Singleton v. Westen et al

Filing 55

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Dkt. No. 39 . It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 22 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 7/22/2013. (mcot, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
Jules M. Singleton,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Lt. Donald Westen, Sgt. Jennines1
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)
Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

Civil Action No.: 5-12-cv-02226-JMC
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is now before the court upon the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) [Dkt. No. 39], filed on June 5, 2013, recommending that
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 22] be granted in part and denied in part.
This case arises out of a complaint filed by Plaintiff Jules M. Singleton (“Plaintiff”), a
state prisoner currently in custody at the Kershaw Correctional Institution in Kershaw, South
Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lieutenant Donald Weston (“Lt. Weston”) and
Sergeant Pharish Jeannis (“Sgt. Jeannis”), both officials at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center
where Plaintiff was being held as a pre-trial detainee, used excessive force in violation of
Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends
that summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against Lt. Weston and that summary
judgment be denied as to Plaintiff’s claim against Sgt. Jeannis. The Report sets forth in detail
the relevant facts and legal standards on this matter, and the court incorporates the Magistrate
Judge’s Report herein without a recitation.

Defendants are identified correctly as Lt. Donald Weston and Sgt. Pharish Jeannis in
Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. [Dkt. No. 22-1].
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate
Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive
weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are made, and
the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
DISCUSSION
In this case, both parties filed specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. The
court first addresses Defendants’ Objections to the Report and Recommendation 2 [Dkt. No. 42].
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that summary judgment be denied
as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Sgt. Jeannis, including the Magistrate Judge’s
determination that Sgt. Jeannis is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The incident at issue happened as Plaintiff, who was handcuffed and shackled at the time,
was being escorted by Defendants to the shower. Plaintiff claims that he was directed to and did
comply with an order from Sgt. Jeannis to lift his right leg so that Sgt. Jeannis could remove the
shackle from his ankle. Plaintiff alleges that when he did so, Sgt. Jeannis snatched the chain
connected to the other shackle, which was still attached to Plaintiff’s left ankle, causing
Plaintiff’s feet to be pulled out from under him and causing him to fall onto his head. Because

Although Defendants do not object to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim is not barred by the holdings in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) and Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the court finds that the Magistrate Judge was correct in
reaching this determination.
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Plaintiff was also handcuffed at the time, Plaintiff was unable to break his fall. Plaintiff alleges
that the fall briefly rendered him unconscious and that he was not provided with medical
attention until two days later. Prison medical records confirm that Plaintiff was treated for mild
head injury. Plaintiff asserts that he complied with all of Defendants’ instructions prior to the
incident.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff turned combative and refused the order that he lift his leg
so that Sgt. Jeannis could remove the shackle. Defendants further assert that a reasonable
amount of force was used to defend against Plaintiff’s combativeness and to bring Plaintiff to the
floor and into compliance with Sgt. Jeannis’s commands. In their Objections to the Report,
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence, other than the fact of his injury,
that Sgt. Jeannis acted with any intent to harm Plaintiff, arguing instead that Plaintiff’s
allegations amount to nothing more than an accident or, at best, mere negligence. See Davidson
v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) (a government official’s negligence in causing injury
“does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was
designed to prevent.”)

The Magistrate Judge found that it could not be determined as a matter of law that

Defendants actions were “applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” rather
than undertaken “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
40 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). Resolution of that issue requires a determination of
which party’s version of events were more credible. Summary judgment is not appropriately
granted when the material facts are conflicting and the resolution of those conflicting facts
requires the court to make credibility determinations. See Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458,
460 (4th Cir. 1979).

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The Magistrate Judge further found that Sgt. Jeannis was not entitled to qualified
immunity. In analyzing Sgt. Jeannis’s claim for qualified immunity, the Magistrate Judge
properly considered 1) whether the facts that Plaintiff has put forth, and viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, constitute a violation of a constitutional right and 2) whether the right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232 (2009). There is no dispute that the right to be free from the excessive use of force was
clearly established at the time of the incident. However, since facts remain in dispute about
whether Sgt. Jeannis’s use of force was excessive as Plaintiff claims or justified as Defendants
claim, the Magistrate Judge properly found that summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity was not appropriate given the material facts in dispute. The court agrees, and accepts
the Magistrates Judge’s recommendation that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Sgt. Jeannis be denied.
The court next addresses Plaintiff’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation 3 [Dkt.
No. 44]. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that summary
judgment be granted in favor of Lt. Weston on the grounds that Lt. Weston cannot be liable as a
supervisory official for the alleged use of excessive force by his subordinate, Sgt. Jeannis.
In his Objections, Plaintiff asserts that, because Lt. Weston was present at the time of the
incident, assisted Sgt. Jeannis during the course of events, and failed to correct Sgt. Jeannis’s
behavior, “an affirmative causal link exists between [Lt. Weston’s] inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered” by Plaintiff in this case. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th

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Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was titled “Response to
Summary Judgment With A Counter Claim and with Plaintiff Summary Judgment.” [Dkt. No.
32]. To the extent Plaintiff’s Response included his own Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Magistrate Judge denied such motion as untimely, as it was filed well past the deadline for
dispositive motions. Plaintiff does not object to this finding, and the court agrees with this
ruling.
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Cir. 1994). The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Plaintiff presented no evidence that
Lt. Weston acted personally in the alleged assault or that Lt. Weston anticipated or could have
anticipated the alleged assault. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984) (a
supervisor cannot “reasonably be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his
properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct”).
Therefore, the court agrees that Lt. Weston cannot be held liable as a matter of law and that
summary judgment should be granted as to him.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judges Report and
Recommendation [Dkt. No. 39].

It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 22] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
July 22, 2013
Greenville, South Carolina

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