Vincent v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court overrules Plaintiff's objections, adopts the Report 22 , and incorporates it herein. Therefore, it is the judgment of the Court Defendant's final decision denying Plaintiff's claims for DIB and DWB is AFFIRMED.IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis on 12/29/2016. (dsto, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
MICHAEL WOODWARD VINCENT,
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-02867-MGL
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS
This is a Social Security appeal in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision
of Defendant denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Disabled Widower’s
Benefits (DWB). The parties are represented by excellent counsel. The matter is before the Court
for review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the United States Magistrate Judge
suggesting to the Court Defendant’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claims for DIB and DWB be
affirmed. The Report was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for
the District of South Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or
recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on December 13, 2016, and Plaintiff filed his
objections on December 27, 2016. The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s objections, but holds
them to be without merit. Therefore, it will enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff filed his application for DIB and DWB on March 4, 2012, asserting his disability
commenced on February 28, 2012.
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which the
ALJ conducted on December 4, 2013. Then, on January 10, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review of the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became Defendant’s final
decision for purposes of judicial review. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, seeking judicial
review of Defendant’s final decision denying his claims.
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process
for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The five steps
are: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant has a medically determinable severe impairment(s); (3) whether such impairment(s) meets
or equals an impairment set forth in the Listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevents the
claimant from returning to his past relevant work; and, if so, (5) whether the claimant is able to
perform other work as it exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(v),
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court is required to conduct a de novo review of those
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report to which a specific objection has been made. The Court
need not conduct a de novo review, however, “when a party makes general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the [Magistrate Judge’s] proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Thus, the Court will address each specific objection to the Report in turn. As
provided above, however, the Court need not–and will not–address any of Plaintiff’s arguments that
fail to point the Court to alleged specific errors the Magistrate Judge made in the Report.
It is Plaintiff’s duty to both produce evidence and prove he is disabled under the Act. See
Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). And, it is the duty of the ALJ, not this Court,
to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,
1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Under the substantial evidence standard, however, the Court must view the
entire record as a whole. See Steurer v. Bowen, 815 F.2d, 1249, 1250 (8th Cir. 1987).
“Additionally, the substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts. An administrative
decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an
opposite decision.” Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). Likewise, when considering a Social
Security disability claim, it is not the province of this Court to “reweigh conflicting evidence . . . or
substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir.
2005) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (alteration omitted). The Court “must sustain the ALJ’s
decision, even if [it] disagree[s] with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff raises two specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. The Court will
address each one in turn.
First, Plaintiff asserts the Magistrate Judge erred by accepting the ALJ’s allegedly
conclusory statement regarding the combined effect of Plaintiff’s multiple impairments. ECF No.
24 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiff avers the Magistrate Judge failed to point out exactly where the ALJ
conducted this analysis within his decision, citing Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff insists the lack of a detailed discussion of how Plaintiff’s combined impairments affect him
is particularly significant given his diagnoses of hypochondriasis and somatization disorder. The
Court is unpersuaded.
Importantly, Walker was not intended to be used as a trap for the Commissioner; rather, the
adequacy requirement of Walker is met if it is clear from the decision as a whole the ALJ considered
the combined effect of a claimant’s impairments. Thus, there have been instances in which this
Court has affirmed an appeal in which the ALJ could have done a better job explaining his decision
because, when the opinion was read as a whole, the Court was able to take the ALJ at her or his
word that she or he had properly analyzed the issue. See, e.g., Sims v. Colvin, Civil Action No.
0:14-1663-MGL-PJG, 2015 WL 5525096, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2015) (“[T]he Court is satisfied
that, when the ALJ’s opinion is read as a whole, it is clear that he considered the combined effect
of Plaintiff s combined impairments.”). Further, the Court’s “general practice, which [it] see[s] no
reason to depart from here, is to take a lower tribunal at its word when it declares that it has
considered a matter.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005). Additionally, to
the extent the ALJ could have done a better job in explaining his decision, “if the [ALJ’s] decision
is overwhelmingly supported by the record though the agency’s original opinion failed to marshal
that support, then remanding is a waste of time.” Bishop v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App’x 65,
67 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is such a case. The ALJ’s decision,
when read as a whole, convinces this Court he properly considered the evidence of the effect of
Plaintiff’s combined impairments, “and the ALJ’s decision is [so] overwhelmingly supported by the
record . . . [that] remanding is a waste of time.” Id. Hence, because this Court is of the firm opinion
the ALJ properly considered and explained his consideration of Plaintiff’s impairments in
combination, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s first objection.
Second, Plaintiff urges the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending the ALJ made an
appropriate determination of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC). ECF No. 24 at 3.
Plaintiff claims the ALJ neglected to account for Plaintiff’s mental health limitations in the RFC.
The Court disagrees.
“An ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ’s failure to cite
specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered.” Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436
(8th Cir. 2000). But, the “ALJ may not select and discuss only that evidence that favors his ultimate
conclusion, but must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the evidence to allow the .
. . [C]ourt to trace the path of his reasoning.” Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (4th Cir. 1995). That
said, although the ALJ “must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his]
conclusion,” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001), the Court “will nonetheless
give the opinion a commonsensical reading rather than nitpicking at it,” Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d
363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As already noted, “the substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within
which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts. An administrative
decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an
opposite decision.” Clarke, 843 F.2d at 272-73. The Court “must sustain the ALJ’s decision, even
if [it] disagree[s] with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Smith,
99 F.3d at 638. Where, as here, the ALJ discussed medical and nonmedical evidence leading to his
RFC assessment for Plaintiff, specifically addressing each of Plaintiff’s impairments and giving him
every benefit of the doubt in limiting him to light work and restricting him from exposure to work
hazards, the Court holds the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ
adequately explained the RFC analysis.
Here, “[c]ertainly, the ALJ could have done a better job in explaining the bases for finding
that [Plaintiff] is not disabled under the Act. But, the fact that the ALJ could have offered a more
thorough explanation for [his] decision does not change [the Court’s] conclusion that substantial
evidence in the record supports that decision.” See Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x 264, 276 (4th Cir.
2015). Therefore, discerning no legal error, and holding the ALJ’s decision on this issue is
supported by substantial evidence, the Court will overrule this objection as well.
In sum, the Court holds there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion Plaintiff
was not disabled under the Act during the relevant time period and the ALJ’s decision is free from
reversible legal error. Further, the determination is reasonable.
After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case under the standard set forth
above, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections, adopts the Report, and incorporates it herein.
Therefore, it is the judgment of the Court Defendant’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claims for
DIB and DWB is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 29th day of December, 2016, in Columbia, South Carolina.
s/ Mary Geiger Lewis
MARY GEIGER LEWIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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