Peirce v. Bryant et al
Filing
51
OPINION AND ORDER: The Defendant Woods' motion to dismiss is DENIED.(ECF No. 6 .) Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 9/17/2015.(prou, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FLORENCE DIVISION
) Civil Action No.: 4:14-2927-BHH
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Plaintiff, )
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v.
)
OPINION AND ORDER
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Off. Charles Bryant, Chief Randy Rizzo,
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Charlene Taylor, Josephine Isom, Donnell )
Thompson, Earline Evans Woods, and
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Tracy Edge,
)
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Defendants. )
__________________________________ )
Retha Peirce,
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Earline Evans Woods’ Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF No. 6.) In her complaint, the plaintiff asserts causes of action for (1)
Violation of Fourth Amendment Prosecution (42 USC § 1983); (2) Violation of Fourth
Amendment (42 USC § 1983); (3) Malicious Prosecution; (4) Abuse of Process; (5)
Defamation; (6) Civil Conspiracy; and (7) Violation of First Amendment Free Speech (42
USC § 1983). (ECF No.1-1.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff was the mayor of the town of Atlantic Beach. (Compl. ¶ 6.) The plaintiff
contends that the defendants conspired together to have her removed from office. Id. ¶ 7.
Specifically, it is alleged that the defendants agreed and planned to have her pretextually
arrested. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. On or about April 10, 2009, she was arrested, allegedly for leaving
the scene of an accident. Id. After the plaintiff was “suspended from her office as mayor,
the charges were dismissed. Id. ¶ 13.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff’s complaint should set forth “a short and plain statement . . . showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed
factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To show that the plaintiff is “entitled to
relief,” the complaint must provide “more than labels and conclusions,” and “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pled facts
as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . .” Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Notably,
“legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement” do not qualify as well pled facts.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must state “a plausible
claim for relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Stated differently, “where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). Still, Rule 12(b)(6) “does not countenance . . .
dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.” Colon Health
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Centers of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). “A plausible but inconclusive inference from pleaded
facts will survive a motion to dismiss . . . .” Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of Puerto
Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (Souter, J.).
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff first contends that the claim against her, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, should be dismissed because she is a private citizen and did not act pursuant to
any state authority, as that statutory provision requires. It is true that purely private conduct
no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory, is not actionable under
Section 1983 or under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).
Because the United States Constitution regulates only the government, not private parties,
a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that
the challenged conduct constitutes “state action.” See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1002 (1982). To qualify as state action, the conduct in question “must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with
the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S.
at 936–37.
A private individual or entity, however, who jointly participates in alleged
constitutional wrongdoing with a state or local official may be said to have engaged in “state
action,” satisfying that requirement of Section 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,
27-28 (1980). In order to state a cognizable claim that a private individual, such as Woods,
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jointly participated with a state actor to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Plaintiff must
allege: (1) some type of conspiracy, agreement, or concerted action between the state and
the private party; (2) that the state and private party shared common goals; and, (3)
conduct pursuant to the conspiracy, agreement, or concerted action that violated Plaintiff's
federally protected rights. Id.
By the thinnest margin, the plaintiff has alleged that Woods, as one of “the
defendants,” “conspired” and “compact[ed]” with certain government officials to have the
plaintiff removed from office. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11.) She is presumptively included in
references to “the defendants.” See id. The evidence, of course, may show no such
conspiracy or agreement sufficient to invoke Section 1983 against her, but these
allegations satisfy the pleading standard.
For similar reasons, the Court cannot make any determination related to the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act. There is nothing in the Complaint or the briefs of the parties that
explains with whom Woods works or how precisely her conduct was related to
governmental action. She may have been a private citizen acting in concert, as alleged for
purposes of Section 1983, but somehow less than an employee or agent as required by the
Tort Claims Act. There is simply no information on her relationship to the defendants or the
State. Accordingly, no analysis can be made as to the Act’s applicability at this stage. And
Defendant Woods has been sued in her individual capacity.
Likewise, the Court believes that issues of fact exist as to the discovery of the
respective causes of action such that the plaintiff’s arguments in this respect cannot be
resolved on the face of the Complaint.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant Woods’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.
(ECF No. 6.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
September 17, 2015
Greenville, South Carolina
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