock-up for DD time. Dawson specifically objects to the magistrate judges findings that
(1) Dawson is currently housed at LCI despite the fact that he has unserved DD time; (2)
he covered the window in his cell, arguing that it was his cell mate who covered the
window; (3) there is no rule that requires prison staff to return inmates to general
population if they have two years or less of DD time; (4) his confinement did not violate
his due process rights, nor was he discriminated against in violation of his equal
protection rights for his confinement; (5) Cartledge’s decision to keep him in lock-up was
within his discretion; and (6) Dawson’s liberty was not taken without cause.
Prisoners are entitled to constitutional protections; however, those rights are
limited in comparison to the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a
criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings
does not apply.”). Minimum procedural protections are required when a prisoner may be
deprived of a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d
171, 181 (4th Cir. 2012). The required minimum protections are: (1) advance written
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Dawson next objects to what he believes is the magistrate judge’s finding that Dawson failed to file a
grievance regarding equal protection. Pl.’s Obj. 2 (referencing page 6 line 25 of the R&R). However,
Dawson points to the defendants’ argument recognized in the R&R and not the magistrate judge’s own
findings. In fact, the magistrate judge found that “it appears Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative
remedies with regard to the allegations associated with DD which also raised allegations of
discrimination/equal protection violation.” R&R 8. The magistrate judge found that although Dawson
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his Eighth Amendment claims, Dawson did properly
exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his discrimination and due process claims. The magistrate
judge then addressed the merits of Dawson’s equal protection and due process claims. See R&R 8–14.
Therefore, Dawson’s objection fails.

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notice of the disciplinary hearing; (2) an opportunity to present evidence and call
witnesses on his behalf, unless doing so would be hazardous to institutional safety and
correctional goals; and (3) receipt of a written statement of the factfinder as to the
evidence used in their determination and the reason for the disciplinary action. Brown v.
Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 504–05 (4th Cir. 2004). In the prison context, “there must be
mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution that are of general application.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
Dawson’s first two objections regarding his DD time are to page 9 lines 6, 7, and
9 of the R&R. Pl.’s Objections 3. However, his objection actually relates to the
defendants’ argument and not the magistrate judges findings. R&R 9. Dawson next
objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that there is no prison policy requiring prison
officials to return inmates to general population once they have less than two years DD
time remaining. Pl.’s Objections 3. Although Dawson alleges that he was told numerous
times that he had to have less than two years DD time to be released from lock-up, he
provides no evidence of a prison policy to that effect. Rather, the evidence shows that it
is within the discretion of the warden whether to return the inmate to general population
when they have unserved DD time. See Mauney Aff. ¶ 3; Cartledge Aff. ¶ 3.
Dawson next objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that Cartledge and Mauney
did not violate his due process rights. Dawson alleges that Mauney and Cartledge
violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by refusing to return him to
general population without providing him a hearing or notice of why he was being kept in
lock-up. Pl.’s Objections 4. The evidence shows that prison officials told Dawson on
numerous occasions why he was being kept in lock-up, each time referencing Dawson’s

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continuous disciplinary issues. See Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 1. Prison officials responded to each
grievance and staff request Dawson filed relating to his time in lock-up. See id. In
response to his Step 1 grievance, Cartledge stated:
It is true that you did not receive a charge when the investigation was
complete however it was my choice to re-instate the DD time you have
previously earned. You have been convicted of 116 charges during your
incarceration and currently have DD time until 04-18-15. At this point
you are 13 months disciplinary free however 1 of the disciplinary
convictions in april [sic] 2012 was a class 1 Narcotics charge and the other
a class 2 for Threaening [sic] Staff. Based on this information and your
history while incarcerated your grievance denied [sic].
Defs.’ Reply Ex. 1. Dawson continued to file grievances relating to the same issue. See
Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 1. The evidence shows that Dawson was returned to lock-up to serve DD
time he previously accrued after he threatened his cell mate and refused to uncover his
cell window. Cartledge’s decision to keep Dawson in lock-up in light of his disciplinary
record was a legitimate exercise of his discretion as warden. Therefore, Dawson failed to
establish a due process violation.
D. Equal Protection
Dawson next objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that he failed to establish
an equal protection violation. Pl.’s Objections 3–4. “[W]hile a prisoner does not forfeit
his constitutional right to equal protection by the fact he has been convicted of a crime
and imprisoned, prisoner claims under the equal protection clause . . . must still be
analyzed in light of the special security and management concerns in the prison system.”
Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2001). “To succeed on an equal
protection claim, a prisoner must first show that he was treated differently from others
who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment resulted from intentional or
purposeful discrimination.” Daye v. Rubenstein, 417 F. App’x 317, 318 (4th Cir. 2011).
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After the prisoner makes such a showing, the prisoner “must allege facts that, if ‘true,
would demonstrate that disparate treatment lacks justification under the requisite level of
scrutiny.’” Id. at 318–19 (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002)).
“When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Hause v. Vaught, 993
F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
Courts apply a four-part test to determine whether a prison policy is constitutional:
(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the policy and the
penological interest; (2) whether an alternative means of exercising the
right remains open to prison inmates; (3) the impact accommodation of the
asserted right will have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of
prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives that fully
accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological
interests.
Morrison, 239 F.3d at 655.
Dawson alleges that defendants Cartledge and Mauney violated his equal
protection rights by refusing to release him back into general population for no reason,
while allowing other inmates with less than 2 years DD time remaining to leave lock-up.
The magistrate judge found that Dawson “has offered nothing outside of the conclusory
statements that his equal protection rights have been violated . . . and fails to show a
violation of his equal protection rights.” R&R 12. Although Dawson alleges that
Cartledge told him that he would be released once he had less than two years DD time,
there is no evidence of a prison policy that requires inmates to be returned to general
population at that time. Mauney Aff. ¶ 3; Cartledge Aff. ¶ 3. Rather, it is within
Cartledge’s discretion whether to keep an inmate serving DD time for prison infractions
in lock-up. Cartledge Aff. ¶ 2. Dawson has DD time until February 7, 2015 for various

