Williams v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 34

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 27 Report and Recommendation, affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Honorable Timothy M. Cain on 02/07/2014. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
Charles Jackson Williams,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Carolyn W. Colvin,1
Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5:12-2593-TMC

ORDER

Plaintiff Charles Jackson Williams (“Williams”) brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (“SSA”). This matter is before the court
for review of the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of the United States Magistrate Judge,
made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C.,
concerning the disposition of social security cases in this district. (ECF No. 27.)2 The Report
recommends affirming the decision of the Commissioner to deny benefits. The court adopts the
Report and affirms the denial of benefits.

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Carolyn W . Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on February 14, 2013.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Colvin should be substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the
defendant in this action.

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The magistrate judge’s recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final
determination remains with the United States District Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The
court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is
made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate
judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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I. Background
In June 2009, Williams filed an application for DIB and SSI, alleging that he became
unable to work on April 14, 2008, due to due to anxiety, depression, obsessive compulsive
disorder, ADHD, and blood pressure problems. His application was denied initially and on
reconsideration. Williams requested a review by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and a
hearing was held before an ALJ on February 1, 2011.
On February 23, 2011, the ALJ denied Williams’ claims finding him not disabled under
the SSA. The ALJ found that Williams suffered from the following serious impairments:
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression, and anxiety. However, the ALJ found that
Williams’ impairments did not meet or were not medically equal to the criteria for any of the
listed impairments. The ALJ then proceeded to assess Williams’ residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). The ALJ found that Williams could perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels with certain limitations. The ALJ found Williams could not return to his past relevant
work, but could perform other jobs in existence in the national economy in significant numbers
and, therefore, denied his claims.
On July 12, 2012, the Appeals Council, after considering additional information, declined
to review the ALJ’s decision. Williams filed this action for judicial review on September 20,
2012. In the Report, the magistrate judge sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which
are incorporated here by reference. Williams filed objections to the Report on December 2, 2013
(ECF No. 29), and the Commissioner filed a response to those objections on December 16, 2013
(ECF No. 31). This matter is now ripe for review.

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II. Standard of Review
The federal judiciary has a limited role in the administrative scheme established by the
SSA. Section 405(g) of the Act provides, “the findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence has been defined . . . as more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). This standard
precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court’s findings for
those of the Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971). Thus, in its review,
the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations,
or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996).
However, “[f]rom this it does not follow . . . that the findings of the administrative
agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates
more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative agency.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d
278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). Rather, “the courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give
careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the
[Commissioner’s] findings, and that this conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
III. Analysis
In his objections, Williams contends that the magistrate judge erred by: 1) finding that
the ALJ’s decision regarding Williams’ mental impairments was supported by substantial
evidence; 2) finding that the ALJ properly treated the opinions of Drs. Cole and Mullen’s; 3)
finding that the ALJ properly explained her credibility determination and her findings are

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supported by substantial evidence; and 4) failing to address Plaintiff’s argument regarding the
VE’s testimony as to limitations as to pace.
1) Mental Impairments
As to his mental impairments, Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge erred in
determining that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. (Objections at 1-3).
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (and the magistrate judge) ignored evidence that
Plaintiff was unable to take care of his personal hygiene and successfully shop with his mother
and failed to address Plaintiff’s obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”) behavior. Id. at 2.
However, the magistrate judge did address these issues. (Report at 16-17). The magistrate judge
found the evidence that Plaintiff was unable to manage his personal care which is cited by
Plaintiff is limited to one-time occurrences. (Report at 16). The magistrate judge then cited to
Plaintiff’s testimony that he was able to take care of his personal hygiene. Id.
Further, as to Plaintiff’s inability to shop, the magistrate judge noted that the ALJ found
Plaintiff was able to shop with his mother and had moderate difficulties in social functioning.
(Report at 17).

The magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff had

moderate limitations in social functioning was supported by substantial evidence. Id. The
magistrate judge cited cases holding that the ALJ is not required to provide a written evaluation
of every piece of evidence, but need only minimally articulate her reasoning between the
evidence and her conclusions. (Report at 18). The court agrees.
An ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence in the record, so long as a
reviewing court can determine from the opinion “what the ALJ did and why he did it.” Piney
Mountain Coal Co. v. Mays, 176 F.3d 753, 762 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lane Hollow Coal
Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 137 F.3d 799, 803 (4th Cir. 1998)) (holding that