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prison infractions. Mauney Aff. ¶ 3; Cartledge Aff. ¶ 2. Specifically, prison officials
returned Dawson to DD time after an incident during which Dawson’s cell window was
covered and neither Dawson nor his cellmate complied with orders to uncover the
window. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 6. Further, Dawson threatened to beat up his cellmate. Defs.’
Mot. Ex. 7. Both events are outlined in incident reports. Defs.’ Mot Ex. 6, Ex. 7.
Dawson filed numerous grievances relating to his time in lock-up. See Pl.’s Resp.
Ex. 1. On September 25, 2012, Mauney told Dawson that “[y]ou have disciplinary
detention until 02/24/21 unless you get additional charges and acquire more” and that
Mauney “will release people to the yard starting with those who have the least amount of
time unless there are other reasons to hold them in lock-up . . . but right now beds on the
yard are very few and there are many ahead of you.” Id. at 3. Dawson continued to file
essentially the same grievance and was told that he continued to have disciplinary issues
that were not helping his efforts to be returned to the general population, referencing his
last disciplinary issue on April 12, 2012 for use and possession of narcotics. See id. at 48. On October 22, 2012, Robert Ward, Deputy Director of Operations at PCI, sent
Dawson a letter in response to a staff request concerning Dawson’s time in lock-up. Id.
at 9. Ward stated that:
Your records indicate that you were previously afforded the opportunity to
be released back into general population as long as you maintained
behavior consistent with inmates housed in general population and didn’t
get into further trouble. Then you were placed under “investigation,” and
even though no new charges were brought against you, your behavior
clearly indicated that general population is not the place for you at this
time.

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Id. Dawson continued to file grievances concerning his time in lock-up, but the
grievances were returned as duplicates because the grievance policy allows inmates to
submit only one grievance per circumstance. Id. at 12.
Dawson has failed to show that he was treated differently than similarly situated
inmates and that his unequal treatment resulted from intentional discrimination as
required to establish an equal protection violation. Although Dawson claims that other
inmates with less than two years DD time were released into the general population,
Mauney explained to Dawson that the first inmates released are those with the least
amount of time and that space in general population was limited. See Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 1 at
3. Further, the incident reports provide evidence of Dawson’s disciplinary issues and
support Cartledge and Mauney’s decision that he remain in lock-up. Therefore, even if
Dawson establishes an equal protection violation, Mauney and Cartledge satisfy the
rational basis level of scrutiny.
E. Default Judgment
Dawson objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that Dawson’s motion for
default judgment should be denied because defendants complied with the court’s order
after an extension was granted. Pl.’s Obj. 5-6. Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows the court clerk to enter default against a defendant who fails to plead or
otherwise defend. The law disfavors default judgments and favors resolution of claims
on their merits. 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2681 (3d ed. 1998). Nevertheless, “[i]t is well established that the district
court has the authority to dismiss or to enter default judgment, depending on which party
is at fault, for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence or to comply with its orders

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or rules of procedure.” Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th
Cir. 1968). This power “is one inherent in the courts in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice [and] may be exercised sua sponte under proper circumstances.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 614
(2d Cir. 1964); Singapore Tong Teik PTE Ltd v. Coppola, No. 04-cv-3440, 2007 WL
2375796, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2007); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Spencer, No.
10-cv-0004, 2011 WL 39089, at *1 (W.D. Va. Jan. 5. 2001).
On July 28, 2014, Dawson filed a motion for default judgment against defendants.
Dawson claims that the defendants failed to comply with Judge Rogers’ order granting
Dawson’s motion to compel. Dawson alleges that defendants were required to produce
certain documents within five days of the order, but failed to do so. On July 9, 2014,
Judge Rogers did order defendants to produce certain documents responsive to Dawson’s
production requests within 5 days. However, defendants filed a motion for extension of
time on July 14, 2014, requesting 4 additional days to produce the documents. The
magistrate judge granted defendants’ motion on August 1, 2014, giving defendants until
July 18, 2014 to produce the documents.
Defendants provided a letter from their attorney addressed to Dawson dated
August 19, 2014. The letter stated that the materials were sent to Dawson on July 18 in
compliance with the court order. However, the lawyer notified Dawson that “[t]oday I
received them back in a damaged condition with a note from the post office that they
were inadvertently damaged by the Postal Service. I apologize for the inconvenience and
am mailing the materials to you on the same day I received notice that the materials had
not been delivered.” Defs.’ Reply to Mot. to Compel. Thus, the magistrate judge

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recommended the court deny Dawson’s motion for default judgment, finding that
defendants did comply with his order.
The evidence shows that defendants did comply with the order on the motion to
compel and served Dawson by mail on July 18, 2014, the fourth day provided in the
court’s four-day extension. Dawson did not receive the documents because the Postal
Service returned them to defendants. However, defendants re-sent the documents on the
same day explaining the problem. Thus, the court adopts the magistrate judge’s
recommendation that Dawson’s motion for default judgment be denied because the
evidence shows that defendants complied with the order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s R&R in full,
and GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment. All remaining pending motions are MOOT.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 19, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina

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