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an ALJ's duty to explain his findings and conclusions on all material issues of fact or law is
satisfied when a reviewing court can determine, from an ALJ's opinion and the evidence of
record, how he reached his conclusion). The function of this court is not to reweigh the evidence
in the record. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir.1986). Rather, this court is to
determine whether, upon review of the whole record, the Commissioner's decision is supported
by substantial evidence and a proper application of the law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,
1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
At the hearing, Plaintiff testified his mother has sent him to the grocery store and he has
had to leave groceries in the cart because of a panic attack. (R. 55). He testified he drove with
his mother to the hearing and his mother gives him “that kind of little extra peace . . . or
confidence.” (R. 65). Plaintiff also testified he was able to take care of his personal hygiene (R.
56-57), but he has gone as long as a week without bathing. (R. 67). He testified that after his
first marriage ended, he lived by himself for a year, and the dirty dishes accumulated to the point
that he placed them in the bath tub to soak. (R.66 ).
The ALJ stated Plaintiff was able to drive and shop with his mother. (R. 18). In
assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ took into account that Plaintiff “goes to stores at odd hours,
when few people are around, and sometimes leaves due to anxiety” (R. 20). The ALJ limited
Plaintiff’s interactions with others due to his anxiety. Id. The ALJ also noted Plaintiff was able
to shop, although he has had panic attacks on occasion. Id. As for Plaintiff’s OCD, the court
does not find that the ALJ erred where the record lacks evidence of more severe functional
limitations stemming from his OCD. Moreover, the ALJ also accounted for Plaintiff’s OCD in
the RFC.

As the magistrate judge found, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence.

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2) Medical Opinions
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly explain how Dr. Cole’s opinion, which
the ALJ accorded significant weight, was incorporated into Plaintiff’s RFC. (Objections at 3).
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Cole found that he had moderate difficulties with
concentration which would decrease in a work situation due to his anxiety. Id. at 4. However, in
regard to Dr. Cole’s opinion, the ALJ stated that “[t]o the extent it is consistent with the [RFC]
determination, the undersigned gives this opinion significant weight in limiting the claimant to
simple, repetitive, non-paced work due to his concentration and focus problems and limiting his
interactions with others due to his anxiety.” (R. 19).
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the ALJ’s
reasons for granting less weight to Dr. Mullen’s opinion are supported by substantial evidence.
(Objections at 4-5). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to explain how Dr.
Mullen’s opinion contrasts sharply with the other evidence. Id. at 4. Reviewing the Report, the
court agrees with the magistrate judge’s analysis and conclusion that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
3) Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff argues that while the magistrate judge found that the ALJ explained her findings
regarding the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s credibility, the magistrate judge erred by failing
to address Plaintiff’s concerns that the ALJ’s credibility findings are not supported by the
evidence.

(Objections at 5).

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ cherry-picked

evidence in her evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility. Id. While Plaintiff is correct that an ALJ
may not pick and choose only the evidence that supports a particular position, it does not appear
that the ALJ did so in this instance. Reviewing the Report, the court agrees with the magistrate

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judge’s analysis and conclusion that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
4) Vocational Expert’s Testimony
Plaintiff contends that he has submitted evidence that he has moderate difficulties with
concentration, persistence, and pace, and these moderate difficulties would worsen in a job
situation and the vocational expert (“VE”) testified that if Plaintiff’s pace was interfered with
even on an occasional basis, there would be no work which Plaintiff could perform. (Objections
5-6). Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge erred by failing to address the VE’s testimony
regarding limitations as to pace. (Objections at 6). Reviewing the Report, the court agrees that
the magistrate judge did not address this particular issue. However, to be fair, Plaintiff raised
this specific issue in his brief under his argument about the ALJ’s treatment of the medical
opinions, specifically Dr. Cole’s opinion. (ECF No. 19 at 30; Pl.’s Br. at 30). In any event, the
court finds it is without merit.
In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform work which is pace
oriented. (R. 18). Plaintiff’s counsel questioned the VE regarding whether an individual working
as an industrial cleaner would have to “maintain some type of production and pace.” (R. 87).
The VE responded that an individual working as an industrial cleaner would have to maintain
pace, but such a position does not involve fast paced work. (R. 87-88). Plaintiff’s counsel
continued stating that the ALJ’s hypothetical included the limitation that the position not be face
paced and he questioned whether there was a pace involved in the position of industrial cleaner.
(R. 88). The VE responded that in that position, a person would have “to keep up with certain
standards,” and “follow certain rules and regulations.” (R. 88). Plaintiff’s counsel than asked
the VE what would his answer be if he added to the hypothetical that the person’s pace would be

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interfered with on an occasional basis such that it would be below what [is] considered a normal
production pace,” and the VE responded that there would be no work. (Id.)
The court finds that the limitation which Plaintiff’s counsel included is different than
what the ALJ included in his limitations. In questioning the VE, the ALJ included the limitation
of a job “that’s not pace oriented, like coming down the line and somebody else depending on
me.” (R. 80-81). Maintaining some type of production and pace and complying with rules and
regulations is entirely different than a pace oriented position on an assembly line. The latter is
production-rate pace, while the former is goal-oriented pace. Here, the hypothetical question
posed to the VE by Plaintiff’s counsel included an additional limitation. Lee v. Sullivan, 945
F.2d 689, 698–94 (4th Cir.1991) (noting that a requirement introduced by claimant's counsel in a
question to the VE “was not sustained by the evidence, and the vocational expert's testimony in
response to the question was without support in the record”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument
is without merit.
After a thorough review of the record, the court adopts the Report and the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge

February 7, 2014
Anderson, South Carolina

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